Archive for the ‘Spirituality’ Category

How much for that spiritual practice in the window?

Saturday, January 6th, 2007

The issue of selfless service has come up which raises another question for me. Marko emphasized that we must not have a goal in mind when performing it, that we must give this service freely. And this has traditionally been the way religion or spirituality has worked, those teaching it in a church or monastary give the teachings away. Granted money is needed to run the church or monastary, but money is never asked for; it is accepted by donation only. And with these donations said religious or spiritual institutions have always managed to make financial ends meet.

Now it seems, at least in the “west,” that there are fixed fees for the teaching of spiritual lessons; it’s become a business. This is part goes back to the issue of category error, that religion or spirituality is not to be conflated with business. But for the purpose of this blog we might focus on selfless service, in giving freely from our heart with no expectation of compensation of any kind.

So is it proper to charge any amount of money, even a sliding fee scale, for teaching “spiritual practice?” Even if one chooses to make it one’s livlihood, as some priests or monks do? In the latter case it’s always been, as I noted, traditional to only accept donations with no expectation. And to accept zero compensation if that’s what’s given. So is the tradition of dana outdated in a modern capitalistic society where we need to make money? Or should the making of money be separate from the giving of spiritual service? Or what?

Is self-transformation self-centered?

Monday, January 1st, 2007

http://www.explorefaith.org/oasis/art/meditation.html 

The following excerpt is from a book review by Mark D. Wood of “Healing deconstruction: Postmodern thought in Buddhism and Christianity” edited by David Loy. It seems Wood’s critiques could equally apply to the main preoccupations in the emerging integral worldview?

The following constitute the principal limitations of their work. First, by making the transformation of the self the primary, if not sole, prerequisite for the creation of a “new way of relating to the world,” these authors reduce this project to a matter of individual conversion or, in secular terms, psychotherapy. Second, each author theorizes suffering as being primarily, if not entirely, an effect of discursive, cognitive, and especially philosophical conditions of existence. In doing so, they theorize suffering in fundamentally idealist terms. Suffering is caused, for example, by dualistic thinking, the metaphysics of presence, and the idea of the autonomous self. Third, and closely related to the second limitation, as a result of their assumptions regarding the discursive, cognitive, and philosophical causes of suffering, none of the authors investigates the role that particular institutions and structures may play in terms of causing people to suffer today. In short, their position is idealist and ahistorical. For these authors, suffering and healing have been and forever remain essentially epistemological, rather than sociological, problems. Fourth, and finally, I would suggest that these limitations characterize a mode of academic intellectual practice that remains alienated from most, especially working class, “selves.” Ensconced like secular monks in close-knit circles of professional associations, intellectuals rarely connect their scholarship and pedagogy to the needs and concerns of “selves” who suffer not from “dualism,” the idea of the “autonomous self,” belief in “inherent existence,” or a conception of “healing as holism,” but rather from the absence of empowering conditions of labor and life. Unless academic intellectuals working to develop a more “holistic praxis ” engage with life beyond the academy, their work will at most result in absolution therapy for middle-class scholars, while those who make the luxuries of reading and writing philosophy possible will continue to suffer.

With the exception of Magliola, all of the authors identify dualistic thinking and the autonomous self as principal causes of suffering and barriers that must be overcome to heal a wounded world. Each of the authors elaborates strategies for deconstructing dualistic thinking and the autonomous self.

Transforming institutions and the “self” are, of course, intrinsically related to each other. You cannot transform one without transforming the other. If it is the case, as I believe that it is, that “the self” produces and is more profoundly a product of institutionalized social, political, and economic relations, then transforming the self requires transforming these relations. This does not mean abandoning the work of criticizing different conceptions of the self. Rather it means exposing the linkages between different conceptions of the self and the practical relations out of which the former develop so that we may acquire a better understanding of what must be done to build a society in which, for example, “humanitarian selves” would flourish naturally.

Unfortunately, none of the authors in this volume investigates the connections between ideas and institutions. In addition to the problem of formulating the work of healing as primarily a matter of self- transformation, each of these authors assumes that suffering is primarily, if not solely, caused by ideas.

There is, however, no necessary relationship between altering our mental perceptions and transforming the objective arrangement of “things” and “people” in the world (e.g., the unequal distribution of privileges, property, and power). In making this point, I assume a philosophical position that is not shared by the authors of Healing Deconstruction: namely, that there is a difference between the way we see, represent, imagine, talk, and write about reality and reality in itself. In short, I assume that being and consciousness, subjectivity and objectivity, discursive and extra-discursive conditions of existence are linked to and yet fundamentally non-identical with each other. The world is heterogeneous to our sensually derived/mentally constructed ideas about the world.

With the exception of Joy, the authors in this volume either explicitly reduce extra-subjective to subjective conditions of existence or simply assume the latter encompasses the former in what amounts to a totalizing anthropomorphism of a most embarrassing kind. Thus, while they are critical of anthropomorphism, they nevertheless collapse objective into subjective conditions of existence.

But is it really the case that words, ideas, and concepts are the cause of suffering? Are the Ogoni fighting to protect their land from Shell Oil destructive operations in Nigeria, African Americans contesting police brutality in New York City, and women struggling to improve their lives in El Salvador ultimately struggling against the wrong enemy? Is their tendency to think dualistically and believe in the autonomous self as the root source of the problems they confront? Were the bombs that rained on Yugoslavia, killing thousands of citizens, a consequence of thinking according to deadened categories, metaphysical binaries, and “mind-forg’d manacles?” Perhaps. But the links between these ways of thinking and social, and political, economic, and military forces that are so obviously implicated in human suffering must be demonstrated and not merely asserted or assumed. Not surprisingly, as I detail below, the authors in this work do not clarify these linkages as their projects remain within the comfortable limits of philosophy alone.

