Archive for the ‘Holon theory’ Category

Theory for Anything v. Theory of Everything

Monday, September 4th, 2006

In the Postmodern Spirituality blog I pasted a quote from Mark about how he approaches integral theory. He prefers the TFA v. the TOE for the reasons listed in that post. See Mark’s interview here

Here is a similar view I found that was originally posted by Balder in the IN forum where he quotes Henri Bortoft (1985), Counterfeit and Authentic Wholes, pp. 283-286:

Everything we encounter in the world can be said to be either one thing or another, either this or that, either before or after, and so on. Wherever we look, there are different things to be distinguished from one another: this book here, that pen there, the table underneath, and so on. Each thing is outside the other, and all things are separate from one another. But in recognizing the things about us in this way, we, too, are separate from and outside of the things we see. We find ourselves laid out side by side, together with and separate from, the things we recognize. This is the familiar spectator awareness. In the moment of recognizing a thing we stand outside that thing, and in the moment of standing outside that thing we turn into an “I” that knows that thing, for there cannot be an “outside” without the distinction of something being outside some other thing. Thus, the “I” of “I know” arises in the knowing of something in the moment of recognition of the thing known. By virtue of its origin, the “I” that knows is outside what knows.

We cannot know the whole in the way in which we know things because we cannot recognize the whole as a thing. If the whole were available to be recognized in the same way as we recognize the things that surround us, then the whole wouel be counted among those things as one of them. We could point and say, “here is this” and “there is that,” and “that’s the whole over there.” If we had the power of such recognition, we would know the whole in the same way that we know its parts, for the whole itself would simply be numbered among its parts. The whole would be outside its parts in the same way that each part is outside of all other parts. But the whole comes into presence within its parts, and we cannot encounter the whole in the same way that we encounter the parts. We should not thing of the whole as if it were a thing.

Awareness is occupied with things. The whole is absent to awareness because it is not a thing among things. To awareness, the whole is no-thing. The whole that is no-thing is taken as mere nothing, in which case it vanishes. When this loss happens, we are left with a world of things, and the apparent task of putting them together to make a whole. Such an effort disregards the authentic whole.

The other choice is to take the whole to be no-thing but not nothing. This possibility is difficult for awareness, which cannot distinguish the two. Yet, we have an illustration immediately on hand with the experience of reading. We do not take the meaning of a sentence to be a word. The meaning of a sentence is no-word. But evidently this is not the same as nothing, for if it were we could never read! The whole presences within parts, but from the standpoint of awareness that grasps external parts, the whole is an absence. The absence, however, is not the same as nothing. Rather, it is an active absence inasmuch as we do not try to be aware of the whole, as if we could grasp it like a part, but instead let ourselves be open to be moved by the whole…

We cannot separate part and whole into disjointed positions, for they are not two as in common arithmetic. The arithmetic of the whole is not numerical. We do not have part and whole, though the number category of ordinary language will always make it seem so. If we do not separate part and whole into two, we appear to have an alternative of moving in a single direction, either from part to whole or from whole to part. If we start from this position, we must at least insist on moving in both directions at once, so that we have neither the resultant whole as a sum nor the transcendental whole as a dominant authority, but the emergent whole that comes forth into its parts. The character of this emergence is the “unfolding of enfolding,” so that the parts are the place of the whole where it bodies forth into presence. The whole imparts itself; it is accomplished through the parts it fulfills.

We can perhaps do something more to bring out the relationship between whole and part by considering the hologram… If we break the hologram plate into fractions, we do not break the whole. The whole is present in each fraction, but its presence diminishes as the fractioning proceeds. Starting from the other end, with many fractions, we could put the fractions together to build up the totality. As we did so, the whole would emerge; it would come forth more fully as we approached the totality. But we would not be building up the whole. The whole is already present, present in the fractions, coming fully into presence in the totality. The superficial ordering of the fractional parts may be a linear series — this next to that, and so on. But the ordering of the parts with respect to the emergent whole, the essential ordering, is nested and not linear. Thus, the emergence of the whole is orthogonal to the accumulation of parts because it is the coming into presence of the whole that is whole, the whole that is immanent.

