Open Integral

I’m having a discussion with a Dzogchen practitioner and scholar about the nature of rigpa, which he says is not metaphysical yet it is still unconditioned. I brought up the rangtong-shentong debate (see Jackson below), because it seems that Dzogchen is still retaining the notion of an “unconditioned” state that is not the same as the “conditional,” conventional reality. I.e., the dichotomy of the two truths instead of their identity. Even the wikipedia entry suggests a relation of Dzogchen rigpa to shentong. Said practitioner quoted the Dalai Lama (below) as qualifying rigpa as avoiding the pitfalls of shentong and therefore valid. Yet when I read Batchelor on emptiness and the two truths (also below) I cannot reconcile how Dzogchen rigpa stays within the conditioned, codependent origination, yet is “outside” it in some “unconditioned” state. Any help?

From Roger Jackson’s review of The Great Debate on Emptiness:

Other-emptiness was declared to be the heart of a “Great Madhyamaka” philosophical system rooted in India and superior to the “self-emptiness” (rangtong) view of the Prasangika school regarded by Gelukpas (and others) as the acme of Buddhist thought. Although it originated with the Jonangpas, the otheremptiness view found adherents over the years within the other principal lineages of Tibet: the Nyingma, the Kagyu, and to a lesser extent, the Sakya. It is taught by certain masters of those traditions to this day.

The conflict between Rangtongpas and Shentongpas (as I will denote them) is perhaps the most significant philosophical debate in Tibetan history. The ground on which it was contested includes arguments about the Buddha’s intent in teaching emptiness in multiple ways, the significance of discourse about buddhanature (or the “matrix-of-one-gone-thus,” as Hopkins translates it)1 and dharmakaya, the parameters of the two truths, and the sort of negation that emptiness is. To its participants, though, the debate is not mere scholastic speculation about how many nothings can fit on the non-head of a non-pin. Rather, it impinges directly on the great question of spiritual freedom: for Mahayana Buddhists, enlightenment is contingent on a direct realization of emptiness, and emptiness cannot be directly realized if one’s philosophical understanding of it is incorrect. Thus, the stakes in the debate could not be higher.

From the wikipedia entry on Shentong.

Shentong (also, zhentong; Tibetan: གཞེན་སྟོང་; Wylie: gzhen-stong), also sometimes called ”Yogacara Madhyamaka,” is a philosophical sub-school found in Tibetan Buddhism whose followers hold that the nature of mind is “empty of other” (i.e., empty of all qualities other than an inherent, ineffable nature), in contrast to the “Rangtong” view of the followers of Prasangika Madhyamaka, who hold that all phenomena are unequivocally empty of self-nature, without positing anything beyond that. According to Shentongpas, the emptiness of ultimate reality should not be characterized in the same way as the emptiness of apparent phenomena.

When speaking of the emptiness of mind’s ultimate nature, Shentongpas often use terms such as “luminous clarity,” “luminous awareness,” “the clear light nature of mind,” and so forth to characterize their experiences. Such language is often employed in Dzogchen expositions as well.

Stephen Batchelor on emptiness:

Emptiness” is a confusing term. Although used as an abstract noun, it does not in any way denote an abstract thing or state. It is not something we “realize” in a moment of mystical insight that “breaks through” to a transcendent reality concealed behind yet mysteriously underpinning the empirical world. Nor do things “arise” from emptiness and “dissolve” back into it as though it were some kind of formless, cosmic stuff. These are just some of the ways emptiness has been appropriated as a metaphor of metaphysical and religious consolation.

Emptiness is a starkly unappetizing term used to under-cut yearnings for such consolation. Yet ironically it has been called into the service of such longings. Shunyata (emptiness) is rendered into English as “the Void” by translators who overlook the fact that the term is neither prefixed by a definite article (“the”) nor exalted with a capital letter, both of which are absent in classical Asian languages. From here it is only a hop, skip, and a jump to equating emptiness with such metaphysical notions as “the Absolute,” “the Truth,” or even “God.” The notion of emptiness falls prey to the very habit of mind it was intended to undermine.

Stephen Batchelor on the two truths (one might argue that Nagarjuna was trying to return an understanding of the two truths to the Buddha’s original meaning.):

“Very often,” says Maurice Walshe in the introduction to his translation of the Long Discourses of the Buddha (Digha Nikaya), “the Buddha talks in the Suttas in terms of conventional or relative truth (sammuti-sacca), according to which people and things exist just as they appear to the naïve understanding. Elsewhere, however, when addressing and audience capable of appreciating his meaning, he speaks in terms of ultimate truth (paramattha-sacca).”