Not only do each of the authors reduce objective to subjective conditions of determination and freedom, they also, and as indicated above, explain suffering as being primarily, if not solely, caused by the mistaken epistemological assumption that reality or some aspect of reality is not subject to difference. Oddly enough, in making this argument, the same authors who critique essentialist thinking posit a concept of suffering in which its source remains essentially the same throughout all time and in this way, the solution to suffering has nothing to do with the material differences between one period, place, or society and another. The defenders of difference, in other words, remain oddly indifferent to historical differences.

It is not private ownership of health care resources and their allocation according to the law of profitmaking that leaves so many in need of healing. Nor is it corporate-driven degradation of the environment that leaves nature in a state of toxic shock. Rather, it turns out that what caused suffering during the time of Gotama the Buddha in the fifth century b.c.e., Hui-neng in the sixth century c.e., Dogen in the twelfth century c.e., Eckhart in the thirteenth century c.e. is the same as what causes suffering during our own time. The cause was and remains “dualistic thinking,” belief in “inherent existence,” “an autonomous self,” “healing as holism,” etc. We just keep making the same ontological blunder over and over.

In place of analyzing social, political, economic, and military forces that are responsible for the “[r]acism, sexism, and classism [that] pervade our social structures in ways that damage the lives of billions of people,” these authors remain within the limits of the onto-theological tradition (p. 71). While each of the authors is concerned with translating erudite theory into healing practice, they do not analyze the social, political, and economic relations which are materially cogenerative of “the self.” I would suggest that a more fruitful analysis of suffering ought to examine not only the historically and socially specific ideas and concepts that cause human beings to suffer but also, and as importantly, the social, political, and economic institutions and relations that reinforce and are reinforced by these ideas and concepts. Such an analysis might, for example, expose the ways in which the existing division of labor, property, and power reinforce “dualistic thinking” and belief in the concept of the “autonomous self.” In this way, the philosophical critique of dualistic thinking and the autonomous self would become a political critique of the social relations that give rise to dualistic thinking and belief in the concept of the autonomous self. Such an analysis assumes that the problems posed by dualistic thinking and the autonomous self cannot be solved philosophically. Solving these problems also means building institutions that support, for example, integrated thinking and a relational concept of the self.

To accomplish this end, however, requires translating philosophical categories into sociological categories, for example, translating the problem posed philosophically as the problem of “the self” into a problem regarding social, political, and economic conditions that structure the relationships between different “selves”…What is needed, then, is not only a “new vision of things” and concept of self. What is also needed is a different mode of organizing our practical relationships with each other. To realize this goal requires not only interpreting the world differently, but participating in the work of transforming the social relations reflected in and reinforced by our theoretical concepts.

The failure to engage with extra-philosophical conditions of human existence perhaps explains why these authors are left with little more than gestures toward something called transformative practice.

Perhaps their failure to examine extraphilosophical causes of suffering partially explains why the theme of dualism (or separation) between the self and the world is so prominent among their concerns. Perhaps this concern tells us more about their particular circumstances than it does about the nature of “the human condition.” Indeed, and as indicated in my introduction, I would suggest that their work is symptomatic of a certain mode of intellectual practice which is not only alienated from most human beings (and no doubt their own) extraphilosophical needs, problems, and concerns but also pessimistic regarding the possibility of building anything like a genuinely democratic, just, and peaceful global society. But the struggle to build such a society is, as indicated above, underway everywhere around the world and in this regard, I would argue that intellectuals concerned with healing ought to link their work to individuals and organizations struggling to improve their material and spiritual conditions of life. In short, it “requires a move from theorizing to practice” (p. 10). Anything less reduces healing to a purely academic endeavor.

Abuse of enlightenment? Enlightened abuse?

Tuesday, December 26th, 2006

It seems a new thread has emerged from an old one so I copied and pasted here. You know my thoughts on enlighenment are “bah humbug” so I’ll stay out of this one. 

  • Andy Smith Says:
    “I’m not saying people shouldn’t study and discuss his works, but just that (for me at least, others may feel differently!) it is limiting if that is the only thing that is studied, since he is not an Enlightened being. It means that one remains stuck in the realm of the relative intellect.”

    And you are saying that Aurobindo was an enlightened being, that you know this for certain? Or that you know that anyone discussed in this forum is/was enlightened?

  • alan kazlev Says:
    Andy asked

    And you are saying that Aurobindo was an enlightened being, that you know this for certain?

    Yes. And The Mother too

    This is evident from

    o The authoritory with which and about which they wrote or spoke (KW in contrast always uses second hand sources when discussing these matters, so do I. However this argument in itself is not persuasive because an Intermediate Zone guru also speaks with authority and direct experience)
    o The anecdotes of those who knew them
    o Most importantly, and in addition to the above two points, there has not been a single case of them abusing their position. This is in contrats to the “intermediate zone” gurus who have only partial enlightenment, but speak witha uthority and have dedicated followers whose lives were transformed. But the IZ guru will almost always in some way absue their position. The authentic and totally enlightened being never will. (If they ever do, they aren’t totally enlightened). This si one reason why I have become so interested in the subject of abyusive and ambiguous gurus of late, it is teh real acid test concerning who is truly genuine and who not.

    Or that you know that anyone discussed in this forum is/was enlightened?

    Sri Ramana, although apart from me no-one here has discussed him here (or if they have, sorry, hard leeping track of everything lol!). For the same three reasons as given re S.A. Marko has also mentioned A.H. Almaas; I don’t know enough about him, but if he passes the above three points then I would concede he is too.

    I would add a fourth agument in both cases, but this is not much use for you as it is meant only for me: To me they each have an authentic presence about them (however I concede I have in the past been fooled by intermediate zone gurus, that is why i say my intimations on this matter should not be taken as authoritative). Ultimately you yourself in your innermost being have to decide who is authentic, and even then be careful not to be sidetracked by rationalisations or intermediate zone glamour.

    I understand Andy that these arguments are not persuasive to the external rational mind. But you yourself have acknowledged there are states of consciousness beyond that.

