Open Integral

I’m starting another thread continuing the re-posting of the Integral Review discussion because we’ve been having technical problems. It seems comments, including my own, have been ending up in the spam bin. We’re working on correcting this so please bear with us, thanks.

Gregory Desilet Posted: Thu Nov 08, 2007 9:08 pm

In the posts of Bonnie, Edward, and myself I get a sense that we are circling or converging around the problematic of how to discuss or put into words (or refine in words) what Derrida (and Heidegger) refer to as “the being of Being.” Getting a handle on this, as Wilber and many others have intuited, is crucial to the formation of viable spirituality. I sense that we all find important clues or guides in the work of particular Buddhist theorists such as Nagarjuna and Western philosophers such as Derrida. I would like to add thoughts from a commentator on Deleuze, Todd May. I’ve been reading him recently and I think much of what Deleuze says (via May) adds to and may help to clarify some of the similarities in what each of us has been saying. I think it also helps to clarify the position of language in all of this. I apologize in advance for the length of this post, but I think it will be worth the time.

Here is May in a discussion of Deleuze on “difference”:

Quote:
We might say that difference is the overflowing character of things themselves, their inability to be wrestled into categories of representation. If we say this, however, we must again be careful. There is no strategy of resistance among things. Being is not bothered when it is represented. Rather, being is always more and therefore other than what representation posits for it. The world (or what there is) is in its very character a transgression of the categories of any representational thought; it is an offense to both good sense and common sense . . . Behind the identities the dogmatic image of thought presents to us, difference is what there is. This difference may be virtual, but it is not transcendent. It is there, coiled in the heart of things. It is of their very nature. When Deleuze says that difference is behind everything, we should not take him to mean that it is beyond everything. It is behind things, but still within them (p. 82).

Having tried to think difference in relation to being (to ontology) and the nature of nature or the nature of things, Deleuze (as May understands him) then reflects on language:

Quote:
But what about language itself? If we are to reject the conception of the world offered to us by the dogmatic image of thought, are we also to reject the image of language as seeking to represent that world? The world, being, overflows representational categories. Does language itself also overflow those categories? (p. 96)

Having asked these questions, Deleuze believes the problem must be approached in a particular way:

Quote:
The challenge Deleuze confronts is to substitute for the representational view of language a view that allows it to overflow the categories of representation. He needs to construct, alongside his ontology, a view of language adequate to that ontology. Just as he finds a difference in being that resists capture by the stable categories of the dogmatic image of thought, so he must find in the language in which he tells us about this difference something that, equally, resists those stable categories. He must make the language of his ontology resonate with the same irrecuperable energy that he has discovered in the ontology itself. In short, he must offer us what he calls a logic of sense (p. 97).

To use Heidegger’s phrase, language as “the house of being,” as it is brought to reflect being, can (ultimately) do nothing other than reflect the core of being, however problematic or paradoxical that core may be. In this sense language, life, and world are of a piece and theorists such as Wilber, Deleuze, Derrida, etc. are right to believe that what we may believe about one necessarily involves us in a web that structures what we come to believe about the others. A theory of being is a theory of language; a theory of language is a theory of being. And a theory of language is also a theory of life.

May then moves on to discuss the relationship between Deleuze’s notions of sense and nonsense:

Quote:
It is because there is nonsense, because something can bring together the series that is being (or the world) and the series that is language and circulate between and among them, that there can be sense. Sense is an effect of nonsense: it is caused by this bringing together and it arises on its surface. It is like a sound effect or an optical effect because it is not produced by nonsense in any traditional causal sense. It is not like the sound that is produced when a bat hits a ball. Sense is incorporeal; it is not inserted into the causal order of material things. Optical effects and sound effects happen when a certain way of being seen or being heard emerges from an optical or sonic arrangement. What are called optical illusions are like this. Draw a certain pattern on paper and the eyes see something more than is drawn. This doesn’t just have to do with the lines on the paper, nor with the eyes, but with what happens between them, with what Deleuze might call a certain nonsense that circulates in their interaction. So it is with sense. Nonsense circulates between and among the differences of language and the world. In that circulation, language and the world offer certain ways of being “proposed.” A “proposition,” which is what has a sense, is a way of their being proposed. It is both an effect of that circulation and a proposal within language for the world (pp. 108-109).

Deleuze’s “nonsense” is probably another notion that parallels Derrida’s understanding of khora and Buddhist uses of the notion of “emptiness.”

