Alan Kazlev notes in his 8/22/06 blog that Wilber “understands metaphysics only by the popular, non-academic philosophical meaning.†And this: “(note: The ‘post-metaphysics’ in the title of this post concerns Ken Wilber’s interpretation of post-metaphysics (Wilber-V), and not contemporary German philosopher Jürgen Habermas’s earlier use of the term.)†http://integraltransformation.blogspot.com/
Here’s how one reviewer of Habermas’ book Postmetaphysical Thinking describes it: http://www.generation-online.org/p/fphabermas1.htm
“Postmetaphysical thinking appears to coincide with the movement away from metaphysical philosophies of reflection of which Hegel is understood to be the final innovator. Hence both Kierkegaard and Marx are seen as paths away from this type of thought and stepping stones on the way to functional sociologies and psychologies that set in motion the procedures of communication theory. Habermas draws heavily on Mead to develop a theory of social interaction that is not dependent upon idealist notions of the self positing of the ego which, upto Fichte, depended upon the I as the original source of consciousness. In developing Mead’s idea of the social ego Habermas puts forward that consciousness is not a originary act of the ego, but an external force that encroaches inwardly and forms the ego within a set of responses to stimuli from the other, wherein the I through being refered to by another can gain knowledge of himself in seeing how a second actor organises his interlocutionary demands. In developing communication theory, Habermas is, in our terms, developing a theory of society that is not reducible to a simple totality but has social complexity as its ground i.e. a number of plural language games, different orders of power, different structures of politics in play at anyone time. He is thus concerned with developing a theory of individuation within a discourse of social differentiation.â€Â
It would appear that metaphysical thinking, in this context, is the idealist notion of the self as the original source of consciousness. I think this applies not only to the little self, the ego, but the so-called big Self consciousness as originary source of the universe. PM thinking then recognizes the external and social forces contribute significantly to the creation of “reality.†In other words, an AQAL approach instead of the quadrant absolutism based on self consciousness.
And this is how Ken describes PM thinking in his model. For example, in his book Integral Spirituality he says in defining the metaphysical traditions:
“What all of these contemplative Traditions had in common is that they were, and still are, monologicalâ€â€they all subscribe to the philosophy of consciousness. The entire Buddhist psychology and great metaphysical systems of Theravada and Yogachara are build on monological consciousness, individual or collective, as are the great Neoplatonic systems in the West, including the contemplative traditions. In fact, all of the types of knowledge offered by both Premodernity (and Modernity) were unaware of the constitutive nature of the Lower-Left quadrant, and that is where Postmodernity leveled devastating (and accurate) critiques of both.†p. 64
It’s the same definition of metaphysical and postmetaphysical by Habermas and (post)modern philosophy after Hegel.
For example, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy discusses Kant’s Critique of Metaphyics, metaphysics being the a priori assumptions of an ontological perspective. Kant concludes that “the synthetic a priori propositions that characterize metaphysics are not ‘really’ possible at all.” This is exactly how Ken defines metaphyics and comes to the same conclusion using the myth of the given against ontological and phenomenological arguments. In fact Ken correctly credits Kant with being one of the first moderns to differentiate the value spheres of morals, science and art with his Three Critiques, translated by Ken as the Big Three and elaborated into the 4 quadrants. Ken recognizes the same in Habermas’ 3 validity claims and worlds, the latter of which also critiques the metaphysics of self consciousness.
Hi Edward
I will need to reread what you said about Habermas when I have more time and are not so tired, but here is a quick response to KW’s statement:
“What all of these contemplative Traditions had in common is that they were, and still are, monologicalâ€â€they all subscribe to the philosophy of consciousness.
Untrue. Madhyamika does not say that Reality is Consciousness, but rather that Reality cannot be grasped by the conceptual mind.
The entire Buddhist psychology and great metaphysical systems of Theravada
Theravada teaches a version of the dharma theory: a plurality of essences, not monism.
and Yogachara are build on monological consciousness
Yes, this critique could be applied to Yogachara, which was influential in much of Chinese Buddhism (as “Mind Only” teaching), including Zen. Perhaps that is where KW gets the idea that the Yogacharin “mind only” teaching is pan-buddhist, when it isn’t. This is not in any way to criticise Yogachara of course!
…as are the great Neoplatonic systems in the West
In Neoplatonism the One is above and prior to Nous (Mind), so once again the Wilberian criticism doesn’t apply.
I am not the only one to point out KW’s tendency to overgeneralise with these sort of sweeping statements (remember Frank’s statement that Wilber overreacted to resulting in the whole Earpy diatribe?). Wilber only weakens his own case with these overgeneralisations.
Also, as Jorge Ferrer has shown in Revisioning Transpersonal Theory, Wilber (i.e. Wilber-IV) is in agreement with the Neo-Sufi perennialist position which assumes a series of stages of consciousness or levels of being with the impersonal Absolute at the top, in contrast to other, more theistic, but equally authentic traditions.
So it could be suggested that in the latest (“post-metaphysical”) iteration of his thought, KW is actually attacking and refuting his own former (Wilber-IV) position, but he does this not directly or even consciously, but rather by confusing or projecting his former intellectual position onto all other spiritual teachings in general.
In part 3 of my essay on Integral World, I quote Sri Aurobindo as referreing to several states of enlightenemnt or liberation, including the impersonal liberation that KW prefers, and the personal theistic liberation. But all these states are in turn transcended by the realisation of Supermind (The infinite Truth-Consciousness).
In my current essay in progress, I include a critique of and alternative to AQAL.
I think the bottom line is that what Ken is calling the philosophy of consciousness is what Kant and Habermas are calling metaphysics, the a priori assumptions of an ontological perspective. And the general critique is that this perspective is pre-differentiation of the value spheres, hence doesn’t take into account the intersubjective nature of knowledge and being. So Neoplatonism’s One might not be Nous (Mind), but it is derived from the same metaphysics that is being critiqued. It’s not a critique of the conceptual mind but the ontological metaphysical assumptions by the consciousness that makes them.