  • ray harris Says:
    I know this is getting off track but in reading Alan’s reply I wondered if ‘abusing’ their position was ever and objective thing. I’ve been researching child abuse for my novel and one thing is clear, abuse is culturally conditioned. That is, what is considered abuse in one culture is not considered abuse in another. It reminds me of the fuss over swami Muktananda, specifically the claim that he sexually abused young girls. Now as far as I’m aware Muktananda did have sex with female disciples but there are a number of inconsistancies and cultural clashes. The first inconsistancy is that some female disciples have come forward to say that they consented and that they regarded the experience as spiritually powerful, but others have come forward to say they regretted the experience. The next problem, and the one germane to my point, is that the youngest ‘victim’ was supposed to be 14, which by Western standards is ‘child’ abuse but by traditional Indian standards is not, particularly considering that in the widespread devadasi system the devadasi was initiated by a priest (or guru) just before or after her first period. I should also add that the worst account I had read of Muktananda’s abuse was contained in a book by a fundamentalist Christian convert who after conversion regarded her Hindu experiences as the time she had been tempted by Satan.

    So, by what standards do we define abuse? Given for instance, that in Autobiography of a Yogi the famous Babaji asks a disciple to jump off a cliff and kill himself, whereby he is bought back to life? This story being to illustrate the degree of surrender required from a true disciple.

  • alan kazlev Says:
    Hi Ray

    You’ve probably seen this

    * Caldwell, Sarah The Heart of the Secret: A Personal and Scholarly Encounter with Shakta Tantrism in Siddha Yoga. (pdf)

    Apparently Muktananda had one teaching for his outer circle, which was celibate etc, another (based on Kaula Tantra) for his inner circle, and Cauldwell argues that his sexual activities have to be seen in this light.

    But it is one thing to do something like this as part of a traditional culture in which both partners are willing and knowledgable participants; in Muktanada’s case this wasn’t so. And while some girls thought it was a lark, others were freaked out by Muktananda’s advances. Add to that the conspiracy of silence, threats of violence, Muktanada’s temper, etc etc. See this account and this account.

    The thing is, I really like Muktananda, and always have. I get a really nice vibe from him. I’m sure he had many wonderful virtues. But the thing is, he clearly wasn’t an enlightened being. I class him as an “intermediate zone guru”, in which the explerience of enlightenment is combined with the persistence of lower and self-seeking tendencies.

  • From Ignorance to a larger Integral Wholeness, Power, and Truth

    Monday, December 18th, 2006

    The following passage by Sri Aurobindo (from The Life Divine Book 2, ch.19 “Out Of the Sevenfold Ignorance to the Sevenfold Knowledge”, was posted by Tusar on his Savitri Era Open Forum blog.  It may be pertinent to the current discussion of what the Integral Movement stands for and what its goals are.  Please note that I have added the italics to highlight what I consider points of relevance to the present discussion; they aren’t in the original.

    This evolution, this process of heightening and widening and integralisation, is in its nature a growth and an ascent out of the sevenfold ignorance into the integral knowledge. The crux of that ignorance is the constitutional; it resolves itself into a manifold ignorance of the true character of our becoming, an unawareness of our total self, of which the key is a limitation by the plane we inhabit and by the present predominant principle of our nature. The plane we inhabit is the plane of Matter; the present predominant principle in our nature is the mental intelligence with the sense-mind, which depends upon Matter, as its support and pedestal. As a consequence, the preoccupation of the mental intelligence and its powers with the material existence as it is shown to it through the senses, and with life as it has been formulated in a compromise between life and matter, is a special stamp of the constitutional Ignorance. This natural materialism or materialised vitalism, this clamping of ourselves to our beginnings, is a form of self-restriction narrowing the scope of our existence which is very insistent on the human being. It is a first necessity of his physical existence, but is afterwards forged by a primal ignorance into a chain that hampers his every step upwards: the attempt to grow out of this limitation of the wholeness, power and truth of the spirit by the materialised mental intelligence and out of this subjection of the soul to material Nature is the first step towards a real progress of our humanity.

    Wilberians and postmodernists may take exception to the metaphysical language. In that case you need only replace the words used here with terms you feel more appropriate, e.g. you can replace “material plane” with “gross realm”, it amounts to the same thing.

    The concept of the  “materialised mental intelligence” and the self-limitation of being though infatuation with the mental sphere and the material world is however an important one.  Elsewhere (e.g. in Letters on Yoga) Sri Aurobindo refers to this as the “physical mind”.  It is the sceptical intellect that can only accept what is seen and proven empirically, and has difficulty with or rejects concepts pertaining to larger realities.  It is necessary to overcome this limited outlook, and it doesn’t matter whether it is done intellectually through being receptive to esoteric writings and concepts, intuitively through contemplation of the Self and development of insight, dialectically through Nagarjuna or Derrida, yogically through meditation or devotional aspiration (bhakti), or integrally through a heightening or widening of the entire being, because all these practices have a role to play.

    As the quoted passage shows, at issue is growing and evolving beyond self-imposed boundaries to a greater knowledge, power, and wholeness.  In this paragraph, Sri Aurobindo incorporates and integrates the mystic and the evolutionary, the traditional yogas and the modern conception of progress.

    An Integral Approach to Enlightenment and beyond.

    Saturday, November 25th, 2006


    I’ve recently become very interested in Sri Ramana Majarshi, whom I contacted via Gangaji.  See my Integral Transformations blog for more.  As a result I find myself feeling the non-contradiction between the respective revelations of Maharshi and Sri Aurobindo.