With Deleuze’s explanation it becomes possible to understand why language ought not to be regarded as inadequate or deficient any more so than we ought to regard being or the world as inadequate or deficient. It is part of the nature of “what is.” And if “what is” is essentially lacking in something–that would be compared to what? This suggests approaching language as a joy and an opportunity for creation/discovery–much like music. So while we may all wrestle with language in the effort to see and communicate the world, I believe the more we understand and appreciate how it works (or seems to fail to work) the closer we get to understanding being as well as our own human nature.

theurj Posted: Thu Nov 08, 2007 10:06 pm
Post subject: whatchamacallit

Greg’s last post reflects back on Richard’s in that we struggle to “name” the unnamable, and with Bonnie’s term “process” as a way to describe that which cannot be fixed. Because yes, language is also part of the codependent orgination, within and of it, and like a direct experience of nondual awaress the proper words can and must enact the same experience. It is not as though we have a pure experience free of thought or language, as if the latter were profane or apart from it. I think David Loy[1] sums it up well in this interview:

“Well, this relates to the way we understand spirituality and meditation. For example, we often tend to understand meditation—in Zen especially—as getting rid of thoughts. We think that if we can just get rid of thought, then we can see the world as it is, clearly, without any interference from conceptuality. We view thinking as something negative that has to be eliminated in order to realize the emptiness of the mind. But this reflects the delusion of duality, rather than the solution to duality. As Dogen put it, the point isn’t to get rid of thought, but to liberate thought. Form is emptiness, yet emptiness is also form, and our emptiness always takes form. We don’t realize our emptiness apart from form, we realize it in form, as non-attached form. One of the very powerful and creative ways that our emptiness takes form is as thought. The point isn’t to have some pure mind, untainted by thought, like a blue, completely empty sky with no clouds. After a while that gets a little boring! Rather, one should be able to engage or play with the thought processes that arise in a creative, non-attached, nondualistic way. To put it in another way, the idea isn’t to get rid of all language, it’s to be free within language, so that one is non-attached to any particular kind of conceptual system, realizing that there are many possible ways of thinking and expressing oneself. The freedom from conceptualizing that we seek does not happen when we wipe away all thoughts; instead, it happens when we’re not clinging to, or stuck in, any particular thought system. The kind of transformation we seek in our spiritual practices is a mind that’s flexible, supple. Not a mind that clings to the empty blue sky. It’s a mind that’s able to dance with thoughts, to adapt itself according to the situation, the needs of the situation. It’s not an empty mind which can’t think. It’s an ability to talk with the kind of vocabulary or engage in the way that’s going to be most helpful in that situation.”

One of the better ways to “name” this nondual singularity for Derrida, as Greg points out, is via the khora. John Caputo[2] says:

“Khora is neither present nor absent, active nor passive, the Good nor evil, living nor nonliving….Khora has no meaning or essence, no identity to fall back upon….Khora is not even a third kind, because it is not a kind, a genos, at all but is radically singular, as if she/it were a singular individual with a proper name (35-6).”

[1] “Lack and Liberation is Self and Society: An interview with David Loy.” Holos: Forum for a New Worldview, 1:1 2005
[2] Caputo, John (1997), The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Here’s a continuation of the previous thread:

Gregory Desilet Posted: Mon Nov 05, 2007 5:47 pm

Edward raises a couple of points via Andy Smith relating to basic issues in deconstructive and post-formal thinking. A question arises regarding Gary’s citation of Grof (page 145 in Gary’s essay) which I in turn cited:

Quote:
“… the distinction between pre- and trans- has a paradoxical nature; they are neither identical, nor are they completely different from each other”

Andy comments:

Quote:
“I agree that pre and trans are neither identical nor completely different. I don’t agree that this relationship constitutes a paradox. There are, obviously, many phenomena about which such a relationship can be said, without their being considered paradoxical. Indeed, almost any two things are neither identical nor completely different.”

I believe Grof’s point (and Gary’s) concerns the identity/difference between two “classes” of things rather than between “any two things.” The idea being that in formal thinking something is either a duck or a rabbit or a wave or a particle or pre- or trans- but not both. In the next paragraph, citing Jenny Wade, Gary explains, “A framing that Wade uses in relation to either/or (pre-postformal) thinking is constituted by the metaphor of Newtonian physics: ‘Regression and transcendence are neither opposite nor the same, though they may appear to be in a Newtonian conceptualization.’”

The pre-postformal approach relies on concepts regarded as discrete and mutually exclusive. The post-formal approach also relies on concepts regarded as discrete but with the added complexity that these are not mutually exclusive. In post-formal logic something can both be x and not-x with seemingly contradictory qualities at the same time (as in particle/wave). Which identity appears or dominates depends on context. And this situation is a bit of a paradox and would seem nonrational if there were not the evidence of observation to support it.

Moving to another question Andy says,

Quote:
What I don’t understand is how one can denote terms like “polarization” and “scapegoating” or even “less destructive violence”, without privileging one aspect of a dialectic over another. In other words, how does one accept Derrida’s argument without falling into a fatalistic, everything-is-as-it-is view? It seems to me that any attempt to define where we want to go or how we want society to be is just more privileging of one pair over the other—a form of polarizing or rigidifying.

Deconstruction does not operate “without privileging one aspect of a dialectic over another.” In fact, the deconstructive examination of texts (and here I continue associating deconstruction with post-formal thinking) demonstrates that privileging of one sort or another is inescapable in any act of interpretation. Part of the deconstructive work consists of exposing subtle interests or values that may be privileged in a given dialectic or interpretation.

