Archive for the ‘Ethics & Morality’ Category

The narrative of enlightenment as consumer commodity

Saturday, January 16th, 2010

Edward Berge

There’s an interesting discussion on the above topic in a thread by that name at Gaia’s Integral Postmetaphysical Spirituality pod. Craig Hamilton’s conferences came up in this regard. Someone mentioned that while they didn’t approve of his marketing methodology they nonetheless would participate because of some of the presenters. I replied:

This goes to my point above, that sometimes we have to give up some valuable stuff to effect change. Yes, Hamilton brings together some key voices that might make a difference. But those voices, by participating in his conference, offer tacit approval to his commodified method. And many folks then also assume this is the proper way to proceed in the spiritual marketplace. I’m even wondering if those valuable presenters like Swimm, by participating, aren’t subconsciously influenced by such participation and such methods come to be seen as a necessary evil within a commodified culture, that we have to use such measures to reach people in the first place but once we do then we’ll change methodology. Unfortunately in the process we get corrupted and the methodology doesn’t change.

That’s why I boycott I-I and things like the Integral Conference. Yes, there are many people that go to these that challenge Wilber, even on issues such as this commodification. But the conference itself is promoted with such methods and financially supports I-I, which supports such methods. And by attending and participating we tacitly support such measures, measures that will continue because they are receiving support, even if one talks opposition.

What’s the alternative? Those that oppose such methods might form their own integral organization and conference and market themselves in a different way. But I-I has done all the work, it’s just easier to go to theirs, we don’t have the resources, maybe we can change it from within etc etc. To walk our talk is the hardest challenge imaginable. And we all know this has to be done because I-I is not going to change in this way, ever, even after Wilber is gone.

Integral code of ethics?

Tuesday, July 24th, 2007

The Mackey incident got me to wondering again why we have yet to see something like the above emerge, if not out of I-I that what about us, the general integral community? So I went back to my 04 essay “Giving Guns to Children” (in the Reading Room of Integral World) and pasted a few paragraphs below, with some questions to follow. The seminar on ethics to which I refer was one given by Walsh and Wilber (mostly Walsh) at I-I in 04.

“Wilber went on to explain that ethics were first stabilized as a level of development in the mythical stage. This is the reason why ethics get a bad rap; they can be perceived as ethnocentric. But this does not mean that all ethics are at this stage. Like all developmental holoarchies, ethics continues to grow into higher and more inclusive views with concomitant dignities and disasters.

“Walsh said in the seminar that ethics was a foundational practice, the starting point and cornerstone for all other integral practices. He said that at post conventional levels of ethical development we are no longer bound by the conventional rules of right and wrong. At this stage it’s more of a consciously felt, intuitive choice to act with appropriateness to each situation. It becomes more a spontaneous sense and expression of our true nature. That is why Wilber calls it the basic moral intuition, as they are no absolute rules for every case. Wilber gave an example of 10 people in a stranded lifeboat that could only handle 7, so who do you throw out? The BMI would take into consideration if one were Einstein versus if one were Hitler. While maintaining that there are no absolute rules on the one hand it sounds like the BMI does in fact have some universal criteria: save those that have greater depth and can make a higher contribution to the greater span of society.

“But the BMI will be interpreted from each level of consciousness and will hence generate that level’s moral stance. The typical warrior ethic, for example, will extend the greatest depth to a span only of itself, whereas the sociocentric stance will extend the span to a particular culture. The worldcentric stance extends the span to all people, but in orange’s flatland orientation depth is reduced to a mono-level happiness (typically exterior monetary success). This early level of worldcentric embrace cannot yet differentiate the different kinds of happiness or different levels of depth. However, the integral-aperspectival (yellow) level can make these differentiations. But at this level and higher the BMI must extend beyond a mere intuition in only the subjective, UL quadrant. A full ethical theory must embrace all four quadrants. (Wilber, 1995, pp. 613-615) “Otherwise we will very soon slide into solipsism and subjective idealism, which plays heavily into the hyper-agentic, hyper-masculine, disengaged and dangling subject of the fundamental Enlightenment paradigm.” (Wilber, 1995, p. 615)

“Walsh reiterated this idea in the seminar by saying that a peer group is needed for a post-conventional ethics. This is so that we can make commitments to one another and be held accountable. In that sense ethics in not just what each individual decides is right based on their individual moral intuition. Like Wilber’s above statements on integral law and the BMI, this must be validated in an intersubjective community of the adequate to hash out those universals that can be applied to case-by-case situations.”

So my first question is this: are “codes of ethics” limited to the blue meme? And codes in general, given their limiting “right v. wrong” thinking? We can see from above that ethics certainly isn’t limited to the conventional levels, as it continues to develop. And if by code we mean the right-hand, external expressions of the internal then so too would codes develop. What about in terms of legal codes? Certainly they continue to evolve to match the cultural center of gravity? So why no ethical codes? Yes they’d be more flexible, etc. but they’d be codified nonetheless.

So although there might not be “absolute” rules for every case within a rigid code, are their not broad, orienting generalities that might lead us in creating such an integral code of ethics. Are there not such broad, orienting generalizations to integral theory per se? Is there not a structure within which it must fit? And isn’t this AQAL structure itself one of the external measures of whether one is truly “integral?” Surely such a structural code could also be created for ethics that is flexible enough like the integral model itself to accomodate a higher moral imperative like the Basic Moral Intuition?

Not above that Ken said “a full ethical theory must embrace all four quadrants,” not just the individual uppper left.. “Otherwise we will very soon slide into solipsism and subjective idealism, which plays heavily into the hyper-agentic, hyper-masculine, disengaged and dangling subject of the fundamental Enlightenment paradigm.”

So one must ask: Why has such a code not yet been created? If ethics is “cornerstone for all other integral practices” then why has it apparently been neglected? And why are we still so preoccupied with our own, individual development and “process,” but have yet come together to express our collective values within a code of ethics? Perhaps we have yet to really evolve beyond our disengaged and dangling subjectivities, despite our talk to the contrary?

Integral business practices?

Thursday, July 12th, 2007

Ken Mackey has been an inspiration to me since hearing of him in Ken’s IN interview. He’s the CEO of Whole Foods and is implementing many of Ken’s ideas into his business. However the below has given me pause to ponder.

I want to make it clear that I am not claiming that Mackey intentionally tried to manipulate stock prices but that the article seems to suggest as much. The quoted blogger after the article seems to have received the same impression by his choice of words. But if Mackey did indeed do so that would certainly be a greivous breach of law and ethics. Even if he did not it certainly calls into question the ethics of such behaviour, given his privileged position in this particular context.

Here’s a Wall Street Journal article on Mackey’s participation in a Yahoo stocks message board. Could these tactics be justified as “integral?”

Note: the embedded links in the article did not trasfer upon copying. You can find them in the original article linked above.

Whole Foods CEO Mackey Posted Comments on Stock Message Board By DAVID KESMODEL and JOHN R. WILKE

July 11, 2007 6:03 p.m.

In January 2005, someone using the name “Rahodeb” went online to a Yahoo stock-market forum and posted this opinion: No company would want to buy Wild Oats Markets Inc., a natural-foods grocer, at its price then of about $8 a share.

“Would Whole Foods buy OATS?” Rahodeb asked, using Wild Oats’ stock symbol. “Almost surely not at current prices. What would they gain? OATS locations are too small.” Rahodeb speculated that Wild Oats eventually would be sold after sliding into bankruptcy or when its stock price dipped below $5. A month later, Rahodeb wrote that Wild Oats’ management “clearly doesn’t know what it is doing… OATS has no value and no future.”

The comments were typical of the banter on Internet message boards for stocks – but the identity of the writer was anything but. Rahodeb was the online pseudonym for John Mackey, co-founder and chief executive of Whole Foods Market Inc. Earlier this year, his company agreed to buy Wild Oats for $565 million.

For about eight years until last August, Mr. Mackey posted voluminous messages on Yahoo’s stock forums as Rahodeb, the company confirms. The moniker is an anagram for Deborah, which happens to be the name of Mr. Mackey’s wife. Rahodeb routinely cheered Whole Foods’ financial results, trumpeted his personal gains on the stock, and bashed Wild Oats.

Rahodeb even defended Mr. Mackey’s haircut when another user poked fun at a photograph in Whole Foods’ annual report. “I like Mackey’s haircut,” Rahodeb said. “I think he looks cute!”

Mr. Mackey’s online alter ego came to light in a document made public late Tuesday by the Federal Trade Commission in its lawsuit seeking to block the Whole Foods-Wild Oats deal. The 45-page filing, submitted under seal when the lawsuit was filed in June, includes a quote from the Yahoo site in which Mr. Mackey said “the writing is on the wall” for Wild Oats. An FTC footnote said, “As here, Mr. Mackey often posted to Internet sites pseudonymously, often using the name Rahodeb.”