    On the mental level, it is hard to find two “vedantic” teachers more dissimilar.  One teaches transcendence, the other affirms the reality of the world.  One is the culmination of the ancient heritage of Advaita, the other a completely new revelation that equally incorporates insights of modernity and of Vedic tradition.  The irony of it is that these two spiritual giants were contemporaries, and lived practically next door to each other (only 100 km or so apart), yet never met.  The following comments are by Charles Ismael Flores (see Darshan at the Dharma Crossroads - Exploring the Connection of the Sages Bhagavan Ramana Maharshi and Sri Aurobindo, a highly recommendable introduction to the contrast between these two modern-day avatars and sadgrurus (world teachers)

    “The case of Ramana Maharshi and Sri Aurobindo is one that is unique in modern times. Two of the greatest saints of modern India lived in the same era, what would today be a mere three- and-a-half-hour drive from each other in southern India, the state of Tamil Nadu. Side by side lived the highest modern representative of an ancient yoga, and the lauded progenitor of what has been claimed to be an entirely new yoga…

    Ramana Maharshi came to the holy mountain Arunachala in Tiruvannamalai in 1896 when he was 16 years old, and he reportedly never left the mountain for 54 years.

    Sri Aurobindo fled from Bengal to the French colony of Pondicherry in 1910 due to his revolutionary activities to overthrow British rule. Once there he never left, since at one level, it would have been dangerous- but far more importantly to Sri Aurobindo, he had to focus on his sadhana, or spiritual practice.

    They both died within a few months of each other- Bhagavan Maharshi on 14 April and Sri Aurobindo on 5 December 1950.

    So although Tiruvannamalai and Pondicherry are only 65 miles apart, the political realities of the period and the sages’ own practices prevented a physical encounter.

    What are left are the remembrances of visitors and disciples between the two ashrams. Though it is known that thousands of seekers traversed through both ashrams while both sages were alive, only a few have written about their experiences…

    It perhaps would not be fruitful to compare these two great yogic realizations by the use of hermeneutics, or textual interpretation for meaning. Both yogas are logically compelling for the scholar. Seekers (and also scholars) are ultimately drawn to the aim of the yoga using their own minds and their spiritual experiences. Some may be compelled to choose the yoga that states that life and the world is an illusion, and many others today will be drawn to the yoga that dares to affirm life and the world by transforming it to something that explicitly expresses the full range of divine potentialities in matter. In the personalities of Ramana Maharshi and Sri Aurobindo, we have seen in modern times just a couple of the great choices at the crossroads we must make for ourselves in our rapidly changing world.”

    Charles then provides imaginary (but still instructive) interviews are based upon actual recorded talks and letters with Ramana Maharshi and Sri Aurobindo, and the seekers who came to them. There is of course no recorded talk between the two sages.

    While Charles approaches this subject from the path of mental enquiry (albeit a spiritually inspired mental enquiry), I have come at it from the perspective of the spiritual gnostic.  As I have already mentioned in my essay Towards a Larger Definition of the Integral, it is not possible to understand a sage like Sri Aurobindo by limiting one’s approach to an intellectual study of his writings, immensely illuminating as they may be.  Similarly, the same can be said for Ramana.  If one reads Ramana’s talks and books on a literal level, one is left with a  literalist Adviatism.  An Advaitism expressed through a profound and subtle intellect, and a consciousness of one who talks through direct experience, not just book learning.  Of that there is no doubt.  But it is still literalism.  Thus those students who follow Sri Aurobindo literally, and those who follow Ramana literally, will each be guided safely and surely to the Supreme through the infallible source of the particular revelation they have chosen to follow.  This is the way it has always been.,  But it is not the Integral way.  The Integral Path is about the integration of all teachings and revelations; this is something completely new.

    Here I would like to offer a few preliminary thoughts on this subject; although really this deserves to be elaborated upon in an essay.

    Firstly, as I take care to point out on my blog, there is no contradiction between the spiritual revelations of Ramana and Sri Aurobindo.  That is the my starting point here.  Both are authentic emanations of the Supreme, true gurus, not fakes or half lights stuck in the Intermediate Zone.

    But what about the contradiction on the external level of the dualistic intellect?  Here one is faced with the sort of contradiction Charles discusses in his very informative essay.

    The standard answer in Integral theory would be to resort to the True Truths.   At the level of the Absolute, the revelations are the same.  In the dualistic world they are different.

    Unfortunately this “exoteric” perspective does not match with my experience, nor, I believe , with Reality.  In my experience, the revelations, the Light, of Sri Aurobindo and Ramana are not the same.  They are different.  They are not contradictory, but they are distinct.  With a too facile reliance on a Two Truths monism, diversity is lost and everything is swallowed up in a well-meaning but misguided ecumenicalism, in which the infinite multi-faceted attributes of the Supreme are flattened to some banal uniformity that the tiny human mind can comprehend.

    So no, they are not the same.  But they do not contradict each other either.  And therein lies the paradox.  Which is only a paradox to those limited to either/or Aristotelean logic.

    I would suggest here a number of distinct “realities” or divisions of consciousness, by way of explanation.

    o First there is the world of duality.  This is the outer truth, the exoteric reality, the gross realm, the mental, affective, and physical world.  Also theories such as AQAL fit here

    o Then there are the various subtle and causal realms (to use the Vedantic and Wilberian terminology) of intuition, in which the limitations of the gross realm are transcended, but duality (whether explicate or latent) and polarity remain.  This can be considered the outermost aspect of the Intermediate zone, and the beginning of the esoteric.

    o Beyond the subtle and causal realities is the transcendent, nondual, state or states of enlightenment, the revelations of the various true teachers, and the filtered down and distorted transmissions of the partially enlightened that constitute the bulk of spiritual teachers, but who still do have genuine realisations.  In terms of the Two Truths, this is the Absolute Reality, or at least where the Absolute “begins”, and it is as far as most gurus and seekers go (and many of them do not even get this far).  This level, again the Intermediate Zone, is the region in which there is no contradiction between Ramana and Sri Aurobindo.  Both are valid, both complement, both fit into the larger integral picture, and yet each is still totally sufficient for those of purity and faith who wish to follow only a single Path.

    o Beyond the Intermediate Zone are even greater insights.  I get the smallest hints of these through reading Sri Aurobindo’s opus Synthesis of Yoga, where he speaks of different states of realisation, and their integral convergence.  But that is still as yet, for me, a spiritual-mental state, based on following through the light of the Aurobindonian teachings.  Direct experience of the Source – such as Sri Aurobindo himself had and which he conveyed only partially through the limited medium of words – is something else, infallible, beyond words, beyond the limited understanding of even the spiritual and gnostic outer being.