This process tells us something significant about the whole in a way that shows us the significance of the parts. If the whole presences within its parts, then a part is a place for the presencing of the whole. If a part is to be an arena in which the whole can be present, it cannot be “any old thing.” Rather, a part is special and not accidental, since it must be such as to let the whole come into presence. This speacialty of the part is particularly important because it shows us the way to the whole. It clearly indicates that the way to the whole is into and through the parts. It is not to be encountered by stepping back to take an overview, for it is not over and above the parts, as if it were some superior, all-encompassing entity. The whole is to be encountered by stepping right into the parts. This is how we enter into the nesting of the whole, and thus move into the whole as we pass through the parts….

Agency and interiors

Friday, August 11th, 2006

One of the difficulties I have with Wilber’s holon theory is the definition of agency and interior. Now I must confess I’m relying on my memory and Wilber may very well have further defined these terms, but here goes anyway…

I understand agency to be about choice. To have agency is to have the power to act. In the usual sense of the word this means a conscious act, choice. I do not think that atoms have agency. Atoms do not have choices. They do not act, they ‘react’. In what sense do atoms act? They are the passive objects that react to the laws of physics. They do not exercise choice.

In this sense I believe true agency is only exercised by conscious entities and that ‘holons’ below and above a certain level do not have agency, rather they only express reactivity to defined laws. In other words they become artefacts.

I do not think atoms have interiors either. The interior/exterior distinction is purely a human ‘narrative’ construct. Something is exterior only to our concept of an interior. The ability to conceive of such a distinction is only achievable by sentient beings at a certain level of development (we don’t know at what level this occurs). In other words, an interior is something a sentient being believes it has. It is the sum total of its subjective experiences, thoughts, feelings, sensations, ideas and fantasies. Do atoms have this subjective ‘interior’?

Can we know? Knowledge of other sentient being’s interiors is only achieved through communication in a co-created intersubjective space. We now have some sense that animals have an interior of some sort simply because we are able to observe patterned responses to our attempts to communicate to them. A dog learns to obey our commands. But we have had less success at understanding their attempts to communicate with us. It’s a one way thing. Recent research with other primates has created a rudimentary intersubjective space that allows limited communication, enough to allow us to guess at their cognitive and affective capacities.

But atoms? There is no intersubjective space in which we communicate with the interiors of atoms. Wilber is simply speculating that atoms have agency and interiors.

I do not think that his holon theory is an accurate description of reality, rather it is a theoretical construct designed to solve contradictions within various narratives about reality. He is simply adding another layer of abstraction.

The validity of any theory relies on two types of consistancy, internal and external. There has been quite a bit of work done on the internal consistancy of Wilber’s construct, but I’m yet to be convinced of its external consistancy.

I also want to make an objection to something Andrew Cohen said in asking a question of Wilber (as quoted by Edward).

“The fact that our world is more constructed by us than existing as an objectively real static entity is an ever-new revelation. It’s the most challenging insight: that there is very little that is actually given and that the way we perceive everything is a creative and co-creative process.”

This is just plain sloppy. We do not construct the world – we construct an interpretation of the world. Our interpretation may affect our perception but it does not actually affect reality itself. This is just New Age nonsense. I invite Andrew and his followers to stand naked in Death Valley on a hot day or naked in the middle of Antartica and see if they can co-create a reality in which they do not die.

Cohen goes on to say:

“As you have made so clear in Integral Spirituality, these deep perceptual structures are created intersubjectively in consciousness, slowly, over thousands and thousands of years.”

Which is where I disagree and suggest that both Wilber and Cohen have confused surface translations with deep structures. It is the surface translations that have been created intersubjectively, and not necessarily over thousands of years. The PE occurs and the experiencer immediately seeks to interpret it using the narrative tools at his/her disposal.

It is important to note here that the intersubjective space can be radically altered by a novel/creative intervention. Many of the world’s geniuses are lauded because their novel ideas have altered the meta-narrative’s direction. The Buddha was such a genius.

There are people who are able to provide better descriptions. We use them because they resonate with us. We have an ‘a-ha’ moment. This doesn’t mean that these moments are necessarily correct. A prime example is the annoying acceptance of conspiratorial and paranoid narratives. I was watching something on the persistance of anti-Semitism and a young American Arab woman repeated the story that no Jews died in 9/11 and that they had all been warned before (in fact around 700 Jews died).