This passage confirms a view familiar to all Buddhists, no matter what school to which they belong. It is technically known as the doctrine of the Two Truths, according to which reality is divided into two “levels”: the conventional and the ultimate, the relative and the absolute – or, as I translated it somewhere – the partial and the sublime.

It might come as a surprise, therefore – particularly after having just read the words of an eminent translator of the Buddha’s word – to learn that nowhere among the discourses (sutta) in the Pali canon does the Buddha use such terms. This famous distinction between “relative” and “absolute” truth is entirely alien to these early texts. One can certainly interpret his teaching through the lens of such an idea (which, if you read the passage carefully, is what Maurice Walshe does) but bear in mind that the distinction itself is one the Buddha never employed..

The notion of Two Truths goes entirely against the grain of what the Buddha taught. Siddhattha Gotama’s teaching is not founded on absolutes of any kind. He avoids the deeply ingrained assumption of much religious thought that reality is somehow split down the middle (God and Creation / Brahman and Maya / Nirvana and Samsara / Emptiness and Form). Ironically, of course, such divisions are blatantly dualistic – a position most Buddhists are supposed to be at pains to avoid.

In one of the most succinct accounts of his enlightenment, the Buddha speaks of awakening to “dependent origination,” a truth that is “hard to see” since it “goes against the worldly stream.” (Ariyapariyesana Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya 26, section 19). In modern parlance, his insight was counterintuitive. Why? because it went against two “streams”: our instinctive mental habit to split reality into two, and the outward expression of that habit in religious doctrines such as the Two Truths. The Buddha awakened to a glittering plurality of endlessly arising and vanishing phenomena. No God created it; no Mind underpins it; no Unconditioned lies somewhere outside it. Ethics, meditation and wisdom are not founded on some absolute truth, but grow out of a careful examination of what causes suffering and what brings it to an end. Enlightenment, for the Buddha, entailed simply paying attention to the phenomenal flux of your own empirical experience.

The doctrine of the Two Truths seems to have emerged fairly soon after the Buddha’s death. It is not a later Mahayana idea; for it was already taken for granted in the early Abhidhamma. I suspect that it was the first step in the progressive brahminization of Buddhism in India. The Two Truth doctrine is strikingly reminiscent of the Upanishadic teaching that the world of appearances is an illusion (maya) that separates us from the transcendent, absolute reality of God (brahman). But that, of course, was the worldview the Buddha sought to abandon. He wanted to replace it with another way of seeing things altogether: the radical contingency of all existence, devoid of any intrinsic self-essence or God.

Dalai Lama on shentong & dzogchen:

Question: Certain Nyingma masters have expounded shentong- emptiness of other-as the view of Dzogchen. Do you agree with them? Why is shentong such a controversial view among Tibetan Buddhist philosophers?

HHDL: If we read the writings of the great scholar Mipham, especially his commentary on the Sublime Continuum, we find that he explicitly mentions the importance of understanding the Dzogchen view, in which one is able to combine the teachings of emptiness, as expounded in the wisdom sütras of the second turning of the wheel of Dharma, with the sütras belonging to the third turning of the wheel of Dharma, particularly the Essence of Buddhahood Sutra. The understanding developed through a combination of the views expounded in both turnings of the wheel of Dharma will enable us to appreciate what in Dzogchen terminology are called: primordial purity, which is the main subject matter of the second turning, and spontaneous presence, which is the main subject matter of the third turning of the wheel of Dharma.

However, this does not mean that the emptiness spoken of in the second turning, that is in the wisdom sütras, is exactly the same as what in Dzogchen terminology is called primordial purity But one thing which is clear is that without an understanding of emptiness as expounded in the wisdom sutras, and without taking that understanding as a basis, there is no way that you can understand primordial purity in the context of Dzogchen.

As for the question of whether spontaneous presence in Dzogchen is synonymous with what is called the tathagatagarbha- the essence of buddhahood or innate mind of clear light-in the third turning of the wheel of Dharma, especially in the Essence of Buddhahood Sutra, there do seem to be divergent views on that, even among Nyingma meditators and scholars.

One view is that, although there is a difference, the eventual reference for the innate mind of clear light spoken of in Maitreya’s Sublime Continuum or the Essence of Buddhahood Sütra is definitely rigpa, or the spontaneous presence that is spoken of in Dzogchen. But that does not mean that the explicit mention of the two terms refers to the same thing. An example here is that in Yoga Tantra, especially in the tantra of Vairocanãbhisarnbodhi, there is a mention of the rainbow body. Now although we cannot say that this rainbow body is totally synonymous with what is spoken of as the illusory body in Highest Yoga Tantra, yet eventually that reference to the rainbow body, if understood at its deepest level, will come down to the illusory body.