    And what does this mean for an Integral Spirituality?

    It means that an Integral Spirituality honours all authentic revelations, neither letting itself be mentally limited to the outer form of any one, nor collapsing the infinite diversity of the Supreme into a single simplistic equation like shunya or atman.  Which is not to depreciate Openness or Self, but only to point out that again, these are non-integral revelations and soteriologies.  Which does not make them any less worthy.  But an integral spirituality can experience both, and all, without loss of their uniqueness (e.fg. in this case Buddhist non-essentialism and Vedantic essentialism), without being limited to one, and without forcing them all into the same mould.  It is necessary for experience to embrace all revelations and all possibilities, simultaneously, without contradiction. 

    And doing so, to be transformed.  So that consciousness may attune to, embody, and realise a greater Divinity.  And that again a greater one still.

    Only then will we have a true Integral Spirituality.

    The God delusion

    Sunday, October 29th, 2006

    My blog writing has slowed because I’m now well into my novel. My protagonist is now in the Gaza strip and is about to be taken to an Ishraqiya Sufi meeting on the outskirts of Gaza city. He is being guided by Jamal, whose family can trace their lineage back to the ‘assassins’. This basically means Jamal is Ismaeli. Jamal is also a DJ and ‘blogger’ who uses ‘culture jamming’ techniques to wage an electronic jihad against the forces of darkness, the Sunni ’salafiya’. They’ve just produced a copy of a typical jihadi suicide martyr video, with the young martyr appearing with guns and paraphenalia making a serious jihadi speech, then we see him sitting in the car and driving off, the rousing music and propaganda slogans plays in the background. And then the car stalls and he gets out to look under the bonnet, steam is pouring out and he gets angry and kicks the car – cut to long shot of the car blowing up and rousing music. I think he’ll call the satirical series ‘Nasruddin the jihadi’, after the famous satirical figure, sheik Nasruddin.

    Anyway – I bought a copy of ‘The God Delusion’ by Richard Dawkins. Now I know many have dismissed Dawkins as a reductionist but this does not mean he does not make many valid points. I was aware that things had got bad in the US but after reading Dawkins I was not aware that it had got ‘that’ bad. It seems atheists are the new blacks and gays – actively discriminated against. Seems you have to believe in God otherwise you face all sorts of minor and even major acts of discrimination. Given that many of the founding fathers were atheists how did it get to this point?

    Dawkins calls for atheists to get organized but admits its a bit like herding cats. He claims that atheists have a duty to out themselves and says that there are a significant number, greater than many strident and proud religious lobby groups.

    I appreciate his argument that religion is afforded a priviliged position and he points out how in the name of religion all sorts of absurdities and nonsense are tolerated and rationalised. This is itself a form of discrimination. How absurd is it that a court will grant an exemption to take hallucinogens for completely irrational ‘religious’ reasons but deny the exemption for very sound ‘rational’ reasons.

    I also appreciated his dismissal of Stephen Jay Gould’s ‘Non-overlapping magesteria’ concept. He’s particularly scathing about this and it is worth integral theorists understanding his point. The first thing he objects to is that science cannot or ought not to try and answer the ‘why’ question. The second thing he objects to is the idea that religion and theology has any greater expertise than anyone else to answer the ‘why’ question. In fact he dismissive of theology in general and provides examples of theological ‘utter nonsense’.

    Most of the book is an attack on the Abrahamic faith. He does not include Buddhism because he regards it as a philosophy.

    I think that integral theory leads us logically to atheism. A nondual ultimate reality is both nothing and everything. A creator God automatically leads us to dualism. So I often wonder why some Integralists seem to go soft on ‘theism’. Dawkins argues that there is an unexamined cultural norm to treat religious delusion with kid gloves. And yet I would argue this has very serious consequences. The reason the US has moved from a position where the founding fathers were either atheists or deists to where politicians cannot win office unless they declare they believe in God is precisely because religion has been accorded a ‘criticism-free’ status along with its ‘tax-free’ status. This has given it almost free reign to propagate nonsense. And when ‘nonsense’ based only on faith is allowed to trump reason then what we get is a devolution. We are supposed to move from the mythic to the rational and then to the integral. Integral should not be tolerating to move backwards from rational to mythical.

    Enlightened secular humanism

    Friday, October 6th, 2006

    This will be a rambling post – but there is a point.

    I’ve been away in Sydney researching my novel. By coincidence the Sydney Theatre Company put on an extraordinary play – an 8 hour long adaptation of Ovid’s ‘Metamorphoses’ called ‘The Lost Echo’, directed by Barrie Kosky who is well known for his unique interpretation of opera. It was a stunning and shocking tour de force that left many people reeling, capturing the true essence of ‘catharsis’. It used all the theatrical arts, music, drama, comedy, song and dance (of mixed genres). I found parts one and two just simply riveting theatre, you didn’t know what was going to happen next (try a chorus of schoolboys masturbating exaggerated penises or a famous Aussie actress – Deborah Mailman – dressed as schoolboy being fellated on stage with the fellator spitting out fake semen, etc – the one moment of nudity being underwhelming). The third part was simply harrowing and I doubt horror and disgust have ever been better portrayed. It was a complete performance of Ovid’s ‘The Bacchae’ in which the protaganist is ripped apart by the female followers of Bacchus and much of it takes place in a dirty public toilet. Huh? Well, Kosky is exploring depravity as a human emotion, as was Ovid. The public toilet confronts us with the shit and blood of humanity, something directly related to the myth of Dionysian excess with raving Maenads ripping flesh apart in orgiastic excess – an inversion of the blood, piss, shit and fluids of human birth (and referencing Freud and Artuad, etc). The fourth part went over my head simply because it used the music of someone I was completely unfamiliar with so I was largely mystified, although I did understand that it was about the existential wandering of humanity in the underworld (a metaphor for this world).