Whole Foods didn’t authenticate each and every one of Rahodeb’s postings as being from Mr. Mackey, who declined to be interviewed. However, the company said in a statement that among millions of documents the company gave the FTC were postings Mr. Mackey made from 1999 to 2006 “under an alias to avoid having his comments associated with the Company and to avoid others placing too much emphasis on his remarks.” The statement said, “Many of the opinions expressed in these postings now have far less relevance than when they were written.” A spokeswoman for Wild Oats declined to comment.

Mr. Mackey, a 53-year-old vegan, co-founded Whole Foods in 1980. He built the Austin, Texas, company into the world’s largest organic and natural-foods grocer, in part by acquiring many smaller chains. Like Whole Foods itself, Mr. Mackey is unconventional. He slashed his annual salary to $1 starting last January, explaining later that “this is what my heart is telling me is the appropriate thing to do right now.” Outspoken and opinionated, he writes his own blog on the company’s Web site. (Read the blog.)

READ RAHODEB’S COMMENTS

Rahodeb’s farewell comment to the Yahoo message board for Whole Foods stock in August 2006:

http://tinyurl.com/24vtow

In the following entry, Rahodeb says the fundamentals of Wild Oats shares haven’t improved and that its stock price had risen merely because of speculation of a buyout:

http://tinyurl.com/267oc7

In the following dispatch, Rahodeb lambastes a Yahoo user who claimed Wild Oats had been a takeover target at $14 to $16 a share:

http://tinyurl.com/23el99

In this entry, Rahodeb predicts that Whole Foods shares will one day trade at more than $800:

http://tinyurl.com/2bz3ow

In the following, Rahodeb claims Whole Foods shares are undervalued and Wild Oats is overvalued:

http://tinyurl.com/2hrrkt

Note: Whole Foods didn’t authenticate each and every one of Rahodeb’s postings as being from Mr. Mackey. But the company and Mr. Mackey confirmed that he made numerous postings under the name Rahodeb from 1999 to 2006.

MORE

Whole Foods confirms that John Mackey used an alias in making comments about the company’s stock on Yahoo’s Web site:
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/ftchearingupdates/faq.html

A link to John Mackey’s blog:
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/blogs/jm/

Read the full text of the FTC complaint and the FTC document released July 10.

Whole Foods CEO Has Heated Words for FTC
06/27/2007

CEO’s Words May Cook Whole Foods
06/20/2007

Whole Foods agreed in February to acquire Wild Oats, of Boulder, Colo., for $18.50 a share. The FTC sued to block the deal on antitrust grounds in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., saying the combination would reduce competition and raise prices for consumers.

To buttress its case, the FTC is trying to use Mr. Mackey’s words against him. In its lawsuit, it quoted Mr. Mackey informing other Whole Foods board members that buying Wild Oats would enable the company to “avoid nasty price wars” in several markets and reduce the chance that a big conventional grocer like Kroger Co. would create a competing national natural-foods retailer.

When that part of the FTC’s suit became public, Mr. Mackey fired back at the agency with a 14,000-word treatise on his blog. He accused the government of “bullying tactics,” failing to do its homework, and taking out of context “macho posturing” by executives that is common to competitive organizations.

Rahodeb began posting messages about Whole Foods shares on Yahoo.com in the late 1990s. He quickly gained a reputation as being one of the stock’s biggest cheerleaders, and gamely defended himself when other posters chastised him for being too rosy. “I’ve never pretended to be anything but enthusiastic about WFMI,” he wrote in 2000, using Whole Foods’ stock symbol. “I admit to my bias – I love the company and I’m in for the long haul. I shop at Whole Foods. I own a great deal of its stock. I’m aligned with the mission and values of the company… Is there something wrong with this?”

Rahodeb often expressed pride in the work of Mr. Mackey. “While I’m not a ‘Mackey groupie,’ ” he wrote in 2000, “I do admire what the man has accomplished – building a $1.6 billion business from scratch is quite an achievement.” He then asked another user, “whtmewrry 99,” what he or she had accomplished by comparison. (The poster doesn’t appear to have replied.)

By 2005, Whole Foods had grown to more than 160 stores and its annual sales were $4 billion, making it the leading player in the natural and organic foods sector. In a message in January of that year, Rahodeb predicted great things for Whole Foods’ stock. “13 years from now Whole Foods will be a $800+ stock before splits,” he wrote. “Whole Foods is a tremendous growth stock.” At the time, the shares traded at about $94. Whole Foods’ shares closed yesterday at $39.50, up $1.03, or 2.68%.

Rahodeb often sparred with other users, deploying a rigorous analysis of financial statements. “Your quarterly cash flow variance isn’t statistically meaningful because the time period is too short,” he complained to another user who had criticized Whole Foods in March 2006. He then pasted a summary of the previous six years of Whole Foods’ operating cash flow. “Over the past 5 years operating cash flow has increased 330%,” Rahodeb noted.

When it came to Wild Oats, Whole Foods’ main rival, Rahodeb didn’t pull punches. He often criticized Perry Odak, Wild Oats’ former CEO, who resigned last year. “While Odak was trying to figure out the business and conducting expensive ‘research studies,’ to help him figure things out, Whole Foods was signing and opening large stores in OATS territories,” Rahodeb wrote in 2005. “Odak drove off most of the long-term OATS natural foods managers” and brought in executives who “didn’t know too much about the natural/organics industry or their customers.”

Mr. Odak, in a telephone interview, said he was aware of critical postings, but had no idea Mr. Mackey might have been behind them. “It doesn’t surprise me,” he added.

When on occasion Rahodeb went without posting for several weeks, some users expressed concern about his whereabouts. On at least one occasion, he reassured them that he’d been away but was keeping abreast of the chat.

Last August, Rahodeb filed his last dispatch on the Whole Foods message board. He said he’d lost a bet with “hubris12000” about Whole Foods’ stock performance; the terms of the bet required that he stop posting. He blamed the whims of the stock market for a 40% decline in the company’s shares.

“Whole Foods itself has a very bright future, and I will continue to hold my stock for a very long time,” he wrote. “I’ve enjoyed my 8 years on this Board, but all things must come to an end. I wish everyone the very best. Hog152-keep the faith. Liberfar-good luck with your market-timing game. Hubris12000-take your profits while you can.”

Write to David Kesmodel at david.kesmodel@wsj.com and John R. Wilke at john.wilke@wsj.com

Here’s part of another blogger’s opinion at http://www.informationarbitrage.com:

“Did it ever occur to him that maybe, just maybe, his postings using a pseudonym were in violation of a pretty important securities law? Did anyone in the company know about this like, say, company counsel? I don’t even know where to begin as it relates to governance best-practices. This is such a horrible example of corporate stewardship that it is truly mind-boggling. Through his actions, which I will assume for the moment were fueled by ego and not the conscious desire to manipulate stock prices, he has jeopardized the very brand and franchise he and thousands of employees have worked so hard to build over almost 30 years. Did this ever occur to him as he was posting as Rahodeb that he could be placing his company, his employees and his stockholders at risk? I’d assume not. But isn’t this part and parcel of being the CEO of a public company? I’d say so.”

Junk memes

Saturday, June 30th, 2007

An article in yesterday’s ‘Age’ carries good news, the Egyptian government has finally decided to outlaw female circumcision, although I have to say it is outrageous it took them so long. What prompted the decision was the death of a 12 year-old girl from complications. Good news too that the head sheikh of al-Azhar university has said that the practice is un-Islamic and the Coptic Patriarch has said it is un-Christian. A bit late though, the reason the practice persists is because the mullahs and priests did not speak out against the practice and often endorsed it. When the Egyptian government tried in the past some Muslim scholars argued that the practice WAS Islamic. The reason for this confusion is that according to the Shafia’a school of sharia both male and female circumcision is mandated. It might not be in the Koran but it has been debated amongst scholars with some coming down in favour of the practice.

Of course there is no medical reason for the procedure, it is entirely cultural. At some point in the past (pre-Christian and pre-Islamic) some fool had the bright idea that the clitoris was a bad thing and should be cut off (along with the labia minora). The practice is based on Semitic ideas of sex as sin and that the clitoris, as an organ of pure pleasure, was the devil’s seed. Both Christian and Muslim clerics have described the procedure as necessary so as to excise the source of female temptation and pleasure. What better way to control women’s sexuality than to cut it out?