Hi Edward
Okay, fair enough, KW’s sloppy use of language again – i.e. he is saying “consciousness” when he should be saying “ontological reality” (or realities, in the case of the dharma-pluralism of Theravada). Personally I prefer precision in philosophical discussion myself, otherwise anything can be made to mean anything. Anyway, I have already made my own point on this clear re my critique of Wilberian crypto-physicalism. If Habermas is saying the same thing as KW in this regard, then I would criticise him equally for the same reason.
But whether one adopts a Wilberian “Two Truths” crypto-physicalist perspective, an esoteric “ontological spectrum of being” position, or any other worldview or preference, is upto the individual to decide, through philosophical and spiritual inquiry.
I’d agree Alan that whatever philosophical underpinings one prefers is their personal matter of choice. I’m just trying to clarify your intepretation of Ken on this particular issue, which I think is incorrect. Ken is quite clear in his definitions. Let’s explore Integral Spirituality a bit.
“Metaphysics is generally taken to be the branch of philosophy that deals with issues of ontologyâ€â€what is being or reality?â€â€and epistemologyâ€â€how do we know it? The term was first prominently used by Aristotle, in a book he called Metaphysics simply because it was written after his book on Physics. That’s as a good a reason as any, I suppose.
“If metaphysics began with Aristotle, it ended with Kant. Or, at any rate, took a turn that has defined the way sophisticated philosophers think about reality ever since. Kant’s critical philosophy replaced ontological objects with structures of the subject. In essence, this means that
we do not perceive empirical objects in a completely realistic, pregiven fashion; but rather, structures of the knowing subject impart various characteristics to the known object that then appear to belong to the objectâ€â€but really don’t; they are, rather, co-creations of the knowing
subject. Various a priori categories of the knowing subject help to fashion or construct reality as we know it. Reality is not a perception, but a conception; at least in part. Ontology per se just does not exist. Metaphysics is then a broad name for the type of thinking that can’t figure this out. Or, metaphysics is thinking that falls prey to the myth of the given.” pp. 269-70.
So here Ken’s definition of metaphysics is exactly as I said Habermas and the philosophical tradition beginning with Kant describes it.
As to the philosophy of consciousness:
“Habermas calls monological knowledge by various names, particularly “the philosophy of the subject†and the “philosophy of consciousnessâ€Ââ€â€both of which he and every postmodern theorist worth their salt completely savaged. The “philosophy of the subject†simply takes it that an individual subject is aware of phenomena, whereas that subject is actually set in cultural contexts of which the subject is totally unaware. For example, a Tibetan meditator in the 9th century would sit in his cave, meditating on an object of awarenessâ€â€perhaps from the Zabmo Yantigâ€â€and think he was dealing with given realities, whereas every single thing he is aware of is actually culturally molded to a significant (not total) degree. He thinks he is contemplating timeless truths, truths that hold for everybody, whereas a good number of them are Tibetan fashions.
“‘The philosophy of consciousness’ is the similar assumption, namely, that there is consciousness and that phenomena present themselves to consciousness, either individual or a collective or store-house consciousness (e.g.,alayavijnana). Every meditative and contemplative
tradition makes this assumption. And it is simply wrong. It is profoundly mistaken and hence caught in what is often called false consciousness in several ways. The easiest way for now to state this unanimously agreed upon postmodern criticism of the philosophy of consciousness is to
simply say that the philosophy of consciousness is unaware of how the other 3 quadrants profoundly impact and mold consciousness in ways that are completely invisible to consciousness itself. (Again, the Great Holarchy of the wisdom traditions is almost entirely an Upper-Left quadrant affair.) ” p. 62
Thus the philosophy of consciousness is what created the metaphysical, a priori assumptions of the perenniel, ontological perspective. All of it is clearly expounded by Ken based on the traditional philosohical literature. Again, as you say, whether you choose to abide this intepretation is your choice. But it is inacurrate to say that Ken is confusing philosophical terms and concepts.
Edward Berge Says:
September 21st, 2006 at 6:20 pm e
I’d agree Alan that whatever philosophical underpinings one prefers is their personal matter of choice. I’m just trying to clarify your intepretation of Ken on this particular issue, which I think is incorrect. Ken is quite clear in his definitions. Let’s explore Integral Spirituality a bit.
Fair enough. Okay let\’s go.
“Metaphysics is generally taken to be the branch of philosophy that deals with issues of ontologyâ€â€what is being or reality?
Correct; ontoilogy is generally including under the rubric of metaphysics.
â€â€and epistemologyâ€â€how do we know it?
In Western analytical philosophy these two subjects are distinct ; i.e. epistemology is not a subset of metaphysics
The term was first prominently used by Aristotle
Incorrect, Aristotle never used the term. I don\’t know who invented it. According to Wikipedia: \”The word \”metaphysics\” is generally held to have come from the title given to one of Aristotle\’s works by the editor of his works Andronicus of Rhodes\”
, in a book he called Metaphysics
Ariostotle himself didn\’t call it that – see above comment
simply because it was written after his book on Physics.
Yes the books on First Philosophy came after the books on \”physics\”
“If metaphysics began with Aristotle, it ended with Kant.
I\’m sure that fans of Hegel would be surprised to hear that.
btw, Kant didn\’t deny ontology, he just said that the numena are unknowable. That doesn\’t mean they don\’t exist. Kant is actually very similar to Nagarjuna
structures of the knowing subject impart various characteristics to the known object that then appear to belong to the objectâ€â€but really don’t; they are, rather, co-creations of the knowing subject. Various a priori categories of the knowing subject help to fashion or construct reality as we know it.
No disagreement here. I call this the \”mental bubble\”, or as The Mother would say the \”mental fortress\” See my comments on this in my critique of Wilber on IW
Reality is not a perception, but a conception; at least in part.
At least in part. Agreed.
Ontology per se just does not exist.
So Ken is a solipsit?