    The thing that scares me about the play is that it is close to some of the themes in my book. The book has a definite pro Greco-Roman stance and it freely references Greek (and Hindu) mythology. The reason I am fearful is because I may be seen to be unoriginal, but perhaps I am just been oversensitive. We were treated to an extra session after the first night when Barrie and the actors answered questions. Barrie was asked if he thought he was simply going over old territory and he gave a spirited defence of the Greco-Roman myths and gods, saying that they will always be resourced and referenced because they say so much about the human condition.

    Then in today’s The Age A2 supplement I was excited to read that Peter Greenaway is coming to town. Peter is perhaps my favourite director and I count some of his films amongst my favourites, in fact I’ve been seraching for a box set of his films. He is involved in a new project called ‘The Tulse Luper Suitcases’ an epic three parter over 7.5 hours that will be shown next weekend (guess where I will be?). Peter is a natural integral thinker and part of the Tulse Luper project is a set of VJ performances and an online game (see www.tulseluperjourney.com). The project involves the mystery of 92 suitcases filled with clues to an idiosyncratic view of 20th century history.

    But what has all this got to do with the title of the post? Over the past few years I’ve come to gain a deeper appreciation of humanism, particularly secular humanism. I know that many secular humanists are spiritual sceptics. This is not a short coming of secular humanism, it’s a short coming of individuals who cannot include the transcendent as a ‘human’ experience. I’m undecided about the metaphysical reality of spritual beings. I’ve certainly had experiences that indicate they have a separate reality but I am also aware that their appearance is mediated by our own consciousness. They could just as easily be archetypes of the unconscious with their ‘transcendence’ being a trick of the mind.

    I also think it doesn’t much matter if we ‘know’ if they are transcendent or not. On a purely experiential basis we can observe that encountering the archetypes can have a powerful affect on our lives. If they are not transcendent then they are the product of either the individiual or collective unconscious. And in my view any true humanist ought to take as much notice of the irrational as the rational. It is the ‘rationalist’ bias that spoils humanism.

    This means that enlightenment and encountering archetypes is a profoundly human experience, an experience that any true humanist must accept.

    The next part of the title of this post is the ’secular’ bit. Secular has many meanings but in this sense I mean ‘not concerned with the church’ – that is, not aligned to any particular religious or spiritual doctrine. I do not intend it to mean ‘non-spiritual’. A secularist in this sense is simply not aligned to any doctrine and in the best sense is open to all. The key word here is ‘open’. An essential part of the humanist project is open inquiry.

    My own sense of the spiritual is influenced by several strands; Ibn Arabi, Abhinavagupta, Padmasabhava, Jung and both Greek and Hindu mythology. From Ibn Arabi I get the concept of ‘ta’wil’, which Henry Corbin reformulated as the ‘imaginal’. Ibn Arabi had the insight that the transcendent (he was a Platonist) appeared to each individual in a unique manner. This ties in very neatly with Jung’s concept of the process of individuation. It also ties in neatly (I think) with with the Tantricism of Abhinavagupta and Padmasambhava. The Tantric path involves a direct encounter with the gods, with Shakti. According to Abhinavagupta the guru can appear as a physical guru (either purusha or siddha) or a transcendent guru or daiva guru. The daiva guru can take any form s/he pleases – and this feeds neatly back to Ibn Arabi who understood that the beautiful young girl he saw in the market place was an apparition of Gabriel and that his attraction was not erotic in the mundane sense but erotic in the highest sense (as revealed by the fact that Eros was a god).

    Because the transcendent appears to each individual in a unique way (and the Tantric traditions explain this in terms of karma) it is impossible to fix any single interpretation. So again we return to secularism, a refusal to bow to any tradition and to follow the path of transgression – transgression of what? The transgression of all fixed ideological and religious positions and the free engagement with the archetypes.

    I see this act of intentional transgression as a humanist act because it frees the human spirit to beneficial acts of creativity. It’s a sometimes dangerous path because, as the Greek and Hindu myths adequately explore, it touches on madness. Properly guided and understood the process of individuation leads to enlightenment.

    The tragedy of modern society is that through fear of the demands of authentic spirituality many opt for mediocrity. Very often conventional religion is a strategy of this fear, a way to control genuine mysticism and ecstacy. The project of conventional religion is to convert the spiritual impulse to rather mundane and boring social conservatism. It’s actually a way to stop the divine from entering life.

    So I guess I’m a ‘radical’ secular humanist, someone who wants to unleash the creative potential of humanity.

    And so I return to the stage and Kosky’s ‘The Lost Echo’ in all it’s madness, humour, tragedy, horror and eroticism. This is what we are. Piles of shit and blood who love, cry, fear and create great horror and beauty. The Greeks and Hindus understood this and the follies of the gods are the perfect metaphor for the follies of humanity. We have the Greeks to thank for theatre and for the concept of ‘katharsis’, the emotional purification that good theatre was supposed to produce. And this finally links me back to Abhinavagupta who was also one of India’s leading aestheticians – he argued that the purpose of all art was to point to the divine through the various ‘rasas’; horror, comedy, eroticism, pathos, etc.

    The audience applauded long and vigorously, people laughed, gasped and cried – catharsis was achieved. Will it last? For many, probably not, but the best art can be life changing and some were deeply affected. Art is the product of humanity and ‘inspiration’ the moment the archetypes break through. Who would not want to surrender to the numinous, even if it doesn’t have any solid, transcendent existance?

    But no, best be safe – best edit the archetypes, cut out the difficult bits and create a safe, nice archetype, say a baby Jesus? Lol. No Kali’s here please.

    Are mystical states transrational?