We can look at this procedure with abhorrence but the tragic fact is that it persists because women believe it is a necessary precondition to marriage. Mothers take their daughters to women who perform the procedure. It has become a cultural practice and even though it is completely irrational it persists just because it is a cultural practice.

We can understand that it began as a way to control women. The Abrahamic traditions have a fear of women’s sexuality. She is a temptress. That’s why Islam demands that women wear the hijab and burka. I mentioned the plight of Chahinez who was verbally abused when she wore Western clothes. It’s all about conforming to social norms no matter how silly. How many Muslim men would be shocked to learn that in the West men and women join naturist groups and mix freely and that the men are not driven into an uncontrollable sexual frenzy (and don’t get erections – btw, a recent study of men and women contradicted a common belief. The study was to judge reactions to couples having sex. What the study showed was that men tended to go straight to the woman’s eyes and linger before looking at them screwing, whereas the women went straight to the screwing and lingered longer on it than the men, disproving that men are only interested in sex) and are able to carry on perfectly normal conversations. The writer Ayan Hirsi Ali describes the first time she went swimming in a pair of bathers in mixed company. She was shocked that the men did not pay her much attention and that she felt perfectly safe. She had been led to believe that the men would be uncontrollably aroused. The clerics who had told her this were lying.

There are many social norms that are irrational. They exist because they exist. They are like junk DNA in genes, except we could say they are junk memes. This is what culture often is, a collection of irrational rules based on ignorance. It becomes a vicious circle of belief. Some fool decides that such and such has to be done and then a system of enforcement arises. The enforcers rise to a position of power and authority and so they maintain the belief system in order to maintain their power and privilege. They enforce the system through a set of real and imagined threats and punishments. Laws are passed to preserve the junk memes and people are punished (and sometimes killed) or they live in fear of going to hell. The reason the cruel practice of female circumcision persists is because people believe the myth that surrounds it.

We can look at North Africa and realise that many of their beliefs are nonsense. As Chahinez found, all the stories she had heard about the decadence of the West were wrong. She found that she had much more freedom in France (despite the discrimination against Muslims) than she did back in Algeria. She found that women were treated with a great deal more decency and respect than in Muslim countries. Let’s expose the lie. Muslims complain that women are given more respect in Muslim countries. Bullshit. Only if they conform to conservative expectations. In several countries women are kept in place by threats and fear. How many have been killed in honour killings for ’shaming’ the family? And the nature of the shame? To step outside the narrow role for women. There was a case in Britian recently. A father ordered the murder of his daughter because she was seeing a man he did not approve of. They garotted her with a shoe lace and buried her in a suitcase in a backyard.

But we shouldn’t think we don’t have a similar sets of irrational rules. We can look at the conservative moral attitudes of other cultures and laugh. We can listen to their moral conservatives spread fear that if the silly rules are disobeyed the sky will fall in – and laugh because we know the sky won’t fall in if couples hold hands and kiss in public, or if women wear bikinis when they go swimming.

So I thought I would list our own silly rules, our own junk memes.

1. The fear of nudity. Nothing will happen if we decide that clothing is optional. After a relatively short while we will get used to naked bodies and think it perfectly normal.
2. The fear of seeing genitals, even when aroused. Again nothing will happen. In Rome there were phalluses everywhere. The god Priapus was popular and there were many statues and frescoes depicting his enormous member.
3. The fear of open sex. Again nothing will happen. Most people will still prefer private love making, but the sky will not fall in if they are seen, or if you see them, or if children see them.
4. The fear of children openly exploring their sexuality. Provided they are not exploited by adults nothing will happen (and provided they are taught about controlling pregnancy and STI’s).
5. Open and frank sex education and training. This will actually lead to greater sexual and emotional intelligence. The moral conservative agenda keeps people fixated at low levels of both.
6. The depiction of nudity and sex in art, film and TV (even in prime time) (I’d love to see a children’s mystery/adventure film set in a naturist colony like Montalivet in France, the nudity would be incidental to the plot) (Incidentally generations of families have been holidaying in Montalivet and the photographer Jock Sturges, who owns a holiday home there, has captured the ease at which children accept the lifestyle, most of his first subjects have grown up and recounted how fondly they remember holidays at Montalivet – the film might be a simple story about a holiday adventure at Montalivet).
7. The full acceptance of alternative sexualities, homosexuality, bisexuality, transsexuality and polyamory. Again, most people will be heterosexual and monogamous but won’t feel threatened by difference.
8. Flexible gender roles.

It would be interesting to hear your reaction. Have I gone a step too far? Why? What will happen, will the sky fall in or will we adjust? All of these things have been found in one or other culture. Some Polynesian societies would honour a girl’s vagina by regularly massaging it with aromatic oils (with orgasms and pleasant feelings a happy side effect, but not the purpose – the purpose being to have a nice smelling vagina). Both boys and girls would get explicit instruction and girls would be given dildos. Under the ‘taure’are’a’ system adolescents were free to play around. When Captain Cook landed in Tahiti he was entertained with a traditional dance in which a 12 year-old girl has sex with a warrior (it’s recounted in his diary). In the Trobriand Islands children were even freer and adults were nonplussed. For over forty thousand years Aborigines walked around completely naked. Do we think for one moment that these societies were traumatised (or their children)? Quite the opposite, as misguided as it may seem the Pacific is regarded by Western society as an earthly paradise.

The fear of nudity and sex arises in sex negative societies. The fear is irrational and based on mythic thinking, on junk memes. Western society has thankfully moved on from a very dark and sex ignorant period. Islam still has a long way to go, but we shouldn’t be complacent. We still have much further to go.

What’s stopping us? Two things:

1. A set of laws that privilege the Judeo-Christian myth and the moral system they derive from the myth, and a system of controllers (priests, police and others) who benefit from the power and authority.
2. A willing population who believe in the immutability of junk memes because that’s the way they were raised, in other words, an inherent social conservatism that punishes anyone who disobeys the rules, no matter how silly the rules are. Social disapproval is a major factor.

Ethnocentric thinking includes accepting and obeying ‘the rules’ of the group. Sometimes the rules are designed to test obediance. It’s not unusual for a ruling elite to make rules just to see how high their subjects will jump. Some of the most fatuous of these rules can be found amongst the Aryans of India, like the rule forbidding an untouchable from letting their shadow fall on a precious brahmin. How ridiculous can it get? Well, even more ridiculous – a story in the paper about a brahmin mother who insisted her son takes his own plate to university for fear that he might eat off a plate once used by lower caste scum (thus contaminating his precious brahmin purity).

In fact let me suggest a governing principle – wherever you find a silly rule you find someone who benefits. The reason the Judeo-Christians protect their silly sexual morality is because their whole system is largely dependent on it. If these rules are found to be arbitrary and unnecessary then a large part of their ideological edifice collapses and so does the church itself and all that tax free money and property that feeds the egos of narcissistic priests and self-proclaimed ‘born again’ reverands and ministers. Keeping junk memes alive and thriving is big business.

Now a caveat – we do need to be careful. Some rules are necessary and there for good reason. I happen to think that at least seven of the ten commandments make good sense (just not the three that refer to god). I don’t think you should kill (or use violence or force) , lie, steal or covet your neighbour’s wife (or friend’s lover). It’s the rules governing sex that are mostly irrational.

And another caveat – one of the apparent contradictions inherent in my approach is that people with low emotional and sexual intelligence, and therefore low impulse control, will not respect personal boundaries, especially those of adolescents and children. The question is, will a relaxing of the rules allow more abuse to occur, not just child sexual exploitation, but all forms of physical, emotional and mental abuse? This a serious and complex question. Firstly, people with low sexual and emotional intelligence are more likely to abuse others simply because they do not respect or even understand another person’s physical, emotional and mental boundaries. If they get angry they hit out, if they feel lust they exploit the next available opportunity even if it is rape or some kind of physical, emotional or mental manipulation or force. Studies of jail inmates typically show low scores on most developmental tests. In cases of mental disease or disability, such as sociopathy, autism, the person may not be able to read emotions or even recognise the rights of others.

The answer to this is that sexual repression actually causes low sexual and emotional intelligence. The cycle of abuse is real. It may seem counter-intuitive but a careful relaxation of sexual repression will lead to an overall increase in sexual and emotional intelligence and therefore a drop in abuse. It will still happen and should not be tolerated or excused, but the current belief that more repression is needed will only compound the problem by locking in low sexual and emotional intelligence. Let me repeat a point made in my previous post. The Abrahamic moral code is based on low sexual and emotional intelligence and therefore locks the faithful into closed behavioural patterns that inhibit emotional and sexual, and therefore moral, growth.