Metaphysics is then a broad name for the type of thinking that can’t figure this out. Or, metaphysics is thinking that falls prey to the myth of the given.â€Â
So the reasoning here is
o Some of what we percieve is not something \”out there\” but a product of our own mentalisation / activity of consciousness (correct)
o Therefore nothing exists \”out there\”
o Therefore metaphysics is bunkum
“Habermas calls monological knowledge by various names, particularly “the philosophy of the subject†and the “philosophy of consciousnessâ€Ââ€â€both of which he and every postmodern theorist worth their salt completely savaged.
Another of Ken\’s sweeping generalisations.
The “philosophy of the subject†simply takes it that an individual subject is aware of phenomena, whereas that subject is actually set in cultural contexts of which the subject is totally unaware.
Sure.
For example, a Tibetan meditator in the 9th century would sit in his cave, meditating on an object of awarenessâ€â€perhaps from the Zabmo Yantigâ€â€and think he was dealing with given realities, whereas every single thing he is aware of is actually culturally molded to a significant (not total) degree. Every single thing?????
Or some things?
Is his perception of the cave a cultural phantasm?
He thinks he is contemplating timeless truths, truths that hold for everybody, whereas a good number of them are Tibetan fashions.
Or thought forms, as I would say. Sure.
But I contend that there are universal ontological realities. The denial that these realities exist is implicate in physicalism, because physicalism, or materialism, denies these realities, but it doesn\’t deny the reality of the brain, the facts of neuroscience, etc.
Like Ken\’s hypothetical Tibtean monk, physicalists and crypto-physicalists like Wilber himself are totally unaware of their own cultural biases and preconceptions which shape and determine their perception of reality.
“‘The philosophy of consciousness’ is the similar assumption, namely, that there is consciousness and that phenomena present themselves to consciousness, either individual or a collective or store-house consciousness (e.g.,alayavijnana). Every meditative and contemplative
tradition makes this assumption.
EVERY meditative and contemplative tradition??? Tsk tsk Ken, watch those generalisations.
It is ironic that someone who is so concerned to disprove a prior subjective conceptual assumptions makes so many of his own.
And it is simply wrong. It is profoundly mistaken and hence caught in what is often called false consciousness in several ways. The easiest way for now to state this unanimously agreed upon postmodern criticism of the philosophy of consciousness
Unanimously agreed?
Sorry, I know it\’s a cheap shot, but KW invites it.
As you know, Meyerhoff has pretty much demolished any claim to validity taht any of KW\’s sweeping generalisations might have. And Wilber himself has shown himself unable to meet any of these criticisms. See Meyerhoff, An Intellectual Tragedy, and Dismissal vs. Debate
is to simply say that the philosophy of consciousness is unaware of how the other 3 quadrants profoundly impact and mold consciousness in ways that are completely invisible to consciousness itself. (Again, the Great Holarchy of the wisdom traditions is almost entirely an Upper-Left quadrant affair.) †p. 62
AQAL may be a useful starting point, despite its many flaws, but in my current essay in progress I show that it is still stuck in the old Cartesian dualism and the exoteric mindset of the surface consciousness.
Thus the philosophy of consciousness is what created the metaphysical, a priori assumptions of the perenniel, ontological perspective.
So KW denies that concepts like ontological gradations of reality, the existence of spiritual hierarchies and gods, and cosmic and universal consciousness are the result of profound transpersonal mystic and occult experiences, he sees it as just intellectualisation.
Who then does one believe; the intellectual \”pandit\” who cannot even control his own emotional reactions (ref Earpy etc), or the teachings and message of authentic enlightened masters and adepts?
This is what I mean Edward when I say that everyone has to make their own decision regarding how they will relate to and understand the nature of Reality; everyone has their own worlkdviews and prefences. But in subjects pertaining to the Big Questions, I for one tend to look at a teacher\’s credentials – in this case, what sort of person are they, how do they treat others, especially those who criticise them, etc. That\’s their spiritual credentials. And for their acadmic credentials, how reliably to they report the facts, how scholarly is their understanding, how much do they keep their own preconceptions and biases out of the subject they are describing.
In any case, as long as one remains on the level of the rational intellect, it doesn\’t matter which mental hypothesis one accepts, because each is as good or bad as the other. It is necessary to look beyond mentalising to the spiritual reality behind the words.
An Integral philosophy which is limited only to the intellectual doimension, and does not allow access to or mapping of realities beyond that, is imho not a very good integral philosophy.
All of it is clearly expounded by Ken based on the traditional philosohical literature.
See my previous post re KW\’s misunderstanding of Theravada etc. Also see the relevant links in my critique on the Visser site for Ken\’s misunderstanding of Shankara, Plotinus, Sri Aurobindo, Darwinism, etc. I am no Kant scholar but owing to his very poor track record I would be wary of accepting the Wilberian take on Kant either.
Again, as you say, whether you choose to abide this intepretation is your choice.
Yes, but see also my above comments.
But it is inacurrate to say that Ken is confusing philosophical terms and concepts.
And I argue in this post, as I do elsewhere, that it is not.
You make some good points with which I’m in agreement. Ken does tend to make sweeping generalizations, he seems unaware of his own cultural and personal biases shaping his opinions, his Earpy affair was disgraceful and reflects some personal dysfunction (which in turn shapes some of his ideas), he finds unamimous orienting generalizations to support his views when unaiminity doesn’t exist, etc.
But when Ken says that ontology, per se, doesn’t exist, by “per se” he means as conceived by the metaphysical formulation free from epistemological, intepretative considerations. Ken does not say that what we perceive is not out there at all but that’s it shaped by us, that’s all. It doesn’t lead to a denial of ontology as solipcism, it just elaborates the relationship between epistemology and ontology.
Another thing is that Ken doesn’t reduce it all to the physical world, even in his intra-exterior idea. Note it’s exterior, not physical. Ken explains in Excerpt G that that exterior also contains the subtle and causal bodies, which are not physical. And those bodies are the exterior correlative of the higher, transpersonal levels of consciousness, so it’s not all about the intellectual level.
Edward: “Kant’s critical philosophy replaced ontological objects with structures of the subject. In essence, this means that we do not perceive empirical objects in a completely realistic, pregiven fashion.”