    Tuesday, September 5th, 2006

    Consider the possibility that so-called trans-personal mystical states are really just highly developed translative skills of lower developmental levels, and that the intepretation that they are transpersonal is a retro-romantic, regressive recontextualization. Perhaps we need to integrate these states, but do we need to elevate them beyond their actual status? And does considering this possibility have to be intepreted as some form of rationalistic or pomo flatland? If not, then what does that say of the perspective that reduces this perspective?

    Postmodern/Postmetaphysical Spirituality

    Wednesday, August 9th, 2006

    As this is verging on a new topic I’m creating a new post from my last few comments in another post. It seems there is an emerging pomo spirituality that has been elucidated by Benedikter in his Integral World 5-part series on the topic. I’m also noticing this from my own reading on the topic. But Benedikter is using the perenniel tradition’s biased intepretation of an ultimate ground (phenomenological myth of the given), hence his notion that pomo’s intepretation and experience of the witness and productive void is not quite as complete as the former. Whereas to me it goes beyond it devoid of the metaphysical baggage. More later.

  • Edward Berge Says:
    Just a quickie for now, but the above ultimate (inter)subjectivity seems to me to be participating in the phenomenological myth of the given. As does the notion of involution and involutionary givens, and pure absolute experience outside of relativity. These notions seem part and parcel of the metaphysical assumptions of the perenniel traditions. Granted Ken tries to pare them down to a bare minimum, but it seems to me the later pomo enactments recognized the “ultimate” realm but intepreted it in a more accurate postmetaphysical way. The absolute is always deferred, never present, always a possibility and not an actuality. The latter view acknowledges the possibility of ultimate existence but also the impossiblity of knowing it directly. It eliminates all of the metaphysical baggage Ken talks about, while Ken has to retain at least some of it to get his universe going, i.e., the metaphysical Spirit or Consciousness.
  • Edward Berge Says:
    For example, I provide below Marcus Honeysett’s analysis of Derrida’s deconstructive assumptions. But he misses the final piece from Derrida’s last work: Deconstruction only denies the conventiional conception of God, not the transcendental altogether. We can come to relationship with ultimate reality with the creative play of possibility, similar to Whitehead’s notion of creativity. Note Whitehead didn’t have some ultimate (inter)subjectivity either, according to Ken.

    From be thinking.org

    Assumptions Underlying Jacques Derrida’s Theory ofDeconstruction Marcus Honeysett

    Derrida lays many of his presuppositions out in a hard but very important essay called Structure,Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences. You can tell what it is going to be likefrom the title! The argument goes as follows:

    1. Western thought and language have alwayshad a fixed centre in absolute truth. This placeslimits on what it is possible to think or believe. Itprovides a foundation for being (ie what we are),and for knowing (ie how we think). Absolute truthprovides certainties.

    2. However Derrida’s underlying assumption(which this essay does not explore) is that there isno God in the equation to guarantee suchabsolutes, and hence ideas about certainty arenow ruptured. He concludes that any idea of afixed centre was only a structure of powerimposed on us by our past or by institutions ofsociety, and does not in reality exist at all.

    3. Hence for Derrida there is no ultimate reality,no God outside the system to which everyone andeverything relates. Instead the only relationshipsthat we can know are within the system of theworld which Derrida calls discourses. For himultimate reality is only a series of thesediscourses.

    4. Because there is no fixed centre, there shouldno longer be any limits on what it is possible tothink or believe. We should literally be able tothink anything. We can be playful and flexibleabout the way we think, when we realise that “truth”and “falsehood” are simply wrong distinctions tomake. Indeed they are just a destructive andharmful manifestation of that power structure.

    5. Therefore we must stop considering everythingin life, culture and thought in relation to absolutetruth. To not do so is, for Derrida, oppressive andimmoral.A few more points if you want to think a bit further(but these aren’t vital to the argument!):

    6. Derrida says that history is traditionally thoughtto be determined by Being. In other words Godguarantees history There was a beginning andthere is an end to which we are working. Mosthuman optimism for Derrida springs from this fact.The whole of science for example is based on thefact that true things are there to be discoveredand worked towards.

    7. However this idea of history is what stopspeople thinking radical new thoughts because theassumptions we pick up from history areoppressive. But the fact that people can and dothink radical new thoughts is seen to deny thisoppressive version of history, and, of course, any absolute Being behind history.

    8. Derrida’s ideal of play or flexibility therefore completely denies the possibility of absolutes or of God.

    © Marcus Honeysett 2005Source: http://www.bethinking.org/resource.php?ID=197

  • Edward Berge Says:
    For example, see this article on how pomo’s idea of creative play has parallel’s with Whitehead’s process philosophy, all without some metaphysical God or Spirit.

    In the Wake of False Unifications: Whitehead’s Creative Resistance against Imperialist Theologies

    Roland Faber, Claremont, March 31, 2005

    http://www.ctr4process.org/publications/SeminarPapers/28_1%20Faber.pdf

  • My perspective on Consciousness

    Friday, August 4th, 2006

    I’ve been following the consciousness thread with some interest and contemplating what I might want to contribute to the discussion. At first I held back because I didn’t think I had anything ‘new’ to add. But as I thought about it I realized that I perhaps have quite a different perspective, although I’m not sure how I’d categorize it – but then my contribution is about how we categorize these things.

    The first point I’d make is that we experience a number of what I would call (for this exercise) primal (or raw) experiences (PE). These are experiences that invade our awareness outside of our control and include primary perception of exterior events and interior events. We know that we react to PE’s before we construct a narrative about the PE and why we reacted to the PE. To give an example – there is a technique in film making where a sound is placed before the related image. It’s most often used in the horror and suspense genres to shock the audience before the mind can explain the shock. It’s most often used to create false anxiety. The classic example is the cat jumping out of the locker in the first Alien movie. The screech of the cat is heard before we see the cat. We jump at the screech and then relax because we create the narrative that it was only a cat.