I know I’m repeating a theme and indulging in finding different ways to express the same point, but I believe Integral Theory must recognise the role these irrational beliefs play in inhibiting human potential. We actually have nothing to loose because many of these rules are fatuous, and everything to gain.

Is there a right to be wrong?

Saturday, June 23rd, 2007

This questions arises out of my previous post, but I think it deserves a seperate thread. Is there an ethical principle that says a person or group has a right to believe something that is demonstrably wrong? Which is the higher principle, the right to faith or the search for truth?

One of the ways religious freedom distorts ethics is that it actually places the right to faith above the search for truth. And in some notably perverse examples egregious faith in ridiculous things is valued well above the search for truth. There is a conspiracy in many societies not to mention the fact that the emperor has no clothes. Much of this is achieved through basic intimidation. We know that in the past that people who believe ridiculous things will fight and kill to assert their faith in the ridiculous. Christopher Hitchens asserts that many editors he knew did not publish the Danish cartoons because of a respect for Islam, but out of a fear of the potential backlash. We see the same bullying and intimidation at work again over the knighting of Salman Rushdie.

I look forward to the time when the search for truth is placed high on the ethics agenda and that we have worked out that there is no ‘right to be wrong’.

Do cultures have rights?

Saturday, June 23rd, 2007

I’ve started thinking about the problem with progressive/left politics. As I’ve said before I come from the left and I remain committed to many ‘progressive’ causes, but I am becoming increasingly frustrated with what I regard as an increasingly incoherent ‘left’ and even a ‘left’ that has betrayed the very idea of progress. So I’ll be attempting to collect my thoughts on this blog and maybe translate it all into a more formal article.

Most of the problem began when Marxism collapsed. The ‘left’ was socialism/communism/anarchism. There was a ‘relatively’ clear ideology and a program of change with specific targets. The defeat of socialism means that the left is now devoid of a clear ideology and a clear program. What we have is an incoherent smorgasbord of causes. In contrast the right has been ‘generally’ unified under the ideology of neo-liberalism (although there are important differences on the right).

With the abscence of a unifying ideology and political program the left no longer engages in serious debate and analysis and this has allowed a number of incoherent, self-contradictory and therefore irrational ‘beliefs’ to arise. It is these beliefs I want to address.

The first is a irrational set of beliefs around the idea of racism and human rights. Progressive politics quite rightly condemns racism, but I now find that the term racism is completely misused. Racism is the idea that people act in certain ways based entirely on their race. In crude terms Negros are inferior to Caucasians. They can’t help it, they are ‘born’ inferior by virtue of their race. We now know through modern genetics that racism is completely discredited. The problem is that ethnocentrism and sociocentrism still exist and uncritical people label ethnic and cultural discrimination as racism. I believe I may have already cited this example but I’ll use it again because it is a perfect example of how the term racism is misused. The controversial Grand Mufti (now ex-Mufti) Sheikh al-Hilali condemned his critics as being racist. Why? Because they had condemned his conservative religious views. Attacking religion is not racist and besides, Islam embraces every race. Of course he used the term racist because he knew it would have a certain resonance and emotional impact. It was a polemical device.

The problem however, is that significant numbers of people who align themselves on the ‘left’ fail to make the distinction and react automatically in support of any charge of racism. It is this uncritical acceptance of any charge of racism that plagues what I call the ‘oppositionists’, those members of the left who are ‘reactionary’ and who feel they need to react in opposition to ‘perceived’ injustice. The word ‘perceived’ is very important because this is another failing of the oppositionists – they do not seem to bother to analyse whether or not the injustice is imagined or real. It is enough for someone to ‘believe’ they have been unjustly treated. This is often the case with Muslims like al-Hilali, who interpret criticism of what is clearly a problematic position as an attack on their rights.

Another part of this complex is the uncritical application of ’special victim’ (SV) status to groups of people. The process whereby a group or person becomes an SV is extremely vague and seems to occur by word of mouth and the uncritical acceptance of the views of certain key figures. It is a bit like Chinese whispers and it is difficult to investigate where the attribution of SV comes from and therefore difficult to challenge the unspoken and often irrational assumptions behind the decision. The attribution builds momentum and then it becomes a doctrine that you dare not question.

The attribution of SV status then makes another fatal error, it generalises. The specific instance where the group was actually a victim becomes generalised into a belief that this group is always a victim and that their behaviour can be explained as the ‘fault’ of an oppressor. The victim then becomes a permanent victim and is defined by their victimhood. This process denies the complexity of most issues and the reality that in some instances the SV is also an oppressor and that their oppression is not caused by their victimhood, but by their indigenous beliefs.

The next error of the complex is the assumption that cultures and groups of SVs have rights. This is where we enter the debate about social holons. I do not accept that social holons exist. Societies, cultures and sub-cultures are heaps, collections of memes/tropes, signs, symbols and beliefs. They are ideologies of varying coherancy and ideologies do not have rights. Ideologies are simply a heap of ‘ideas’ and ideas are either rational or irrational, right or wrong.

I need to loop back to the error of placing the idea of race into the same category as ethnicity and culture. Ethnicity is not based on race, it is based on culture. Ethnicity is simply another word for tribe or group, or even nationality. For example, Serbians and Croatians are two distinct ethnic groups, but they are genetically and physically indistiguishable. The distinction of Serb or Croat is an idea based simply on place of birth and cultural beliefs. The Serbs generally belong the Eastern Orthodox religion and the Croats are generally Catholic. Another example of an ideological distinction is that between an Irish Catholic and an Irish Protestant. The difference is not genetic or racial, it’s purely ideological.

The one that really drives me crazy is treating Muslims as if they are a race and an ethnicity. I cite a small example to indicate how pervasive this error is. There is an exhibition of Islamic art on in Sydney from a private collection belonging to, of all things, an ex-Iranian Jew. The collection is maginificent and I hope it comes to Melbourne, but the interview with the owner of the collection unfortunately revealed him to be an apologist, and an obsequious apologist at that. The ’small’ problem I had was that he called it ‘Islamic’ art, yet most of it seemed to have nothing to do with Islam. Most of it seemed to be Persian or Arab art. My point is this, we may use the term Christian or Buddhist art to describe art that deals with Christian or Buddhist themes, but mostly we refer to art by nationality or school. If we refer to something as Islamic art or Islamic science we have a right to ask what was the specific contribution made by the doctrine of Islam, why is the art Islamic and not Persian, why is the science Islamic and not just science? I said this was a small point, but it’s actually a significant one because in many cases we find that Islam actually contributed nothing of much consequence. As Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens both point out, religion has not created art, it has only provided narrative themes for art.

Why I find this so annoying is that uncritical members of the left buy into this category error and treat certain ideologies as races and therefore as SVs. I reckon I will scream the next time I hear someone talk about the magnificence of Islamic culture (what of Catholic, Protestant or Mormon culture?). It was not the religious doctrine of Islam that created the golden age, it was the openess of specific rulers to pre-existing cultures. As it did under Christianity, art and science struggled under the shear stupidity of Islamic religious doctrine. Under Islam there were severe restrictions on representational art, particularly of the human form, because of the purely religious belief that any representation of God’s creation was blasphemy. Similarly science was beholden to religious doctrine. What can we say about the alleged greatness of Islamic science when so many clerics are ignorant of even the basics? Up until the early 90’s some Wahhabi clerics in Arabia were still teaching that the earth was flat.

The fear of being called a racist, even though that claim is clearly misapplied and ridiculous, leads many on the ‘oppositional’ and ‘reactionary’ left to be uncritical of other cultures, particularly if they have been given SV status. This is most hypocritically and outrageously applied to Islam, which is often given a ‘get out of jail free’ card simply on the basis of it being appointed a SV (I flatly deny that Islam is a victim of anything, it is a perpetrator and oppressor). There is appaling abuse of human rights and fundamental freedoms under Islam yet so many on the left betray progressivism by refusing to be critical because they believe Islam is a SV that has a ‘right’ to be respected, and perversely, that to be critical of Islam is somehow being racist.

The same perverse logic is applied to Aboriginal Australia. The abuse of women and children in Aboriginal communities has been going on for many decades. I’ve seen it first hand when I worked with an Aboriginal community centre in the late 70’s. There was always a reason why such abuse was excused. Aborigines had been given SV status and therefore could not be held responsible for their own actions. The violence against women and children was never due to indigenous cultural beliefs and practices but due to anger over white colonisation. As the logic goes, when Aborigines are given land rights and self-determination the cycle of abuse will stop.