But Kant still believed there were these “empirical objects”. Alan makes this point: “Kant didn’t deny ontology, he just said that the noumena are unknowable. That doesn’t mean they don’t exist.”
A question here is whether Wilber also believes these empirical objects exist. I think postmoderns accept that something is “out there”, but Ken’s discussions of perspectives could lead one to believe that he doesn’t believe in the independent existence of anything that might be called an empirical object. He says everything is a perspective, but what is a perspective? Is it a combination of an object and observer? That would be dualistic. Is it a unitary event? I think this is what Wilber is getting at. Then in some sense there is no empirical object.
I think Wilber is trying to stake out an area that is beyond–on the one hand–the naive form of the given and a more sophisticated version that even postmoderns believe in, and on the other hand, a purely idealist or solipsist view that says everything is created by consciousness. His notion of the perspective is meant to include both yet transcend them, I think. Whether this view is coherent or not is another question. Certainly the AQAL view of these perspectives as having four aspects or dimensions is riddled with problems and inconsistencies. But the notion of perspective may still be a worthwhile one.
In any case, it should be emphasized that the postmodern view is not universally accepted. Again, i side with Alan here. There are philosophers, e.g., John Searle, who accept the notion of a given. And almost all scientists do, though in their case it is more of a working hypothesis or even faith than a deeply thought-out belief. But the postmodern view–at its roots, the idea that there is no given–is held by an intellectual elite. If it is an avante-garde, most of society clearly has not yet caught up. This doesn’t mean Wilber is wrong, of course, it just means it’s questionable to use this as an orienting generalization, to assume that the debate is settled and we can move on.
Interestingly, Meyerhoff, though indeed demolishing many of Wilber’s claims to universality, did not challenge postmodernism in this manner–presumably because Meyerhoff himself is strongly postmodern in his view. But Jeff did point out, in his most recent article, that Wilber is not consistent, that he contradicts his own postmodern view, as when he builds a theory on the basis of development without acknowledging the role of values in it. In fact, a quick and dirty summary of Meyerhoff’s entire project might be that Wilber is not postmodern enough.
Edward: “For example, a Tibetan meditator in the 9th century would sit in his cave, meditating on an object of awarenessâ€â€perhaps from the Zabmo Yantigâ€â€and think he was dealing with given realities, whereas every single thing he is aware of is actually culturally molded to a significant (not total) degree.”
Alan: “Every single thing?????
“Or some things?
“Is his perception of the cave a cultural phantasm?”
The debate here should not be over whether every single thing is culturally molded, but whether every level of consciousness is. In the ordinary consciousness, yes, even perception of the cave is culturally molded. We don’t have to deny that there is a reality out there to accept that we still view even the natural world in contexts, particularly those shaped by language. One way to understand this is to ask if we perceive the cave in exactly the same way that a non-human animal, lacking language, would. I would say we don’t, and the difference is largely because of language. For example, we use language to label the cave, to describe it in terms that distinguish it from other things, and so on.
The controversial part of Wilber’s view is his extenstion of it to other levels of being. The postmodern view as originally formulated was intended to apply to human beings only. No postmodern philosopher I’m aware of has ever said that animals also perceive their environment in contexts, or that mystics-which most PMs probably don’t even believe have a valid vision–so. Only Ken has made these extrapolations.
In particular, extending this notion to higher consciousness is sheer speculation on Wilber’s part. He tries to support this notion by using what I would say are very poor examples. A Tibetan sitting in a cave is a poor example because meditation– Wilber apparently doesn’t understand this–is not a solely inner process, in which one tries to shut out the surroundings and focus on bright lights and “objects of awareness”. Meditation is about becoming aware–period–of everything, inner thoughts and outer events.
To be sure, beginners may be told to focus on some object as a way of trying to still their mind and raise awareness, and sure, any object they pick out for this purpose is going to be culturally conditioned. How could it not be? And if, as a result of increasing awareness, one has some experience, then to the extent the individual has not completely transcended his ordinary awareness, that experience, too, may be subjected to cultural contexting/interpretation.
But the point is to transcend these contexts. That is what meditation is all about. The higher state of consciousness, by definition, is realized by completely transcending thought. How, if this is realized, can there be any cultural contexts. Transcending thought means transcending language, which is the major source of these contexts.
It is possible there may be other contexts operating at higher levels. This is why I say Wilber’s notion is speculative rather than simply wrong. I find it actually a very interesting idea. But as with many of his ideas, he has a tiger by the tail. I don’t think he really understands what contexts of higher consciousness would be like. they would not involve language, and yet all his attempts at illustrating the contextual nature of higher consciousness always boil down to contexts taken from language, from ordinary consciousness. The very fact that a Tibetan would have different experiences from say, an American, shows very clearly that the experiences are culturally shaped, and therefore aren’t completely transcendent.
Hi Edward, Alan, and Andy, I’ve been enjoying your posts.
Edward, you quote Wilber from Integral Spirituality:
“Ontology per se just does not exist. Metaphysics is then a broad name for the type of thinking that can’t figure this out. Or, metaphysics is thinking that falls prey to the myth of the given.â€Â
Wilber’s glib assertion here, like many of his glib assertions (e.g., like those he has made about evolutionary biology), is misleading.
I’m presently reading Michael Loux’s book, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (3rd edition, Routledge, 2006). Loux teaches philosophy at the University of Notre Dame and his book is widely used in courses in contemporary metaphysics in the US and abroad, and comes highly recommended by “sophisticated philosophers.” (Though Wilber of course conveniently and insularly insinuates that just about anyone he disagrees with is by definition less sophisticated, less developed, less evolved, less enlightened, less “integral,†stuck in some form of developmental arrest or psychopathology such as “boomeritis,” etc.)
As Alan indicates, Wilber is wrong when he says that the term ‘metaphysics’ “was first prominently used by Aristotle, in a book he called Metaphysics simply because it was written after his book on Physics.” Loux writes, “The term ‘metaphysics’ as the name of a discipline is taken from the title of one of Aristotle’s treatises. Aristotle himself never called the treatise by that name; the name was conferred by later thinkers.”