As I explained earlier, in the writings of the Nyingma masters Longchen Rabjam, the omniscient Jikmé Lingpa, and Mipham, there may be mention of the term ‘emptiness of other’, but here the reference is mainly to the fundamental innate mind, that is, to rigpa. This innate mind is ‘empty of other’ in that it is devoid of circumstantial conceptual thought processes. Therefore these types of emptiness of other are totally different from the emptiness of other which was refuted by many Tibetan masters in the past.

There is a tradition of making a distinction between two different perspectives on the nature of emptiness: one is when emptiness is presented within a philosophical analysis of the ultimate reality of things, in which case it ought to be understood in terms of a non-affirming negative phenomena. On the other hand, when it is discussed from the point of view of experience, it should be understood more in terms of an affirming negation.

I think the reason for this statement is that when setting out your philosophical position and view of emptiness, you have to do so while taking into account the common viewpoints of sutra and tantra on the teaching of emptiness. But when speaking from an experiential point of view, you do so more from your understanding of emptiness in terms of the perspective of Highest Yoga Tantra.

In Integral Spirituality (IS) Ken talks about evolutionary enlightenment. He defines enlightenment as the highest level and state at a given historical period. When the originators of the perennial tradition formulated its paradigm it was pre-modern, or possibly mythical-rational. But it had yet to achieve modernity and certain not postmodernity. And it would appear that the higher stages of cognitive development only arrived on the scene in the latter periods. Yes, rationality “started” a long time ago, in India, Greece etc. But it wasn’t the more developed egoic-rationality of today.

Ken takes account of this is IS with the Wilber-Combs lattice. The states are no longer stacked on top of the stages as future stages awaiting stable development. And states are interpreted by the stage that apprehends them, as states can be experienced at any stage. Even full, stable non-dual realization can be experienced by a meditation “master,” yet said master can very well be, and often is, coming from an ethnocentric level.

There are, however, stages above those on the W-C lattice that sound similar to the states, hence Ken’s prior association of them with stable, higher stages. But it seems that those stages lie in our collective future, not past. So I’m wondering, given the following quotes from IS, if the originators of meditative states were somehow in their micro-communities really also advanced to the turquoise or indigo level as well? It’s difficult to know from the quotes because Ken first says “systemic Global View” is a recent emergent, unless 2000 years ago is “recent.” But later he says that such writings on states indeed arose in tuquoise or indigo cognition?

So assuming that Nagarjuna and Padmasambhava and even the current Dalai Lama are not indigo level, then we must take their interpretations of their state experiences as the interpretations of a lower level. And given that indigo level is just now forming in our kosmic groove, how does it interpret such as nonduality? It would seem vision-logical to assume that interpretation would not just be regurgitation of the traditional way, no? And those who interpret such states in that same traditional way must surely not be indigo, no? Unless the traditional interpretations really did time-warp to the future in indigo? Help me out here please.

Note the following exerpted quotes are from the draft, not the book. Having perused the book I can tell you that much of the draft survives verbatim in the book, just at different page numbers. From IS draft:

A second problem quickly compounded that one. If “enlightenment” (or any sort of unio mystica) really meant going through all of those 8 stages, then how could somebody 2000 years ago be enlightened, since some of the stages, like systemic GlobalView, are recent emergents? (107)

It allowed us to see how individuals at even some of the lower stages of development—such as magic or mythic—could still have profound religious, spiritual, and meditative state experiences. Thus, gross/psychic, subtle, causal, and nondual were no longer stages stacked on top of the Western conventional stages, but were states (including altered states and peak experiences) that can and did occur alongside any of those stages. (110)

(What was so doubly confusing to us is the fact that, as indicated on fig. 6, there are also 3 or 4 higher structures beyond the centaur, and they have similar-sounding characteristics as these 3 or 4 higher states, which made it almost impossible to spot the differences. (110)

Anybody familiar with the monastic traditions, East and West, from Zen to Benedictine, will recognize those souls who might be quite spiritually advanced in Underhill’s sense (very advanced in contemplative illumination and unification) and yet might still have a very conformist and conventional mentality—sometimes shockingly xenophobic and ethnocentric—and this goes, unfortunately, for many Tibetan and Japanese meditation masters. Although they are very advanced in meditative states training, their structures are amber-to-orange, and thus their available interpretive repertoire is loaded by the Lower-Left quadrant with very ethnocentric and parochial ideas that pass for timeless Buddhadharma. (E.g., according to his secretary, the Dalai Lama believes homosexuality is a sin, anal sex is a sin, oral sex is bad karma, etc.—when everybody knows that oral sex is not bad karma, only bad oral sex is bad karma…. But these sadly are typical mythic-amber beliefs.) (117-18)