And so, by a long route we come to the reason why the left is partly to blame for the current crisis – because they excused and denied the abuse out of a misplaced cultural sensitivity to a group that had been given SV status. They shut off their critical faculties and indulged in fantasies. They supported the idea of self-determination even when there was clear and ugly evidence that in some communities self-determination was used by violent and abusive men as an excuse to get away with it and that some communities were dysfunctional and couldn’t self-determine themselves out of wet paper bag. There has been a code of silence, but current events have broken that code. Over the next few months we will hear stories of how white doctors and police said nothing for fear of breaking the code, of how Aboriginal women and children were intimidated and how it was the men in charge of the community that perpetrated the crimes, and how Aboriginal activists and intellectuals in the cities placed their political agenda above the rights of remote women and children.

The silence of the left because of a mistaken belief in cultural sensitivity is a complete betrayal of all progressive principles. I think it was the Cape York indigenous leader Noel Pearson who said that the current crisis has created a new generation, we had the ’stolen’ generation, now we have the ‘lost’ generation, children who have been psychologically damaged and have missed out on valuable education and who are effectively illiterate and dependent.

We face a similar betrayal of progressive principles in the cause of appeasing and excusing Islam.

Cultures do not have rights, they are collections of ideas that should be examined with a critical eye. Nor do cultures deserve respect as of right, they must earn respect on the basis of their effectiveness and accuracy. Many cultural memes are irrational, absurd and based on mistaken beliefs, many are lies portrayed as truths. Real progressivism is the systematic removal of irrationality and lies. If that means change then so be it. Who said that cultures must be conserved? Isn’t that the task of conservatives, to conserve tradition? When did progressives become conservatives?

Integral families

Saturday, June 9th, 2007

What exactly is a family? The religious right have appropriated the concept of family and their politics is aimed at protecting ‘the family’. But we all know this is a very narrow understanding of what a family is, namely a nuclear, heterosexual family. Conservative Muslims are big on family as well, however their concept of family includes polygamy. According to the Koran a Muslim male is allowed four wives.

It’s odd that conservative Christians are so concerned about the family because Jesus was definitely anti-family. The gospels tell the story of Jesus demanding that his disciples to leave their families and take up a life of poverty following him as he wandered the Holy Land. In Matthew 8:21 and 22 Jesus tells the disciple who wants to first bury his father to ‘let the dead bury the dead’, in other words to not bury his father. In Matthew 22:22-33 the story is told of the custom that if a man dies without having children his brother should marry his widow and in this example a woman is passed down through seven brothers until her death. Jesus is asked if she will marry again at the resurrection and he says no one will marry in heaven. In Matthew 25 there is the odd parable of the ten virgins who await the bridegroom. Clearly it’s symbolic but the substance of the story is one man deflowering ten virgins (which in those times would have been around the age of 12). In both Matthew and Luke there is the story where Jesus is told his mother and brothers are waiting outside to see him. He ignores this and says his followers are his real mother and brothers. In other words he denies his family. In Luke 11:62 Jesus tells a follower he cannot go back and say goodbye to his family, ‘no-one who puts his hand to the plough and looks back is fit for service in the Kingdom of God.’ In Luke 12:49 he tells his followers that he has come to bring fire and division to the earth, ‘They will be divided, father against son, son against father…’

What is clear from these examples is that Jesus taught to value the Kingdom of God above the family and to deny the family in preference to the spiritual journey. The Catholic church certianly understood this and the highest vocation was to become a celibate. Even St Paul preferred that men dedicate themselves to God, but allowed as a concession that if they could not be so disciplined they could marry.

So how is it that Christians now say the family is the centre of their faith when Jesus was quite clerly an ascetic and encouraged men to leave their families?

The answer comes in the 2nd and 3rd centuries after Jesus’s death when the early Church fathers understood that if they controlled sex and the family they controlled people. It’s about power.

An Integral approach to families must expose this brutal fact and the hypocricy that informs it. An Integral approach must also look at the facts. The concept of the family varies from culture to culture and from time to time. The concept of the nuclear, heterosexual family so beloved of modern conservative Christians is a rather narrow form of the possible variations.

The desire of the Judeo-Christians to control people by controlling the family is no more evident in the issue of gay marriage. Our own PM has consistently said that children are best raised by a mother AND father, but is this right?

Integral theory demands that the greatest number of people be able to develop to their full potential. This means that Integral theory must be concerned with how children are best raised to reach their highest potential in all lines of development. I would argue strongly that the Judeo-Christian family model is not the best structure to achieve this goal. In fact there is evidence to suggest that the Judeo-Christian family is really designed to do one thing, perpetuate the Judeo-Christian worldview.

As far as I’m aware there is no evidence to suggest that children are worse off in gay families. As I understand it what studies have been done suggest that there is no ill effect on children raised in gay families. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that children raised in non-conformative families are badly affected.

However, there is considerable evidence that divorce can cause problems, but this does not help the nuclear family model because these are the families most prone to break-up.

What do children need to develop to their highest potential? I’m not sure a definitive study across all family types has even been done, but I think the research suggests that children need emotional security, predictability, positive affirmation and importantly, stimulation. Divorce has negative effects because it attacks the need for emotional security and predictability. Now if we can isolate what children need I’m confident that we will find that non-conformative structures may do a better job than the heterosexual nuclear family. I’m an old hippy and I know of children raised in communal situations. I’m not going to say that all such communal experiments were successful, many failed, but this is no evidence that children raised in these situations were any worse off than children raised in nuclear families. In fact as far as I’m aware when the communal situation worked well the children were developmentally more advanced than their nuclear-raised peers. The main reason was the stimulation from many adult role models, provided of course, that the communal situation provided emotional security, predictability and positive reinforcement.

Another example is the kibbutz experiment in Israel. Here we do have some substantive studies and the evidence uggests that children raised in communal dorms were not necessarily negatively affected in any sense. In the most radical of the kibbutz children were raised in same sex dorms and showered and toileted together (some kibbutz schools had uni-sex toilets). The whole idea was to negate the Freudian Oedipus complex found in bourgeois family structures. Integral theory needs to remember the work done by Freud and Reich on families and sexual repression. The kibbutz experiment was a direct reaction to Freudian and even Reichian theories.

There have been many studies that show that nuclear, heterosexual families can fail abysmally. Integral theory needs to understand why they fail.

Despite all its rhetoric about the family the Judeo-Christians have a poor record with child rearing. They are not concerned with raising highly competent children, they are mainly concerned with replicating the ideology. I would suggest that a comparative study will show that children raised in conservative Judeo-Christian families will not perform as well as children raised in more non-conventional, progressive families. I’d like to see a definitive study done (and then I’d like to shove it in their faces – see, you only raise brainwashed robots trapped in mythic thinking). I’m aware also that in some fundamentalist religious groups there is systematic abuse. In Mormon circles young adolescent girls are married off to older men, amongst the Amish there have been cases of incest, with the girls blamed for the incident and then pressured to stay silent, and many Catholic families turned a blind eye to the abuses of the clergy. Christopher Hitchens makes the extraordinary claim that in Ireland over half of all children were abused by priests. You can’t tell me that the parents didn’t suspect anything.

I’ll repeat this point – the conservative Judeo-Christians want to control the family because they want to control the minds of children. At its worst it is a totally sinister ambition.

I think Integral theory will eventually prove that provided certain key conditions are met children wil thrive in a range of family types, gay marriages, single-parent and multiple parent. Rather than legislate to privilege the Judeo-Christian mythic model governments should legislate to encourage the key conditions. I personally think that one of the greatest tragedies to affect children is the absentee parent, usually the father. I understand this is a significant problem in some minority communities in the US. Rather than marriage being legally binding I believe parenting should be legally binding. Once you have created a child as either mother or father an Integral society will insist you honour the obligations that it entails. I have no problems in punishing parents who neglect their responsibility. So rather than get a marriage certificate perhaps parents and families (however constituted) should get a parenting certificate. This certificate would give them access to all family benefits but also obligate them to certain conditions, perhaps including a vow of fidelity to the child (I promise to love and treasure you, to do my best to ensure you reach your highest potential, etc – now that would be a good, blue tradition. It could replace christening and could involve grandparents and god-parents, etc).

So why have the Judeo-Christians dominated the family debate? I would suggest because many progressives are at the orange level of individualism and they’ve vacated the debate and left a vacuum. I think the evidence supports progressive families over conservative families, but progressives have been too busy chasing individualism to pay enough attention to raising children. Integral theory needs to address the imbalance.

Here I would also add that I think one of the great destructive effects on the family is orange exploitation for individualistic reasons. Green is communal and is concerned with children. It’s the orange careerist who wants to build wealth and delay having children – and many companies have anti-family cultures. It is Green that demands that capitalism create family friendly work places by including maternity and paternity leave, flexible working hours, child care, etc, etc. Oddly enough conservative Judeo-Christians seem not to make too many demands on capitalism in this regard, their solution is stay at home mothers and remote, workaholic, disciplinarian fathers.