So, to return to my main point – only sentient beings who have sufficient cognitive capacity to create narratives have agency and an interior. Agency and the concept of an interior is a function of the narrative, not of some abstract ‘consciousness’ or an abstract holon. Asserting that atoms have agency and an interior is a form of anthropocentrism.

Holons & AQAL

Friday, August 4th, 2006

I decided to move the comments below to this new post, as it begins a new line of inquiry.

  • Andy Smith Says:
    Edward: “Technically holons have as their other set of duality agency-communion, which is, according to Wilber, not the same as the individual-social duality in the 4 quadrants.”

    They’re not the same, in his system, because he insists on separating individual and social holons, instead of recognizing that they form a developmental continuum. Seeing them in the latter way, there is no need to distinguish agency/communion from individual/social. Even in Wilber’s system, it’s clear that the interior/exterior distinction is far more fundamental than the individual/social distinction. Even Wilber will say that the distinction between an individual holon and a social holon is not always clear. He would never say that the distinction between an interior and an exterior is not clear.

  • Edward Berge Says:
    I’d agree that the individual-social duality might not be fundamental, but agency-communion is essential to the whole idea of a holon, being a part-whole.

    Also technically the other axis of a holon is not interior-extrerior but transcendence-dissolution. I think later Wilber added that dissolution is the negative aspect and integration is the positive aspect on this side of the duality. This duality is more like the AQAL dynamic of evolution-integration Mark discusses.

    And then there’s the notion that holons each have 4 quadrants per the AQAL matrix, so there is some confusion as to the agency-communion and transcendence-dissolution dimension with the 4 quadrants of interior-exterior and individual-social. Mark tried to sort this out in his AQAL Eyes series beginning in Part II.

  • Social Holons, the NLP approach – Ray

    Tuesday, July 18th, 2006

    In just reading the comments by Mark to Edward’s recent post – I don’t believe there is a collective monad, or whatever you want to call it. A collective makes decisions through a complex process of conscious, semi-conscious and unconscious agreements, conflicts, compromises, understandings, accomodations, etc.

    I suddenly thought of NLP (NeuroLinguistic Programming) which teaches that much of our communication is non-verbal. Some recent work has discovered the importance of micro-expressions in communication (especially uncovering lying). Any well trained NLPer knows about micro-expressions (and micro, micro-expressions). Interestingly only around one in a thousand can see micro-expressions. I happen to be one of them and to me they stick out like a blush. The point is this, much of the agreement making in collectives occurs at this micro level. People situate themselves within ‘groupthink’ by a set of subtle signals. Furthermore, as basic group dynamics tells us, people have a range of subtext motives for situating themselves in certain positions.

    In short, there is a surface dynamic and layers of sub-surface dynamic. Much of the consensus action happens at the sub-surface level in such a way as it appears the collective has a mind of its own.

    I would suggest that a skilled person could enter into any collective, analyse the dynamic and consciously alter the ‘groupthink’. I’ve done this myself in small groups. It takes more time in large groups. The first step is to decide who the surface and sub-surface leaders are. And here it is absolutely essential to work out who the real leaders are because they may not be the nominated surface leaders. To give you a very crude example, the real leader may be a quiet female to whom the dominant males are consciously or unconsciously attracted to. If she signals her disapproval using non-verbal means the dominant males will change their behaviour until she signals her approval. But it can be much more subtle than that (she may be reflecting off another person for a nonsexual subtext reason, leading to third or fourth generation dynamics).

    Ray

    Social Holonic Agency

    Sunday, July 16th, 2006

    Edward Berge:

    I’ve cut an pasted my last comments on the topic from the forum, as I’m trying to get a discussion going in there:

    At kenwilber.com there is an article called “Ken Responds to Recent Critics: Edwards, Myerhoff and Others.” Regarding social holons it says that where Ken and Mark disagree is the following:Mark thinks social holons have at least some consciousness and thus display 4 quadrants. Ken thinks that social holons do not have consciousness and 4 quadrants, but that its agency is a dominant mode of discourse and they can be looked “at” as quadrivia.  

    Mark thinks that due to this “consciousness” that social holons display developmental shifts in altitude. In the referenced Integral Naked talks Mark says that he’s doing research on this developmental aspect of organizations agency but to date it is not in print.