Contemporary metaphysics entails the study of topics such as the problem of universals, the nature of abstract entities, the nature of modality (“necessity and possibility†and “possible worlds”), the nature of time, identity through time, the Realism/anti-Realism debate, etc.
John Heil begins his book, From an Ontological Point of View (Oxford University Press, 2003), with a section titled, “The Inescapability of Ontologyâ€Â:
“The twentieth century was not kind to metaphysics. In the English-speaking world, metaphysics was deflated by neo-Kantians, logical positivists, logical empiricists, as well as by philosophers who regarded the study of ordinary language as a fitting replacement for traditional philosophical pursuits. Elsewhere, philosophers promoting phenomenology, hermeneutics, and existentialist and deconstructionist creeds showed themselves equally disdainful of tradition. Metaphysical talk was replaced by talk about metaphysical talk; concern with conceptual schemes and patterns of ontological commitment supplanted concern with ontology. Presumably, we have something like direct access to ways we think and talk about the world. The world itself remains at arm’s length, a subject for study by the empirical sciences. Metaphysics as traditionally conceived seems to pit philosophers against scientists in a way that is bound to favour the scientists and make the philosophers look ridiculous.â€Â
“Attempts to keep philosophy aloof from metaphysics are largely self-defeating. Whether we approve or not, the world has an ontology. Theorists and theories of the world are themselves parts of the world. This homely complication is too often forgotten by those who regard the world as a construct. If the world is theory dependent, what of theories themselves? Do these stand alone, or does their existence depend in some fashion on other theories (‘theories all the way down’)? Whatever the story turns out to be it will include an ontology measurable against competing ontologies.â€Â
Wilber sidesteps all of this when he confidently asserts, “Ontology per se just does not exist. Metaphysics is then a broad name for the type of thinking that can’t figure this out.â€Â
As Nigel Warburton writes:
“Merely asserting something, no matter how loudly, doesn’t make it true. Confident assertion is no substitute for argument, even though most of us, in our uncritical moments, can be persuaded by people who seem to know what they’re talking about, whether or not they really do. The only way other people can assess the truth of an assertion is to examine reasons and evidence that might be given in support of it, or else to seek out evidence or reasons not to believe it. Nevertheless, bald assertions of belief are common…”
Bald assertions indeed.
Not sure if this is exactly on topic, but I’m going to stick this in here. I imagine Alan has seen Rod Hemsell’s article comparing Wilber’s system with Aurobindo’s. I want to point out one particular passage Hemsell quotes from Wilber:
“My own claim is that the distinction interior/exterior is not an emergent quality, but rather exists from the first moment a boundary is drawn; exists, that is, from the moment of creation. What most panpsychists mean by consciousness or mind is not what I mean by consciousness, which is depth. Because consciousness is depth, it is itself literally unqualifiable. …When I say that consciousness or depth is unqualifiable, I mean, in a strong sense, to evoke the Mahayana Buddhist notion of shunyata, or pure Emptiness, …pure Emptiness and pure Consciousness are synonymous. “
This is exactly the view of interiors I have used in my own holarchical model, but it conflicts with other statements of Wilber. Generally, he describes interiors not simply as unqualifiale emptiness or consciousness, but as specific manifestations of mind. For example, his classic illustration of the difference between interior and exterior is language. He notes that someone who speaks only English can’t understand, say, someone speaking French, because there is no shared interior (or the interiors are different, something to this effect). But viewing language comprehension as interior is very different from view ing interiors as unqualifiable. Language is very definitely qualifiable, indeed, most philosophers would probably say it’s at the root of our ability to make (or inability not to make) distinctions.
I use interior in the unqualifiable sense in my model, which is why I can dispense with left and right hand axes. If it is understood that there is a certain degree of emptiness or consciousness at every level, then everything else at that level can be understood in terms of exteriors. For example, language is an exterior because the discriminations it makes can be correlated with changes in neural patterns in the brain. I don’t deny that there is an ineffable aspect to the process of understanding language, but I claim that this ineffableness infuses all of our experiences. We can’t identify it with any particular one.
Wilber, I think, is playing his old game of multiple definitions. Later in the article, Hemsell quotes him as equating interiors with depth and exteriors with surfaceâ€â€but he then adds that surfaces have depth, because everything is consciousness. Or something to that effect. But if he wants to define interiors in these two apparently different ways, then why not, as I have, dispense with the left/right distinction? If everything has depth and interiors, how can there be a distinction between interior and exterior?
Hemsell sees the same problem, and something more as well:
“But if ultimate reality is Emptiness, then what is the status of all of those subjects and objects in the other three quadrants and in all the lower levels of development that are mapped by the integral theory of consciousness? If consciousness is emptiness, then is all the rest of the map ultimately illusion? Does this form of “nondualism” simply negate the form and substance of everything that arises within its purview, or absorb it into its emptiness? And if so, then how does this point of view account for the continued arising of form and its circumstantial, physical, vital and mental conditioning of the witness by its objective appearances? “
I think Wilber would agree that the map is illusion. The problem is that one of the four quadrants seems to be privileged as non-illusory.
Jim: “Attempts to keep philosophy aloof from metaphysics are largely self-defeating. Whether we approve or not, the world has an ontology. Theorists and theories of the world are themselves parts of the world. This homely complication is too often forgotten by those who regard the world as a construct. If the world is theory dependent, what of theories themselves? Do these stand alone, or does their existence depend in some fashion on other theories (‘theories all the way down’)? Whatever the story turns out to be it will include an ontology measurable against competing ontologies.â€Â
I believe the postmodern view would be that it’s theories all the way down. Everything exists in a context, including theories. We can only make sense of a theory because it exists in a context of languge, generally, and of other, related theories, more specifically.
But of course, the whole notion of context is also understandable only because of context. So actually, I think Heil is making the same kind of point that Wilber has tried to make when he simplistically accuses postmodernists of saying everything is relative except their own charges of relativism. Heil’s view of these philosophers is that they are saying there is no metaphysics except the metaphysics they appeal to in order to say there is no metaphysics. But I believe that Heil is going about it in a more sophisticated and certainly less self-contradictory fashion than Wilber.