Anyway, this has gone on long enough and is just an introduction to ’some’ of the issues. In any case, I think it’s time we rescued ‘the family’ from the sinister clutches of the Judeo-Christians.

Integrating validity claims & multiple perspectives

Thursday, May 24th, 2007

Wilber 5 is arguably about multiple perspectives and their integration. But whereas Ken seems to have a “meta”perspective or “integral theory” to handle this job, Habermas “rejects the idea of a metadiscourse that sorts out these boundary issues [so] he must answer this challenge in his democratic theory.” Such an approach avoids what has become the totalizing hegemony of an individual’s metanarrative versus the “public autonomy” of democracy. (By the way, with the latter terms I’m reminded of Mark’s use of the quadratic nature of the social holon’s “agency.”) In any event, you can see from the excerpts below where Ken gets a lot of his ideas on perspectives, validity claims and integration.

As to who has the “better argument” between Ken and Habermas, which criteria will you use? Which form of argument and which validity claim? Or as the below points out, how can one integrate them when they compete in the public sphere? This also brings in the topic of “altitude,” which Habermas also deals with in that democracy is an advance on pre-modern forms of social interaction.

I guess for me some questions are: Is what Ken offering in terms of the “next level,” both of individual and social development, really beyond the deliberative democracy Habermas proposes as the integrating factor? Or is it possible that we have yet to even achieve a full deliberative democracy and hence Ken’s “beyond” is really just speculation informed by personal and unconscious biases from his/our “lifeworld” that have yet to be recognized? And wouldn’t we have to study and understand Habermas at least as equally well that we study and understand Ken to be able to compare their ideas to make such validity claims ourselves? And then hash out such integration via public, communicative discourse within a “community of the adequate?”
And wouldn’t such communal adequacy have such well-informed comparison of ideas instead of just accepting the model of one person, no matter how brilliant or integrative?

I personally cannot see how one can claim to the title of being “integral” without exploring the foundations from which Ken built his model, and Habermas is certainly one such foundation. Unless you explore Habbie and others yourself you are accepting Ken’s interpretations without your own careful and critical consideration and are in effect justifiably criticized for tagging along as a cultish follower. And quite frankly I’m not interested in hearing regurgitated Kenobilia from such acolytes, as puke stinks no matter how exquisite the original meal.

From the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Habermas

Although Habermas’s attitude toward these different modes of critical theory is somewhat ambivalent, he has given good reasons to accept the practical, pluralist approach. Just as in the analysis of modes of inquiry tied to distinct knowledge-constitutive interests, Habermas accepts that various theories and methods each have “a relative legitimacy.” Indeed, like Dewey he goes so far as to argue that the logic of social explanation is pluralistic and elides the “apparatus of general theories.” In the absence of any such general theories, the most fruitful approach to social-scientific knowledge is to bring all the various methods and theories into relation to each other: “Whereas the natural and the cultural or hermeneutic sciences are capable of living in mutually indifferent, albeit more hostile than peaceful coexistence, the social sciences must bear the tension of divergent approaches under one roof” (1988a, 3). In TCA, Habermas casts critical social theory in a similarly pluralistic, yet unifying way. In discussing various accounts of societal modernization, for example, he argues that the main existing theories have their own “particular legitimacy” as developed lines of empirical research, and that Critical Theory takes on the task of critically unifying the various theories and their heterogeneous methods and presuppositions. “Critical social theory does not relate to established lines of research as a competitor; starting from its concept of the rise of modern societies, it attempts to explain the specific limitations and the relative rights of those approaches” (TCA, 2: 375).

What are these claims that are open to criticism and justification? In opposition to the positivist fixation on fact-stating modes of discourse, Habermas does not limit intersubjectively valid, or justifiable, claims to the category of empirical truth, but instead recognizes a spectrum of “validity claims” that also includes, at the least, claims to moral rightness, ethical goodness or authenticity, personal sincerity, and aesthetic value (TCA 1: 8–23; 1993, chap. 1). Although Habermas does not consider such claims to represent a mind-independent world in the manner of empirical truth claims, they can be both publicly criticized as unjustifiable and defended by publicly convincing arguments. To this extent, validity involves a notion of correctness analogous to the idea of truth. In this context, the phrase “validity claim,” as a translation of the German term Geltungsanspruch, does not have the narrow logical sense (truth-preserving argument forms), but rather connotes a richer social idea—that a claim (statement) merits the addressee’s acceptance because it is justified or true in some sense, which can vary according to the sphere of validity and dialogical context.

The term “lifeworld,” by contrast, refers to domains of action in which consensual modes of action coordination predominate. In fact, the distinction between lifeworld and system is better understood as an analytic one that identifies different aspects of social interaction and cooperation (1991b). “Lifeworld” then refers to the background resources, contexts, and dimensions of social action that enable actors to cooperate on the basis of mutual understanding: shared cultural systems of meaning, institutional orders that stabilize patterns of action, and personality structures acquired in family, church, neighborhood, and school (TCA 1: chap. 6; 1998b, chap. 4).

The rationalization of the lifeworld in Western modernity went hand-in-hand with the growth of systemic mechanisms of coordination already mentioned above, in which the demands on fully communicative consensus are relaxed. If large and complex modern societies can no longer be integrated solely on the basis of shared cultural values and norms, new nonintentional mechanisms of coordination must emerge, which take the form of nonlinguistic media of money and power. For example, markets coordinate the collective production and distribution of goods nonintentionally, even if they are grounded in cultural and political institutions such as firms and states. Modernization can become pathological, as when money and power “colonize the lifeworld” and displace communicative forms of solidarity and inhibit the reproduction of the lifeworld, as when, for example, universities become governed by market strategies.

As mentioned above, Habermas proposes a multi-dimensional conception of reason that expresses itself in different forms of cognitive validity: not only in truth claims about the empirical world, but also in rightness claims about the kind of treatment we owe each other as persons, authenticity claims about the good life, technical-pragmatic claims about the means suitable to different goals, and so on. As he acknowledges, the surface grammar of speech acts does not suffice to establish this range of validity types. Rather, to ground the multi-dimensional system of validity claims, one must supplement semantic analysis with a pragmatic analysis of the different sorts of argumentative discourse—the different “logics of argumentation”—through which each type can be intersubjectively justified (TCA 1: 8–42). Thus, a type of validity claim counts as distinct from other types only if one can establish that its discursive justification involves features that distinguish it from other types of justification. Whether or not his pragmatic theory of meaning succeeds, the discursive analysis of validity illuminates important differences in the argumentative demands that come with different types of justifiable claims. To see how Habermas identifies these different features, it is first necessary to understand the general structures of argumentation.

The pragmatic analysis of argumentation in general. Habermas’s discourse theory assumes that the specific type of validity claim one aims to justify—the cognitive goal or topic of argumentation—determines the specific argumentative practices appropriate for such justification. Discourse theory thus calls for a pragmatic analysis of argumentation as a social practice. Such analysis aims to reconstruct the normative presuppositions that structure the discourse of competent arguers. To get at these presuppositions, one cannot simply describe argumentation as it empirically occurs; as we already saw in TCA, one must adopt the performative attitude of a participant and articulate the shared, though often tacit, ideals and rules that provide the basis for regarding some arguments as better than others. Following contemporary argumentation theorists, Habermas assumes one cannot fully articulate these normative presuppositions solely in terms of the logical properties of arguments. Rather, he distinguishes three aspects of argument-making practices: argument as product, as procedure, and as process, which he loosely aligns with the traditional perspectives on argument evaluation of logic, dialectic, and rhetoric. Pragmatically, each of these perspectives functions as a “level of presupposition” involved in the assessment of the cogency—the goodness or strength—of arguments. Habermas seems to regard these perspectives, taken together, as constituting the pragmatic idea of cogency: “at no single one of these analytic levels can the very idea intrinsic to argumentative speech be adequately developed” (TCA 1: 26).

At the logical level, participants are concerned with arguments as products, that is, sets of reasons that support conclusions. From this perspective, arguers aim to construct “cogent arguments that are convincing in virtue of their intrinsic properties and with which validity claims can be redeemed or rejected” (ibid., 25). Following work by Stephen Toulmin and other informal logicians, Habermas regards most if not all argumentation as ultimately resting on ampliative arguments whose conclusions do not follow with deductive certainty but only as more or less plausible or probable. The logical strength of such arguments depends on how well one has taken into account all the relevant information and possible objections. Thus the term “logical” has a broad sense that includes not only formal but also informal logics, in which strength depends on the interrelated meanings of terms and background information that resists complete formalization: induction, analogy, narrative, and so on.