    It sounds similar to Robertson’s notion of organizations having their own will or voice, or consciousness. Robertson also makes clear that it is not a “dominant monad” like an individual, but an agency nonetheless. I admit that I don’t yet understand what constitutes this social holonic consciousenss. I guess we’ll have to wait for Brian’s holacracy.org to develop this theme and Mark’s work to come out in print. Unless some of you out there understand it?

    http://www.kenwilber.com/Writings/PDF/

    KenRespondstoRecentCritics_CRITICS_2006.pdf

    RE: Holacracy
    Posted By: Edward Berge on 07-16-2006 9:08 am
    Posts: 5 EDIT POST
    Here is some of what Mark says on social holons from his printed work at Integral World. From “Through AQAL Eyes,” Part 5, Section 6:Wilber is so suspicious of collective consciousness and social agency that he ends up defining it as a “set of governing rules” and a exterior “network” of “rules” similar he means to the rules of chess, I assume. The regnant nexus then becomes the “rules of social interaction”.  

    Ken Quote: “regnant nexus” as a term sounds just fine for a society, system, or collective holon, because a “nexus” is not really the same as a “monad,” and thus a collective holon can plausibly have a set of governing rules but not a dominant-I. The rules of chess, for example, are the regnant nexus or governing rules of that social interaction. In other words–and again, if we are very careful–I think it is fine to refer to the nexus-agency of a societal holon or system as a regnant nexus or governing network (which is not, of course, a governing individual or dominant monad). (Excerpt C, ¶ 390)

    In defining collective agency as a set of rules Wilber turns the collectives capacity for systemic-agency and self-organisation into the aggregate of individuals’ intentions to follow rules. This results in a decapitated collective holon whose agency is derivative of individual intention.

    Ken Quote: All systems as such are self-organizing, and they are self-organizing because their members are sentient beings with intentionality. (Excerpt C, ¶ Note 31)

    Here we have social agency defined by individuals’ internalisation of governing rules. This is a reductionist understanding of a social holon. The defining pattern of a social holon engaged in activity (such as a game of chess) is characterised by its own levels of meaning, activity, experience, and roles that are not reducible to the internal worlds, experiences or feelings of the individuals engaged in that activity. Wilber’s derivative view of collective agency reflects the weaknesses in his holonic theory. He explains the agency of a collective holon is terms of individuals’ internalisations because his collective holons occupy the bottom two quadrants and individual holons the upper two (see figure 3). When represented like this, collective holons have an agency that is individualistic in essence (and individual holons have a communality that is about the intersections of individuals).

    RE: Holacracy
    Posted By: Edward Berge on 07-16-2006 9:18 am
    Posts: 5 EDIT POST
    I stand corrected. I found the following in a Google search at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/viewContentItem.do?contentType=Article&hdAction=lnkhtml&contentId=1502555Title: The integral holon: A holonomic approach to organisational change and transformation  

    Author(s): Mark G. Edwards

    Journal: Journal of Organizational Change Management

    ISSN: 0953-4814

    Year: Jun 2005 Volume: 18 Issue: 3 Page: 269 – 288

    DOI: 10.1108/09534810510599425

    Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing Limited

    Abstract: Purpose – Over the past two decades there has been a growing recognition of the need to develop integrative approaches to understanding and explaining organisational change. One of the barriers to achieving this has been the lack of an integrative theoretical framework that can cope with the multiple demands of researching and explaining organisational change across diverse domains. To meet this challenge a holonomic framework for the study of organisational change is proposed. The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate the suitability of the holon construct as the basis for a multilevel and multi-paradigm framework for the study of organisational change.

    Design/methodology/approach – Arthur Koestler’s holon construct and the developmental principles of Ken Wilber’s AQAL framework are used as foundations for developing the framework. To this end theory building techniques are used to describe how the holon construct can accommodate the essential explanatory characteristics of ten paradigms commonly used in organisational studies.

    Findings – The holonomic framework described here possesses significant integrative capacity by demonstrating its ability to incorporate multiple concepts from a diversity of organisational fields.

    Originality/value – It has the potential to contribute significantly to the integrative investigation of change across many levels and domains of organisational activity.

    Keywords: Continuing development, Organizational change

    Article Type: Conceptual paper

    Article URL: http://www.emeraldinsight.com/10.1108/09534810510599425