Andy, you ask that given Ken’s latest view on perpsectives if he accepts anything that might be called an empirical object. I’m at work and don’t have access to my copy of IS at the moment, but I think in there he’d agree with you that the type of consciousness you describe is beyond perspective and is direct perception. I’ll provide the quote later.
I’d also agree that the objection to the myth of the given is not universally accepted. As opposed to denigrating those who don’t accept this view, I’d say the opposing views need to be debated in the academy and may the better view prove itself over time. I’d agree that to glibly dismiss opponents as inferior in some way without engaging in the academy is grossly inadequate.
Welcome Jim, I’ve been awaiting your valuable contributions. I’d agree with your quotes that we cannot escape ontology. And that we use ontological assumptions in arguing against another’s ontological assumptions. I’d agree with Heil’s conclusion, as I said above, that time will tell via the academy the better ontological view(s). Currently I favor the critique of “metaphysics” as defined by Habermas, Wilber and Derrida as the assumptions of a priori, pre-given ontological reality without taking into account the epistemological subject that inteprets them.
To paraphrash Fox Mulder’s famous statement from the X-Files: “The truth is (not only in here but) out there.”
Footnote 7 to Exceprt C:
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/books/kosmos/excerptC/notes-1.cfm
Is there any perception that is not a perspective? Yes, I believe so, and it has to do with satori or nondual awareness (or pure Emptiness–consciousness without an object, which is therefore consciousness without a perspective), which I will explore in later excerpts. The conclusion of this integral reformulation of the wisdom traditions is that samsara (or the world of Form) is composed of perspectives, and nirvana (or Emptiness) is pure perception without an object or perspective. The union of Emptiness and Form is thus the union of perception and perspective, where in my pure perception I am one with everything that is arising (although as expressed through my own individual perspective, with which I am no longer exclusively identified). Finding Emptiness is a freedom from all perspectives (a nirvana free of samsara); a union with Form is finding the Fullness of perspectives that alone can express this Freedom (the nonduality of nirvana and samsara). Wisdom is transcending perspectives, compassion is embracing them all.
Edward: “Andy, you ask that given Ken’s latest view on perpsectives if he accepts anything that might be called an empirical object. I’m at work and don’t have access to my copy of IS at the moment, but I think in there he’d agree with you that the type of consciousness you describe is beyond perspective and is direct perception. I’ll provide the quote later.”
Yes, Ken has recently made an exception to the perspective rule with the highest state of consciousness. But he still argues that higher but not highest levels exist in a context, and this is what I was challenging. Also, my comments regard to empirical objects were not restricted to any level of consciousness, but included the ordinary level. The question is whether his concept of perspective, as applied to ordinary consciousness, includes an empirical object.
“I’d agree with Heil’s conclusion, as I said above, that time will tell via the academy the better ontological view(s).”
If the past history of philosophy is any guide, there may be a long wait. This is one of those fundamental questions that rarely gets resolved to the satisfaction of most.
Ken also recognizes that any philosophy requires a priori ontological forms:
“This is not to say that spiritual philosophy can do completely without any a priori forms (no philosophy can); but the fewer, the better. And the a priori forms that are postulated had better be defensible with at least some reference to modern and postmodern forms of justification (and validity claims).” IS p. 273
He reiterates this point by describing these ontological givens via involution, as does the perennial tradition:
“But the notion of involutionary givens is a necessary framework with which the human mind, itself a product of evolution, must use in order to construe evolution in a noncontradictory way.” Excerpt A, fn. 26
But he claims that the ontology of the perennial tradition is evolutionary developments over time laid down as kosmic habits. Kens ontological a prioris are eros, agape, the morphogenetic gradient, certain prototypical forms like Whitehead’s eternal objects, basic mathematical-physical laws, Sheldrake’s implicitly postulated archetypes and the 20 tenets (fn. 26).
It would seem that there’s bound to be a few empirical objects in there somewhere?
“the a priori forms that are postulated had better be defensible with at least some reference to modern and postmodern forms of justification (and validity claims).†IS p. 273…Kens ontological a prioris are eros, agape, the morphogenetic gradient, certain prototypical forms like Whitehead’s eternal objects, basic mathematical-physical laws, Sheldrake’s implicitly postulated archetypes and the 20 tenets.”
Let’s see, how many of these a prioris are defensible in modern or postmodern terms? Eros? Nope–not as an evolutionary principle. Agape? Nope. Morphogenetic gradient? Nope. Whitehead’s eternal objects? You could get some takers, certainly not a consensus. Basic mathematical-physical laws? Yes. Sheldrake’s implicitly postulated archetypes? No. The 20 tenets? Some of them, perhaps, not the ones that are incoherent or inconsistent.
Good points Andy. I argued some of the same points in an earlier blog from my pomo perspective, that Ken assumes some of the very premodern a priori intepretations of conscioussness, for example, that he criticizes in the perennial traditions. Mostly from Vedanta and Vajrayana, as Alan rightly points out.
Alan, Ken says the following in IS:
“In particular, the idea that there are levels of being and knowing beyond the physical (i.e., literally meta-physical) is badly in need of reconstruction. This is not to say that there are no trans-physical realities whatsoever; only that most of the items taken to be entirely trans- or metaphysical by the ancients (e.g., feelings, thoughts, ideas) actually have, at the very least, physical correlates.” p. 310
Here he differentiates between the literal definition of metaphysical, or beyond the physical, with the previous definition of metaphysical as described by philosophy.
In any event, he acknowleges that there are tran-physical realities but asserts that what was taken by “the ancients” to be so did in fact have physical correlates. Then what are these trans-physical realities Ken acknowledges? I’m not sure, as he never directly follows up this statement with examples (that I have seen). I guessed earlier it might be the subtle and causal bodies that correspond to higher levels of consciousness.
Hi Edward
You said:
“In any event, he acknowleges that there are tran-physical realities but asserts that what was taken by “the ancients†to be so did in fact have physical correlates.”