Given the ampliative character of most arguments, logical assessment presupposes the dialectical adequacy of argumentative procedures. That is, we may regard the products of our argument-making practices as logically strong only if we presume, at the dialectical level, that we have submitted arguments and counterarguments to sufficiently severe procedures of critical discussion—as Habermas (TCA 1: 26) puts it, a “ritualized competition for the better arguments.” Dialectical treatments of argumentation typically spell out the “dialectical obligations” of discussants: that one should address the issue at hand, should respond to relevant challenges, meet the specified burden of proof, and so on.

However, robust critical testing of competing arguments depends in turn on the rhetorical quality of the persuasive process. Habermas conceives the rhetorical level in terms of highly idealized properties of communication, which he initially presented as the conditions of an “ideal speech situation” (1973a; also 1971/2001). That way of speaking now strikes him as overly reified, suggesting an ideal condition that real discourses must measure up to, or at least approximately satisfy—motifs that Habermas himself employed until rather recently (cf. 1993, 54–55; 1996b, 322–23). He now understands the idea of rhetorically adequate process as a set of unavoidable yet counterfactual “pragmatic presuppositions” that participants must make if they are to regard the actual execution of dialectical procedures as a sufficiently severe critical test. Habermas (2005b, 89) identifies four such presuppositions as the most important: (i) no one capable of making a relevant contribution has been excluded, (ii) participants have equal voice, (iii) they are internally free to speak their honest opinion without deception or self-deception, and (iv) there are no sources of coercion built into the process and procedures of discourse. Such conditions, in effect, articulate what it would mean to assess all the relevant information and arguments (for a given level of knowledge and inquiry) as reasonably as possible, weighing arguments purely on the merits in a disinterested pursuit of truth. These conditions are counterfactual in the sense that actual discourses can rarely realize—and can never empirically certify—full inclusion, non-coercion, and equality. At the same time, these idealizing presuppositions have an operative effect on actual discourse: we may regard outcomes (both consensual and non-consensual) as reasonable only if our scrutiny of the process does not uncover obvious exclusions, suppression of arguments, manipulation, self-deception, and the like (2003a, 108). In this sense, these pragmatic idealizations function as “standards for a self-correcting learning process” (2005b, 91).

As an understanding of the rhetorical perspective, Habermas’s highly idealized and formal model hardly does justice to the substantive richness of the rhetorical tradition. One can, however, supplement his model with a more substantive rhetoric that draws on Aristotle’s account of ethos and pathos (Rehg 1997). In that case, the rhetorical perspective is concerned with designing arguments for their ability to place the particular audience in the proper social-psychological space for making a responsible collective judgment. But the “space of responsible judgment” still remains an idealization that may not be reduced to any observable actual behavior, but can at most be defeasibly presumed. The same probably holds for dialectical procedures. Although the dialectical perspective draws on the tradition of public debate, dialectical norms, when understood as pragmatic presuppositions, are not identical with institutionalized rules of debate (1990a, 91). A neutral observer can judge whether interlocutors have externally complied with institutional procedures, whereas engaged participants must judge how well they have satisfied the dialectical presupposition of severe critical testing.

The differentiation of argumentative discourses. If the different validity claims require different types of argumentation, then the relevant differences must emerge through a closer analysis of the ways the above aspects of argumentative practice adjust to different sorts of content, that is, the different validity claims at issue (cf. 2005b, chap. 3). To be sure, Habermas does not regard every validity claim as open to discourse proper. Sincerity claims (or “truthfulness claims,” as it is sometimes translated) are the prime example. These are claims an actor makes about his or her interior subjectivity: feelings, moods, desires, beliefs, and the like. Such claims are open to rational assessment, not in discourse but by comparison with the actor’s behavior: for example, if a son claims to care deeply about his parents but never pays them any attention, we would have grounds for doubting the sincerity of his claim. Note that such insincerity might involve self-deception rather than deliberative lying.

Truth and rightness claims, by contrast, are susceptible to argumentative justification in the proper sense, through what Habermas calls “strict discourses.” As he first analyzed the discourses connected with these two types of validity (1973a), they had much in common. Although the types of reasons differed—moral discourse rested primarily on need interpretations, empirical-theoretical discourse on empirical inductions—in both cases, the relevant reasons should, in principle, be acceptable to any reasonable agent. In the case of empirical truth claims, this process-level presupposition of consensus rests on the idea that the objective world is the same for all; in the case of moral rightness, it rests on the idea that valid moral rules and principles hold for all persons. In both cases, the appropriate audience for the testing of claims is universal, and in making a truth or rightness claim one counterfactually presupposes that a universal consensus would result, were the participants able to pursue a sufficiently inclusive and reasonable discourse for a sufficient length of time. Although his early statements are somewhat unclear, on one reading Habermas defined not only moral rightness but also empirical truth in terms of such ideal consensus (similar to C. S. Peirce). He now further distinguishes truth from moral rightness by defining the latter, but not the former, in terms of idealized consensus. More on that below.

Authenticity claims, unlike truth and rightness claims, do not come with such a strong consensual expectation. Habermas associates this type of claim with “ethical” discourse. Unlike moral discourse, in which participants strive to justify norms and courses of action that accord due concern and respect for persons in general, ethical discourses focus on questions of the good life, either for a given individual (“ethical-existential” discourse) or for a particular group or polity (“ethical-political” discourse). Consequently, the kind of reasons that constitute cogent arguments in ethical discourse depend on the life histories, traditions, and particular values of those whose good is at issue. This reference to individual- and group-related particularities means that one should not expect those reasons to win universal consensus (1993, 1–18; 1996b, 162–68). However, Habermas (2003b) seems to recognize one class of ethical questions that do admit of universal consensus. Choices of technologies that bear on the future of human nature, such as genetic enhancement engineering, pose species-wide ethical issues. Such issues concern not merely our self-understanding as members of this or that particular culture or tradition, but how we should understand our basic human dignity. The core of human dignity, and thus the basis for a human-species ethics, on his view, lies in the capacity of human beings for autonomous self-determination.

In sum, Habermas’s discourse theory aligns different types of validity claim with different types of justificatory discourse. At the logical level, cogent arguments must employ somewhat different sorts of reasons to justify different types of claims. Although some sorts of reasons might enter into each type of discourse (e.g., empirical claims), the set of relevant considerations that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for making logically strong arguments will differ. Thus, claims about what human beings need are relevant reasons in moral arguments about welfare obligations, but not for supporting the truth claim that quarks exist. At the dialectical level, one must meet different burdens of proof by answering different types of challenges. For example, in defending the ethical authenticity of Tom’s pursuit of a career in medicine, one need not show that medicine is a career everyone must follow, but only that such a career makes sense, given Tom’s personal background, talents, and desires. One can also examine Tom’s career choice from a moral perspective, but in that case one need only show that anyone in his circumstances is morally permitted to pursue medicine. At the rhetorical level, finally, the scope and depth of agreement differs according to the type of claim. Moral rightness claims and empirical truth claims are justified by reasons that should be acceptable to a universal audience, whereas ethical claims are addressed to those who share a particular history and tradition of values.

Having differentiated types of discourse, Habermas must say something about how they interrelate. Clearly, some discourses depend on other types: most obviously, moral and ethical discourses partly depend on empirical claims, and thus depend on the outcome of empirical discourses about the circumstances and consequences of behavioral rules and the collective pursuit of the good life. The question of interrelationship becomes especially urgent in the political sphere, where different discourses intertwine and lead to competing conclusions, or when issues arise in which discourse types cannot be cleanly separated, so that the standards of cogency become obscure or deeply contested (McCarthy 1991, chap. 7; 1998). Because Habermas (1996c, 1534f) rejects the idea of a metadiscourse that sorts out these boundary issues, he must answer this challenge in his democratic theory.