    I include internal PE’s – sometimes we are overcome by internal states (emotions, false perceptions, spiritual experiences, etc) that are outside our control. False perceptions are an interesting case. Who has not been startled by something they thought they saw but relaxed when they realized it was not what they first thought it was? This is the classic Hindu tale of the person mistaking the rope as a snake.

    The important point here is that after the PE we naturally try and explain it by creating a narrative. It was such and such caused by such and such and it means this and is related to that. Here Gebser’s categories are temporarily useful – the meta-narrative (worldview) we use can be archaic, magical, mythic, rational or integral. It might also be useful to further divide these categories into sub-categories, rational might be further divided into pre-modernist, modernist and post-modernist rationalities (or Western and non-Western rationality).

    If you get the chance I highly recommend you go and see ‘Ten Canoes’ a co-production between Rolf De Heer and the Ramangini (sp?) people of Arnhem land. I say co-production because the film is their story told from their traditional perspective. A documentary on the making of the film revealed some interesting differences between the ‘rational’ approach to making the film and the ‘traditional’ (magical) view. One of the constraints on the Western film makers is that under traditional law only people of the right clan relationship could portray certain people. The concept of acting was foreign and there was some difficulty in finding the correctly related people to play certain roles. There was also some difficulty in maintaining a coherent narrative for film. Traditional stories are complex, atemporal and ahistorical. They are about relationships and not accurate events.

    The point of this slight digression does involve Wilber. When I met him we spent most of our time together talking about is post-metaphysical theory, including his idea of morphogenetic grooves. I thought it was flawed for this reason – he seemed to be mistaking PEs and deep structures for surface translations.

    I maintain that most PEs have remained consistent for most of humanity for most of modern history – but this is impossible to know with any certainty. What has changed are the narratives used to explain the PEs. I would argue that the spiritual states of psychic, subtle, causal and nondual are PEs and have remained consistent and accessible throughout history but that they have been interpreted differently as the human narrative builds in complexity. The grooves Wilber sees are not grooves in our capacity to have these spiritual PEs but grooves in the way we explain them.

    In which case the narrative will always change as more perspectives are added. This is the result of natural accretion. The Shaman of the Neolithic age may very well have had all of the spiritual PEs but they would have had far less narrative options. Wilber does know this because in some of his earlier writing he admits that high spiritual experiences can only be explained using the narrative tools available – if that happens to be within a magical worldview then so be it.

    I appreciate everyone’s recent comments but wish to add a simple cautionary note about what could be called the hermeneutic or narrative trap. This is that all explanations and theories about PEs are narratives. All descriptions and definitions, categories and sub-categories, systems and meta-systems are narratives. They are internal constructs that do not exist outside. Even the distinction of external and internal is itself a construct. Edward might remember that on the Cohorts list Bonnitta and I talked about spiritual PE’s belonging to a category we called the ‘anterior’ – to describe a realm that existed beside/outside the dualistic concepts of interior/exterior. Consciousness in the Eastern sense of Chitta exists in an anterior space.

    I think Anand’s discussion about redefining ‘reality’ might find some benefit in stepping outside the interior/exterior spacetime paradigm into an anterior atemporal/aspatial paradigm.

    However, what we must be extremely careful about is constructing the self as a character in whatever narrative we are using. The self/ego is also a narrative construct. And we must have a narrative, although we can, as some sages have done, choose to remain silent, not only refraining from externally creating a narrative in the intersubjective space but from imagining an internal narrative in our subjective space – iow, telling ourselves a story.

    Another cautionary note is that even elaborate and sophisticated philosophical views that consider both Eastern and Western philosophical traditions are also narratives. They just happen to be complex narratives. As I’ve said, if we are trying to communicate our PEs to others we have to create a narrative that will be understood by their narrative. In the end that’s what an intersubjective space is – a common narrative which can translate and understand subjective narratives. For example – vad, ptd’oof fliftip mnomitopitone! If you get my meaning ;) Miscommunication readily happens when the intersubjective space has huge gaps and cannot hold and translate the various subjectives narratives of all the participants. In fact most of the problem of cross-cultural communication lies in co-constructing a sufficient intersubjective space. This is often made more difficult when any participant defiantly holds onto their narrative and insists that everyone else accepts their narrative as the base ‘truth’ or as the only ‘valid’ narrative. Please note that this defiance can even go as far as denying PEs that do not easily fit into a pre-conceived narrative.

    And it is the internal PEs that cause the most difficulty, simply because not all people experience all of them, especially the spiritual PEs. So it becomes difficult to construct an intersubjective narrative that acknowledges certain internal PEs. And here we have to admit that certain narratives dismiss, censor, forbid, ignore, etc certain PEs. Not too long ago many women in the English speaking world did not know about clitoral or multiple orgasms, or female ejaculation, because the then current intersubjective space would not construct a way to discuss these PEs. So a woman who had experienced multiple orgasm might think there was something wrong with her and a doctor might say she was ‘hysterical’ (from the Greek hustera – meaning womb). And I might add here that part of my age of consent concerns are about children being denied a safe intersubjective space in which they can develop a healthy internal narrative that adequately explains their early sexual PEs – children can and do have orgasms but have no way to safely ‘narratize’ them (if such a word is permissable) just as women were denied a safe intersubjective space (and men for that matter – try talking about orgasm through prostate stimulation to your mates, lol).

    So the same problem exists for spiritual PEs. How do you explain them to people who never had them? Yes, you can construct a clever ‘rational’ narrative that allows their ‘logical’ existance, but such narratives do not create the PEs.

    And finally, another cautionary note. If the concepts of external/internal are narrative constructs then so too are the concepts of consciousness, the absolute, spiritual, non-spiritual, etc, etc. Perhaps there is no exterior (or anterior) mind/body problem because the concepts of mind and body are all in the mind to begin with? I know this is not a new idea.

    So, in summary – I view this problem in terms of PEs and narratives. Which probably puts me in the phenomenological/hermeneutic camp – of course, remembering the hermeneutic trap (paradox?) – it’s all hermeneutics anyway. The AQAL map is just a map.