In the meantime, Asian meditation teachers, with a LL-quadrant that is heavily amber, or mythic-membership, and hence “non-egoic” in the sense of PREinvidualistic, and therefore used to having students simply obey them unhesitatingly and in a conformist-stage fashion, don’t quite know what to do with individualistic-stage Westerners, whose LL-quadrant is loaded orange-to-green. (118)

…many of the great contemplative texts, sutras, and tantras were written in the cognitive line from at least the turquoise and often indigo or violet levels. (127)

“It is only after having understood the view correctly that correct Buddhist mediation can take place.”

Below are excerpts from an interesting article on the differences between Hindu and Buddhist “enlightenment.” It starts with the differences of how they conceptualize the nondual and seems to indicate that to properly do “Buddhist” meditation one must have the “correct view.” It also emphasizes that this correct view is not a mish-mash of intermixed Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist views with a “common core.” It seems the latter attempt arises more from one’s “personal ideas” or agendas. Such might also be the agenda, of which Ken partakes, to find the “common ground” of all the “spiritual traditions,” aka the “perennial philosophy.” So again I must ask: Is Ken’s mixing and matching of nondual language and tradition more of his own creation and in effect watering down each mis-matched tradition? Or are the “traditions” so ethnocentric as to not see how “it all comes together?” Or what?

Also note that this “correct” Buddhist view is stated in the first excerpted paragraph.

Enlightenment: Buddhism Vis-à-Vis Hinduism
Ācārya Dharma Vajra (Sridhar SJB Rana)
Published: Buddhist Himalaya, 1996

…in the Buddhist context, illusion is not removed but rather seen as knowledge itself – or is transformed into knowledge. And this knowledge is not something that is the support or base of Samsara. It is the knowledge of the true mode of existence of Samsara itself.

There are two traditions of explaining ‘advaya’ in Buddhism. One is called the Vast Lineage (skt. Vaipulay parampara) of Asanga-Vasubandyhu based on the ‘Five Works’ of Maitreya which emphasizes subject-object (skt. grahaka-grahya) duality. But unlike the various forms of Vedanta, they neither merge into one whole nor does the grasper (subject) vanishes the illusion and only the eternal grasper remains. Here they are found to be untenable from the very beginning. What remains is emptiness. This system had many great teachers like Dingnaga-Dharmakirti.

The second lineage called the Profound Lineage (skt. gambhira parampara) started with Nagarajuna and was passed down through famous teachers such as Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, Chandrakirti, Shantideva and Atisha. There were many other famous teachers like Shantarakshita and Kamakashila who also gave synthetic interpretations of ‘advaya’ using both traditions.

Any Buddhist hermeneutics must be based on one of these hermeneutics or their various branches like ‘Sakara Yogachara’, ‘Nirakara Yogachara’, ‘Yogachara’ ‘Sautrantic Madhyamik’, ‘Prasangic Madhyamika’, and ‘Svatantric Madhyamika’ etc. Just because one understands Sanskrit or Tibetan, one cannot interpret the ‘Sastras’ (texts) as one likes, giving straightforward meanings to them. Any interpretation must belong to one of these hermeneutical methodologies. Otherwise it becomes one’s own private idea of what these texts are teaching….Such interpretations are personal ideas and not true Buddhist hermeneutics and if analyzed, one will find many contradiction and inconsistencies.

It is only after having understood the view correctly that correct Buddhist mediation can take place. Otherwise, there would be no difference between Hindu, Sufi, Christian, Tao and Buddhist meditations.

Notice, I say valid study, valid study means study with valid lineage teachers (not just somebody who knows Sanskrit or Tibetan and happens to be a lama or Vajracharya by caste as is found among Tamangs and Newars respectively). Valid lineage Masters teach according to historically accepted Buddhist hermeneutics and do not give their own personal self-contradictory interpretations. Such a Master had studied with someone who belonged to one or more of these hermeneutical lineages. Such a study is not merely intellectual entertainment but a proper base for acquiring wisdom gained through listening and contemplation and creates an understanding of the correct view, which itself would be the proper foundation for proper Buddhist meditation i.e. the third wisdom gained through meditation. Simply doing ‘nadi-vayu-tilak yoga’ without such a base is the same as doing Hindu meditation even if it is part of Hevajra or Cakrasamvara or Vajrabhairava or Kalacakra practice.