Is Ken right on Derrida?

I’m sure you all know what Ken thinks of Derrida. But is he accurate? And if not, why? Following are excerpts of an “integral” analysis of Derrida that is very different than Ken’s. I’d suggest that if Ken’s kosmic address is this far off on one of his contemporaries (only recently dead) then one really must question whether Ken’s naviagtion system has a true “global” positioning satelite.

Integral Re-Views Postmodernism by Gary Hampton, in the current issue of Integral Review

Abstract: In this article I re-evaluate the potential contribution of postmodernism to integral theory via integrally-derived perspectives. I identify a premature foreclosure: the underappreciation of postformal modes of thinking (cognitive development beyond Piaget’s formal operations). I then enact certain forms of postformal reasoning in relation to integral theory. This includes an engagement with such perspectives as complexity theory, conceptual ecology, vision-logic, dialectics, genealogy, critical theory, and construct-awareness. A major theme concerns the dialectical relationship between reconstruction and deconstruction-partly explored through a developmental assessment of contra-indicative discourse by both Wilber and Derrida. Although the territory is complex, the relationship between current Wilberian theory and postmodernism is clearly problematised. I posit that a deeper engagement with postmodernism can lead to an autopoietic deepening of integral theory.

In so doing, particular texts from Wilber and Derrida-chosen for their contra-indicative properties-are developmentally assessed to problematise the premise that Wilber’s (re)constructive approach is necessarily operating at a more mature developmental level than Derrida’s deconstructive approach.

Derrida’s comments here are therefore not coming from a relativist perspective. He is making value judgments in favour of a discussion of Spirit and against Heidegger’s inappropriate silence on the issue. Furthermore, deconstruction itself is clearly articulated as being beyond the relativism of unbridled equivocity: Derrida sees relativism as self-limiting, confusing, unintelligible.

Here, in addition to Derrida’s vividness of language regarding concerns and insights into matters spiritual-with a sense of appropriate wordplay-we can also see Cook-Greuter’s identification of the construct-aware Magician where “concerns, questions, insights and commentary cleverly united into one complex sentence structure.” A plausible hypothesis, then, would be to consider that these comments from Derrida centre around the perspective of The Magician-a level beyond Wilber’s Teal / Integral / “post-postmodern” / Yellow vMeme. In short, this evidence supports the hypothesis that the above text from Derrida is operating from the construct-aware stage.

Derrida rationally differentiates deconstruction from destruction and indicates that deconstruction is a constructive activity. He also explicitly reflexes upon its subtle dialectical quality. His writing demonstrates a high level of developmental maturity, in which deconstruction is recognised and reflexively enacted in a post-relativist, dialectical, construct-aware mode. Derrida and deconstruction are clearly something Other than that signified by Wilber in his use of the term, deconstructive postmodernism.

7 Responses to “Is Ken right on Derrida?”

  1. Edward,

    Thanks for the link. I read the article. It had some good points. But I think on the argument about Derrida Gary Hampton is wrong.

    I think the problem stems from this idea that green is relativist. And relativist is taken to mean that the person can not make any judgments or believes in no better/worse. No one can actually do that. There is plenty of vvertigo in postmodernism and a difficulty in some to make clear distinctions, but eventually pushed people come down on a side.

    Hampton says that Derrida is no relativist therefore he’s not green. He’s right he’s not total relativist (who is) but wrong that he is post-relativist. The issue is post postmodern not post-relativist. i.e. He needs a cross-paradigmatic systematic view which I do not find in Derrida. And I’ve read a lot Jacques.

    Because green means (in the relativist or so-called deconstructive phase) an overturning of the previous hierarchies to install new hierarchies. The hierarchy of the underside. Not the loss of hierarchy altogether. I see Derrida much more in light of say Levinas in this sense.

    But I don’t see it as integral/second-tier (much less construct-aware) because it is still held to the same basic winner take all view. It’s still one hierarchy over another, just whose on top and bottom is reversed. It doesn’t question the co-arising of the terms and the way in which (construct-aware) such hierarchies are themselves products of a limited injunction, a function of the limitation of the worldsapce within which they arise.

    For example in Glas, Derrida famously argues that Hegel’s insane sister precedes her rationalist brother. Without sister then no brother. Without feminine then no masculine. And without craziness no rationality, implying that perhaps Hegel himself with his uber architecture of the mind was the crazy one.

    Or his piece with Habermas on 9/11 where he talks about how everyone else views the event through the lens of a changed post 9/11, especially post Cold War World. He argues that its actually the return of the absent (over present): the mujihadeen trained by the Americans in Afghanistan versus the Soviets. It’s the Cold War coming back for him.