Thanks for posting that! It seems then that KW is not so physicalist as I had thought. I’ll certainly add that quote from IS, and a bit of commentary, in my current essay. Thanks again!
“Then what are these trans-physical realities Ken acknowledges?”
That’s the whole point. He is stuck in a bind. On the one hand he has taken on board contemporaray secular and postmodernist memes (sensu Dawkins) which means he is duty bound to debunk all ontologies that posit supra-physical realities. This may also be tied in with a narcissistic belief that his own intellectual understanding is superior to all previous spiritual teachings; to have “included but transcended” them all. He presnets all previous teachings as inferior to his own integral theory because he asserts they are still stuck on metaphysics, whereas he is not. But on the other hand he is aware that such realities exist. So he trying to have it both ways.
As you say
“he never directly follows up this statement with examples”
And he doesn’t because he doesn’t have any examples. He cannot take it further; he cannot describe these supraphysical realities, because any such description would be ontology, and metaphysics, and that means he would lose his self-appointed position as the one who has included and transcended all previosu teachings by being “post-metaphysical”. So he has painted himslef into a corner.
I guessed earlier it might be the subtle and causal bodies that correspond to higher levels of consciousness.
Ah, but that is ontology
The only place I see where he talks about it is in the section on reincarnation in Excerpt G. And in this excerpt he reinterates all the same critiques of the perennial traditions, so it’s consistent with the IS quotes on the topic.
#4. Complexity of gross form is necessary for the expression or manifestation of both higher consciousness and subtler energy.
Hypothesis #4 introduces the possibility that the higher forms of consciousness and energy (i.e., higher than the gross-family realm) are not tied to complexifications of gross form ontologically but rather as vehicles of the expression of subtler forms and energies in that gross realm itself. In other words, it is not that higher consciousness and energies are bound to the complexities of gross form out of ontological necessity, but that they need a correspondingly complex form of gross matter in order to express or manifest themselves in and through the material realm.
Hi Edward
You quote KW as saying:
In other words, it is not that higher consciousness and energies are bound to the complexities of gross form out of ontological necessity, but that they need a correspondingly complex form of gross matter in order to express or manifest themselves in and through the material realm.
This is very interesting, because the implication here (unless I am seriously misinterpreting things) seems to be that KW criticises others for being “metaphysical” and “ontological”, but he doesn’t realise that by positing the reality of “higher consciousness and energies” he is doing exactly the same thing!
Wouldn’t it be easier for Wilber to just say “what these traditional teachings have given us is an understanding of higher ontological realities, an understanding that can then be incorporating into the larger integral picture, just as the empirical approach of modernity can be.” If KW could say that then there would be little philosophical disagreement between him and myself (heaps of disagreement in details, sure, but not in basics). But (and perhaps I am wrong here, so I depend on others more knowledgable of Wilber’s teachings than myself to correct me in this) I get the impression here that Wilber himself is confused: he condemns metaphysics and ontology as “abstraction”, claims he has gone beyond it, but then he refers to it himself in a very traditional way as part of his own philosophy!
It seems Ken does as you say, condemning metaphysics in one breath and allowing it with this statement on reincarnation in the next. He tries to qualify in that part of Excerpt G that what he’s saying is not the same as what the metaphysical traditions say. I can’t say I understand it. But I don’t understand a lot what he says these days.
I had always taken Excerpt G as Ken’s view that all forms of consciousness exist with a physical basis. Now this other quote is indeed muddying the waters, it does seem he’s trying to play both sides.
The notion of supra-physical consciousness or energies (energies that aren’t physical???) is a classic example of what Daniel Dennett calls skyhooks, trying to explain phenomena from above rather than below (cranes). Anyone, like Alan, who believes in supra-physical realities has to explain how a human being, composed of physical matter, can realize them (or how “they need a correspondingly complex form of gross matter in order to express or manifest themselves in and through the material realm”). This is a dualist view.
Andy said
“Anyone, like Alan, who believes in supra-physical realities has to explain how a human being, composed of physical matter, can realize them”
That’s easy! Humans (and other beings) are multi-ontological entitries, not just physical beings. So thoughts come from the mental universe, emotions from the affective universe, sensations from the physical universe (by “universe” i mean a distinct ontological “reality” or gradation). As the Buddhsits say, we are aggregates, or rather, aggregates of aggregates.
Interested to see that both you guys are as confused about KW’s lack of consistency on this as I am. Perhaps the real reason academia has no interest in KW is that – as indicated by this present example – he doesn’t seme to be able to present a self-consistent argument. Obviously as you Andy and as Jeff Meyerhoff have in different ways pointed out there are many other contradictions throughout Wilber’s work, but his stance on metaphysics is probably the most glaring one.
Anyway, definitely something to include in my essay in progress!
“That’s easy! Humans (and other beings) are multi-ontological entities, not just physical beings. So thoughts come from the mental universe, emotions from the affective universe, sensations from the physical universe (by “universe†i mean a distinct ontological “reality†or gradation). ”
It may be easy to say that, but it doesn’t make it a coherent position. There is no known way that humans can be “multi-ontological”, as you put it. You say thoughts come from the mental universe. Then why are they correlated with activity in specific parts of the brain? How can the mental universe interact with the brain if it is supra-physical? I’m not sure at this point how you define “supra-physical”, but in the context in which that term was used earlier in this thread when discussing Wilber’s views, it basically means by definition something which has no correlation with anything in the physical universe. You (like dualists in general) seem to want it both ways. You want certain levels or states of consciousness to be entirely free-floating, completely independent of the physical world, on the one hand, but able, on the other hand, to interact with that world. No philosopher I’m aware of is figured out how that could happen.
To be fair, every other explanation of the relationship of consciousness (even the ordinary kind) to brain has its own currently unsolvable problems. One could make the argument that dualism is really no worse in this respect than any of the alternatives. Still, it’s hard to find philosophers today that like the notion.
Andy said
I’m not sure at this point how you define “supra-physicalâ€Â, but in the context in which that term was used earlier in this thread when discussing Wilber’s views, it basically means by definition something which has no correlation with anything in the physical universe.