Habermas (1990a, 116–94) has also attempted to give discourse ethics some empirical foothold by looking to moral psychology and social anthropology. The psychological line of argument draws on the theory of communicative action to reconstruct theories of moral development such as Lawrence Kohlberg’s. According to Habermas, moral maturation involves the growing ability to integrate the interpersonal perspectives given with the system of personal pronouns; the endpoint of that process coincides with the capacity to engage in the mutual perspective-taking required by (U) [universalization principle]. The anthropological line of argument focuses on identity formation, drawing on the social psychology of G. H. Mead. In broad agreement with Hegelian models of mutual recognition, Mead understands the individual’s development of a stable personal identity as inextricably bound up with processes of socialization that depend on participation in relationships of mutual recognition. Habermas (ibid., 195–215; 1990b) extends this analysis to respond to feminist and communitarian criticisms of impartialist, justice-based moralities. According to the standard critiques, such moralities assume an implausibly atomistic view of the self and thus fail to appreciate the moral import of particularity and cultural substance: particular relationships between unique individuals, on the one hand, and membership in particular cultural communities or traditions, on the other. Mead’s analysis shows that the critics are on to an important point: if individuation depends on socialization, then any anthropologically viable system of morality must protect not only the integrity of individuals but also the web of relationships and cultural forms of life on which individuals depend for their moral development. Discourse ethics, Habermas claims, meets this two-fold demand in virtue of the kind of mutual perspective-taking it requires. If we examine (U), we see that it requires participants to attend to the values and interests of each person as a unique individual; conversely, each individual conditions her judgment about the moral import of her values and interests on what all participants can freely accept. Consequently, moral discourse is structured in a way that links moral validity with solidaristic concern for both the concrete individual and the morally formative communities on which her identity depends.

The central task of Habermas’s democratic theory is to provide a normative account of legitimate law. His deliberative democratic model rests on what is perhaps the most complex argument in his philosophical corpus, found in his Between Facts and Norms (1996b; German ed., 1992b; for commentary, see Baynes 1995; Rosenfeld and Arato 1998; vom Schomberg and Baynes 2004). Boiled down to its essentials, however, the argument links his discourse theory with an analysis of the demands inherent on modern legal systems, which Habermas understands in light of the history of Western modernization. The analysis thus begins with a functional explanation of the need for positive law in modern societies. This analysis picks up on points he made in TCA (see sec. 3.1 above).

Societies are stable over the long run only if their members generally perceive them as legitimate: as organized in accordance with what is true, right, and good. In premodern Europe, legitimacy was grounded in a shared religious worldview that penetrated all spheres of life. As modernization engendered religious pluralism and functional differentiation (autonomous market economies, bureaucratic administrations, unconstrained scientific research), the potentials for misunderstanding and conflict about the good and the right increased—just as the shared background resources for the consensual resolution of such conflicts decreased. When we consider this dynamic simply from the standpoint of the (D) [discourse]-principle, the prospects for legitimacy in modern societies appear quite dim.

Sociologically, then, one can understand modern law as a functional solution to the conflict potentials inherent in modernization. By opening up legally defined spheres of individual freedom, modern law reduces the burden of questions that require general (society-wide) discursive consensus. Within these legal boundaries, individuals are free to pursue their interests and happiness as they see fit, normally through various modes of association, whether that pursuit is primarily governed by modes of strategic action (as in economic markets), by recognized authority or consensual discourse (e.g., within religious communities, in the sciences), or by bureaucratic rationality (as in hierarchically organized voluntary enterprises). Consequently, modern law is fundamentally concerned with the definition, protection, and resolution of conflicts among, individual freedoms in their various institutional and organizational contexts.

The demands on the legitimation of law change with this functional realignment: to be legitimate, modern law must secure the private autonomy of those subject to it. The legal guarantee of private autonomy in turn presupposes an established legal code and a legally defined status of equal citizenship in terms of actionable basic rights that secure a space for individual freedom. However, such rights are expressions of freedom only if citizens can also understand themselves as the authors of the laws that interpret their rights—that is, only if the laws that protect private autonomy also issue from citizens’ exercise of public autonomy as lawmakers acting through elected representatives. Thus, the rights that define individual freedom must also include rights of political participation. As Habermas understands the relation between private and public autonomy, each is “co-original” or “equiprimordial,” conceptually presupposing the other in the sense that each can be fully realized only if the other is fully realized. The exercise of public autonomy in its full sense presupposes participants who understand themselves as individually free (privately autonomous), which in turn presupposes that they can shape their individual freedoms through the exercise of public autonomy. This equiprimordial relationship, Habermas (1998a, chap. 9) believes, enables his discourse theory to combine the best insights of the civic republican and classical liberal traditions of democracy, which found expression in Rousseau and Locke, respectively.

The idea of public autonomy means that the legitimacy of ordinary legislation must ultimately be traceable to robust processes of public discourse that influence formal decisionmaking in legislative bodies. Habermas summarizes this requirement in his democratic principle of legitimacy: “only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legal constituted” (1996b, 110). As he goes on to explain, this principle articulates the core requirement for “externally” institutionalizing the different types of practical discourse that are relevant for the justification of particular laws. Decisions about laws typically involve a combination of validity claims: not only truth claims about the likely consequences of different legal options, but also claims about their moral rightness (or justice), claims about the authenticity of different options in light of the polity’s shared values and history, and pragmatic claims about which option is feasible or more efficient. Legitimate laws must pass the different types of discursive tests that come with each of these validity claims. Habermas also recognizes that many issues involve conflicts among particular interests that cannot be reconciled by discursive agreement on validity but only through fair bargaining processes.

Integral suicide

Wednesday, May 9th, 2007

I’ve often expressed an interest in dealing with policy from an integral perspective. Theory is fine, but how do we put it into practice?

I was watching a rather moving documentary on TV. It was an examination of the growing movement amongst senior citizens to choose the moment and method of their death. There is a group in Oz called Exit who demand the right to suicide painlessly. It seems that seniors in their hundreds are going to Mexico to buy nembutol, a drug used to euthanase animals, and then smuggle it back into Oz. Apparently nembutol causes a peaceful death. However, a more radical faction of Exit have started manufacturing nembutol illegally in backyard laboratories. What is driving this movement?

The seniors interviewed were quite adamant that they did not want to die a slow, helpless death where they were kept alive just to be kept alive. They all expressed a fear of loosing ‘quality’ of life and rotting away in a nursing home. They were also quite adamant that they would only suicide when they were close to their last years. One man was 91 and still active, but calmly noted he was declining rapidly. All of the seniors interviewed seemed intelligent and very competent. In fact my guess is that many of them were of above average intelligence with many having achieved a lot in their lives. One was a retired doctor. The message I got was that these people feared loosing control and wanted to control the manner in which they died. Some of them spoke bitterly about becoming the victims of the medical profession who would put them in beds and keep them alive without ensuring a ‘quality’ of life. One woman complained that she didn’t want to put in a home to play mindless games of bingo.

Of course, the documentary canvassed the opinions of those opposed to the Exit movement, but I found their objections faulty. This may very well have been a fault of the video researchers for not finding better arguments against suicide. One doctor was an advocate from Right to Life. He was arrogant, patronizing and young. It made me think that anyone under the age of sixty or so should generally be barred from advocating on this issue. He exemplified everything the Exit elders were objecting to – a medical profession willing to remove power from them. This young advocate was like most moralisers, he assumed his moral position was absolute and right – people have to be kept alive even if they suffer greatly.

The second anti position was another doctor. She thought the answer was to understand what the Exit elders feared and solve that problem. I found her argument naive. They fear the gradual loss of control that occurs in old age. They fear decripitude and being infantalized in nursing homes. In a way the doctor was right. A lot more must be done to ensure a dignified old age, but much of this has to do with money. It’s okay if you are rich, but if you are poor you face a life of poverty on an inadequate pension and sub-standard care in a sub-standard nursing home. Some of these sub-standard nursing homes do the bare minimum and are really just ‘parking’ places where old people are hidden away to die.

The problem with people who have retired is that they no longer make an income, so they become an expense on society. The doctor was naive because there is no movement to radically improve aged care, people would rather hide the problem away. It’s an interesting problem. Society is not ready to assist the elderly to suicide, but they are also not prepared to spend the money to ensure a dignified old age.

I would expect to see an increase in the demand for the suicide option as the boomers get older. The boomers will be less likely to tolerate the disempowerment of old age. There will have to be a quite radical rethink of aged care. No more waltzes and Bing Crosby as the music of the 60’s and 70’s takes over. How about prescribing marijuana for use in retirement homes?

Btw, the members of Exit argued that the elderly are suiciding at an increasing rate anyway. The reason they want nembutol legalized is so that the suicide is non-violent. The most common form of suicide amongst the elderly, especially older men (who have lost their partner and are alone) is hanging. The Exit seniors were quite adamant. We will choose our own time, but we want to be able to do it peacefully.

What do you think? Should the elderly and the terminally ill be able to suicide? Is a greater good being served in keeping people who will not recover alive? What would the integral policy be?

At-will employment

Monday, February 12th, 2007

Questions: From what worldview does at-will employment arise? Would at-will employment be acceptable to an “integral” business?

Here are a couple links to get the discussion going:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/At-will

http://www.rbs2.com/atwill.htm