    Again reverse the traditional hierarchy and make a new hierarchy.

    I think Derrida is actually quite sharp, in fact even within that level a genius. But he is not construct aware.

  2. My apologies I misspelled Gary’s last name as Hampton. It should be Hampson.

  3. Edward Berge says:

    Thanks for the input Chris. I don’t know if you read many of the previous posts on Derrida so I provide links below. If you have the time and interest check them out and perhaps we can go from there. I don’t have the energy to go back over that material.

    Postmodern/Postmetaphysical Spirituality http://www.openintegral.net/blog/?p=57

    Postmetaphysical Thinking 4
    http://www.openintegral.net/blog/?p=107

    Derrida and Nonduality by Desilet
    http://www.openintegral.net/blog/?p=178

  4. Edward Berge says:

    Chris,

    I’m going to use some excerpts from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Derrida to address your comments more specifically. (http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/derrida.htm).

    Derrida most emphatically does not merely reverse the binaries in a dualism, replacing one with the other and maintaining a “hierarchy of the underside.”

    “This reversal of the subordinated term of an opposition accomplishes the first of deconstruction’s dual strategic intents.

    “Derrida must highlight that the categories that sustain and safeguard any dualism are always already disrupted and displaced. To effect this second aspect of deconstruction’s strategic intents, Derrida usually coins a new term, or reworks an old one, to permanently disrupt the structure into which he has intervened – examples of this include his discussion of the pharmakon in Plato (drug or tincture, salutary or maleficent), and the supplement in Rousseau, which will be considered towards the end of this section.

    “To phrase the problem in slightly different terms, Derrida’s argument is that in examining a binary opposition, deconstruction manages to expose a trace. This is not a trace of the oppositions that have since been deconstructed – on the contrary, the trace is a rupture within metaphysics, a pattern of incongruities where the metaphysical rubs up against the non-metaphysical, that it is deconstruction’s job to juxtapose as best as it can. The trace does not appear as such (OG 65), but the logic of its path in a text can be mimed by a deconstructive intervention and hence brought to the fore.”

    Hence deconstruction does indeed, as you say, “question the co-arising of the terms and the way in which (construct-aware) such hierarchies are themselves products of a limited injunction, a function of the limitation of the worldsapce within which they arise.”

    As the encyclopedia surmises: “These are, of course, themes reflected upon at length by Derrida, and they have an immediate consequence on the meta-theoretical level.” Deconstruction is a critical theory– without a theoretic center which can accomodate the particular instance with flexibility–that integrates all the various paradigms from a contract-aware (meta) a-perspective.

  5. Edward Berge says:

    In other words, as a “theory/praxis” it doesn’t exist apart from that which it deconstructs, like just another “perspective.” Or like an “emptiness” apart from form. As the encyclopedia says on its meta-theoretical level:

    “To the minimal extent that we can refer to Derrida’s own arguments, it must be recognised that they are always intertwined with the arguments of whomever, or whatever, he seeks to deconstruct. For example, Derrida argues that his critique of the Husserlian ‘now’ moment is actually based upon resources within Husserl’s own text which elide the self-presence that he was attempting to secure (SP 64-66). If Derrida’s point is simply that Husserl’s phenomenology holds within itself conclusions that Husserl failed to recognise, Derrida seems to be able to disavow any transcendental or ontological position. This is why he argues that his work occupies a place in the margins of philosophy, rather than simply being philosophy per se.”

  6. Edward Berge says:

    From “Counterpoints in transpersonal theory” by Gerry Goddard at http://www.islandastrology.net/counter.htm

    The ‘new paradigmatic’ activity which arises from the ‘ruins’ of radical deconstruction becomes an ontological and epistemological investigation into the nature of paradigm itself, into the process and history of paradigm formation, rather than a direct search for a new and better paradigm that trumps all the old ones. Now in a radical spirit of self reflexivity, we question the foundational nature of foundations themselves that masquerade either as ‘facts’ or as a priori principles and assumptions. Unlike the ultimate foundational and indubitable principles sought by traditional metaphysics, our new paradigmatic principles or metaphors of explanation cannot constitute a rock bottom and certain foundation of things, but need to be seen as the horizon of an ever expanding, integrating and evolving totality of experience and knowledge. To give up the need and the search for a formulatible certainty—a search for an unquestioned set of foundational axioms—is surely an increase in wisdom

  7. Edward Berge says:

    If anyone is interested Gary Hampson has engaged this topic at the zaadz/ii pod at this link: http://pods.zaadz.com/ii/discussions/view/153004

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