I cerrtainly won’t say there is no correlation! Only that it represents a different “density grade” of reality. Obviously there are correlations, connections, interactions, etc (there is a rich (albeit distinct in each case) metaphoric language and metaphysical systems in both Neoplatonism and Kabbalah to describe precisely these interactions). Otherwise as you correctly point out it would be impossible for the brain to mirror thoughts (and vice-versa, for thoughts to correspond to patterns brain activity)
One could make the argument that dualism is really no worse in this respect than any of the alternatives. Still, it’s hard to find philosophers today that like the notion.
David Chalmers comes to mind.
“One could make the argument that dualism is really no worse in this respect than any of the alternatives. Still, it’s hard to find philosophers today that like the notion.
“David Chalmers comes to mind.”
Chalmers is a property dualist, which is basically what Wilber is with his exterior/interior holons all the way down. Panpsychism, though often proposed as a way out of the materialist/dualist conundrum, is a kind dualism, but dualism conceived of in a different way from the classical, Cartesian form of dualism, known as substance dualism. I was referring to substance dualism, which is what I understand your view to be.
Andy said:
“Chalmers is a property dualist, which is basically what Wilber is with his exterior/interior holons all the way down.”
Thanks for clarifying!
By the way Wilber’s “all the way down” trip is a “tower of turtles” fallacy.
“Panpsychism, though often proposed as a way out of the materialist/dualist conundrum, is a kind dualism, but dualism conceived of in a different way from the classical, Cartesian form of dualism, known as substance dualism.”
I would consider myself a panspychic monist, in that I consider that ultimately everything is conscious, although in matter this is an extremely restricted consciousness, what Sri Aurobindo calls the “Inconscient”, and monist in that there is only one reality of which we all partake and ultiamtely are, The Absolute (if defined impersonally) or The Supreme (if defined personally and impersonally). Personally I dislike the word “God” because of it’s religious connotations
“I was referring to substance dualism, which is what I understand your view to be.”
Subtance gradationism or substance emanationism would be better labels for my own understanding. Dualism implies only two realities, which have an incompatable relationship with each other. I agree with the Neoplatonists and more especially Kabbalists here; the realities in some cases are intermately interconnected (hence emanation). See also Gurdjieff / Ouspensky and Taoist alchemy for spiritual transformation, many other examples including Vajrayana and Sri Aurobindo, which show that the realities are not fixed and immutable as Descartes believed. And Theosophists would assert (validly i believe) that there is as much difference between affects (or the astral plane, whatever) and thoughts(the mental plane) as there is between matter and affects. Perhaps there are seven or twelve or more such primary gradations, of which matter is the “densest”.
Also I agree with the holists (including KW) that individual realities cannot be taken in isolation, and there is interaction between them. But as a description of mundane physical reality i don’t agree with Wilber’s quadra-polar idealism.
Been lurking here for a bit.
I’ve mentioned before on this forum that I think one of the very best books (if not the very best book at present) on a fundamental theory of consciousness is Daniel Stoljar’s “Ignorance and Imagination” (http://www.amazon.com/Ignorance-Imagination-Epistemic-Consciousness-Philosophy/dp/0195306589/sr=8-1/qid=1159320272/ref=pd_bbs_1/002-9885333-4767248?ie=UTF8&s=books). Without trying to be provocative, I think Stoljar offers an attractive alternative to panpsychism or dual (or quad) aspectism. I stopped being a panpsychist after reading Stoljar.
There’s a disturbing tendency here to mainly focus on Wilber when the topic is a fundamental theory of consciousness. Why is this? After all, when it comes to a fundamental theory, he hasn’t done much.
“There’s a disturbing tendency here to mainly focus on Wilber when the topic is a fundamental theory of consciousness. Why is this? After all, when it comes to a fundamental theory, he hasn’t done much.”
I agree with that, I just don’t think there has been much discussion of a fundamental theory here. And Wilber would probably say we can’t have a theory in that sense, that our position is such that we can’t understand how consciousness is related to the material world. I believe that’s probably the case, though that doesn’t mean we can’t refine the question somewhat, which is what I see these philosophers doing.
As far as Stoljar goes, I did read that one paper of his you suggested, but I didn’t see his approach as an improvement on panpsychism.
Andy Smith said “As far as Stoljar goes, I did read that one paper of his you suggested, but I didn’t see his approach as an improvement on panpsychism.”
Irrespective of the change in my position, Stoljar is now seen by many in the analytic philosophy community as having made a fundamental contribution to a future theory of consciousness. And one concrete contribution of his is to clearly show that one does not have to be a panpsychist, dual aspect theorist or property dualist (as an alternative to materialism). So, it’s not just me, which is a comfort to me
To put it simply, Stoljar allowed me to be a physicalist and not a materialist or a panpsychist.
Please help me out here Anand, as I’m not familiar with the categories or what they imply. Relating to our discussion, for example, does being a physicalist per Stoljar indicate that there are no ontological planes of existense and/or consciousness separate from physical existence?
Edward Berge said “Relating to our discussion, for example, does being a physicalist per Stoljar indicate that there are no ontological planes of existense and/or consciousness separate from physical existence?”
As I understand your discussion, for a Stoljar physicalist (as opposed to a physicalist who’s more of a materialist), there would be no need for a separate ontological plane of existence since consciousness is just a natural phenomenon (and not supernatural, intra-physical etc.) However, calling this new theory naturalism or physicalism might be misleading since it may end up bearing almost no resemblence to our current physicalism (which is usually equated with materialism).
In very concrete terms, the new physicalism would not have any problems with – for instance – “causation from above” since even such a causation would be natural – if it existed at all. So, positing say a higher level perspective which has causal properties would not constitute an invalid sky hook since we are not committed to just bottom up causation.
Anand, please feel free to start a thread on Stoljar, if you wish. You’re presumably more familiar with his work than anyone else here. I’ll pay attention.
Andy Smith said “Anand, please feel free to start a thread on Stoljar, if you wish.”
I don’t think I have the required permission to start a thread. I’ll check.
You can get authorized by going to the About page and emailing James.