Here a confusion perhaps arises from the deconstructive critique of polarization whereby (in formal and pre-formal thinking) oppositional structure presents itself as consisting of discrete and mutually exclusive poles. One pole appears as “pure,” “whole,” and “good” while the other pole appears as an impurity or contamination of the whole. Furthermore, this built-in hierarchy of the pure over the impure presents itself as a fixed and absolute hierarchy immune to alteration or context. This kind of radically exclusive and permanently fixed privileging—not all privileging whatsoever—emerges as a primary target of deconstructive critique. With other less rigid, more context sensitive modes of privileging and evaluation remaining to it, deconstruction separates itself from fatalism or the resignation to vicious relativism that concerns Andy.

Consistent with this approach, even the radically exclusive privileging deconstruction targets is not thereby “radically excluded” (as an “impurity”). It remains a valuable developmental stage of reasoning and evaluation from which, to borrow Gary’s phrase, “the way out is through.” Consequently, deconstruction offers a complex but consistent “logic” and an inclusiveness that does not preclude choices based on evaluation and judgment. And this bodes well for the unique value and possibilities of what may be regarded as a brand of post-formal thinking.

Gregory Desilet Posted: Mon Nov 05, 2007 8:28 pm

Picking up here on something Bonnie says above:

Quote:
“My sense is that it is not the fault of language that we have divided our understanding into binary pairs – but that language merely reflects a deeper human condition, a more primordial arising in which that division occurs. The importance of the “postmodern project” is to de-couple the process in which language is a powerful feedback mechanism which reinforces the primordial boundaries continua-dually arising at a more fundamental level.”

I think you are correct to say the fault is not with language—that there is a deeper origin but I don’t agree that the postmodern project (specifically deconstruction) is not “sufficient to the task” of addressing or appreciating this point (as you say just before this). Edward’s post regarding Derrida’s commentary on Plato’s Khora offers a case in point. Also Derrida’s concept (or as he sometimes says “nonconcept”) of différance is another example. Différance as a generative operation penetrates deeper than language and, as Derrida argues in his famous essay “Différance”: “Older than Being itself, such a différance has no name in our language” (Margins of Philosophy, p. 26).

But, to be clear, what you say in the quote above pertains to “binary pairs” which may perhaps be distinguished from operations of différance. If so, you may be questioning more the arising of oppositional pairs and the feedback mechanism language provides for this rather than the broader notion of the arising of differences. As a way of addressing this distinction while also addressing your initial post (under Wilberian theory vs. post-formal reasoning) regarding “clarification on what we are considering to be post-formal dialectics” I offer the following attempt at clarification (while also risking confusing the issue!—but, hey, nothing ventured, nothing gained).

Post-formal dialectics vs. formal dialectics:

Post-formal says—see x as y; this is a metaphorical (or, if you will, an analogical) operation turning on what some call a “root metaphor.” To that extent it has also been thought of as a nondialectical alternative insofar as it exceeds definition (or identity) through opposition.

Formal says: see x as the opposite of y; this is a traditionally dialectical operation involving discrete separation between x and y and the securing of the identity of x through y as its opposite.

Formal dialectics invites the tendency to evaluate and hierarchize to the extreme that one side of the opposition functions as the corruption or pollution of the other. Here dialectics becomes an operation of sorting and evaluating difference by radical exclusion. On the other hand, the post-formal sorts differences (Gary has used the word “contrasts”) by way of judgments and evaluations that continue to include even as they appear to exclude (a move consistent with appreciating the economy/ecology of being, according an essential role to every aspect of being)

In the post-formal approach:

See x as y =

see y as x-differed, deferred

and also

= see x as x-differed, deferred

(For Derrida’s elaboration on this see Margins of Philosophy p. 17).

Drawing temporality and context into consideration, it also becomes possible to understand the sense in which x is not equal to x. This, of course, challenges the law of identity—the cornerstone of traditional Aristotelian logic.

The post-formal claim that x is not equal to itself would seem to preclude the suggestion offered by Bonnie “that post-formal thinking sees dialectical pairs as self-defining.” The possibility of self-definition would seem to imply the possibility of a core identity that could be self-evidently grasped in a revelatory intuition apart from all intrusions and destabilizations of difference and relation. This self-definition, to the extent it implies a kind of self-presence, appears to fall within the metaphysical claims Derrida thoroughly targets in deconstruction. But if I am misunderstanding your sense her, Bonnie, please let me know.

Given this analysis, I see overlap between deconstruction and excerpts Edward has posted from the interpretation of Nagarjuna and also Faber on Whitehead. Although difficult to put into words, something like the following from Faber seems like a good stab at it (as cited by Edward in a post above):

Quote:
“In the Category of the Ultimate, ultimate reality appears as a triangle of generalities in process: unification of multiplicities; multiplication of unities; and their rhythmic togetherness as creative advance into novelty. Every unity becomes a unique unification of its prehensive relations within a virtually infinite multitude, and in its perishing it generates the multiplication of this multitude. In fact, in this fluent Chaosmos nothing is ultimate—neither unity nor multiplicity—there is only unification and multiplication immersed in the rhythm of an endlessly cyclical process of relational transcendence or of self-transcending relativity.”