In Ray’s latest on tantra he asks what is transcended and what is included. In a previous blog on fixed ontological levels someone asked why Ken doesn’t include those, since they are an important part of the perennial tradition.
Ken makes the distinction between enduring and transitional structures. Enduring structures, though included, stick around in the makeup of the higher-level holon. E.g., on the individual exterior this is the holarchy from cell to tissue to organ, or the enfoldment of the different parts of the brain. On the individual interior it is represented by the basic cognitive structures of concrete operational, formal operational, meta-systemic, paradigmatic etc.
Transitional structures, on the other hand, are replaced when they are transcended. This includes all of the self-related lines such as morals, values, identity and worldviews.  Hence things such as fixed, Platonic, ontological levels are generated by a worldview that is replaced by more complex worldviews later in development. It is not that the previous worldviews are wrong but rather they are appropriate to that level of cognitive complexity. It’s when we confuse these types of structures that we try to retain aspects of previous worldviews within a more complex cultural and cognitive context.
Ken goes into this in some detail in Integral Psychology, which I don’t have on hand to reference. But I found the following short explanation at the following link:
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/books/cowokev7_intro.cfm/
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The Graves/Beck system does not clearly distinguish between transitional and enduring structures, nor between basic and self-related structures. In my own system, the basic structures are enduring and remain fully active capacities available at all later stages, but most of the self-related streams (such as morals, values, and self-identity) consist of transitional stages which tend to be replaced by subsequent stages. (Subpersonalities can exist at different levels or memes, however, so that one can indeed have a purple subpersonality, a blue subpersonality, and so on. These often are context-triggered, so that one have quite different types of moral responses, affects, needs, etc. in different situations.) But in general, for the central or proximate self, once its center of gravity reaches, say, green, it will not activate a pure purple meme unless it is regressing; but it can (and constantly does) activate the corresponding basic structures of the purple meme (namely, the emotional-phantasmic level). When a green adult “activates” a purple meme, that is not the identical meme the two-year-old child possesses. For the two-year old, the purple meme is the basis of the infant’s central identity, its proximate self (or I), whereas for a green adult, it is part of the distal self (or me). When the green adult “activates purple,” he or she is actually activating the basic capacities (basic structures) first laid down during the “purple period” (e.g., phantasmic-emotional), but because the self’s exclusive identity is no longer at the “purple level,” the corresponding transitional structures (morals, values, worldviews) are not fully activated unless one is regressing (or unless one is activating a purple subpersonality). So, at the least, I would differentiate between “purple capacities” and “purple self;” the former are enduring, the latter is transitional. See Integral Psychology for a further discussion of these issues.
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(Who posted this, by the way?)
“Subpersonalities can exist at different levels or memes, however, so that one can indeed have a purple subpersonality, a blue subpersonality, and so on. These often are context-triggered, so that one have quite different types of moral responses, affects, needs, etc. in different situations.”
As I have discussed elsewhere, I find the distinction between enduring and transitional structures a false one. As the above quoted passage about subpersonalities indicates, Wilber himself now realizes the distinction isn’t black-and-white. We don’t leave earlier moral stages behind. Wilber now argues, however, that when we manifest an earlier moral stage, we are regressing. The obvious value-ladenness of this term makes it seem that the process is very different from what happens when we, say, employ or identify with sensorimotor functions that we also first manifested in early development. But that is because morals by definition involve values, so a word that indicates manifestation of an earlier moral stage is bound to be value-laden, whereas a description of a manifestation of a non-moral function is not.
In both cases, permanent or enduring structures are involved. We develop sensorimotor function relatively early, and the structures involved with this remain with us for life. But likewise, we develop a self-centered morality early in life, and that remains with us, too. If it didn’t, we couldn’t “regress”. Wilber says the difference is that we don’t fully identify with the self-centered morality after we develop to a higher morality. In fact, sometimes we may, as when someone (ahem) throws a childish rant, but generally this is temporary. But the same is true for sensorimotor function. Once we develop the capacity to feel, then to think in various increasingly more complex and abstract ways, we don’t fully identify with sensorimotor function, either. In both cases, what happens is that the earlier structure is overgrown–literally as well as figuratively, by brain development–by later structures, which control, modify, interfere with the earlier structures. The interaction is two-way, as the lower structrues also modify function of the higher.
Obviously, there is a transition involved. Children change when they grow up. But it’s unnecessary to postulate transitional structures. There are just newer permanent structures, which change the function of the earlier permanent structrures. It’s not that we have transitional structure A at one point in time, B at a later point, C at a later point. It’s that we have permanent structure A at one point, permanent A plus B at a second point, and A plus B plus C at a still later time. The newer structures create new combinations which drive the transition.
Why, then, does Wilber make this unnecessary distinction between transitional and permanent? Why doesn’t he see that it’s a false distinction? As I said earlier, morals by definition involve values. A lower morality by definition seems “bad”, so as adults we don’t want to admit that we have this lower moral function still within us. When it does manifest itself and we can’t deny it, we call it regressing, to confirm that it is abnormal and unhealthy. But in fact, the lower self-centered moral response is sometimes quite appropriate and healthy, as in life-or-death situations (or in artificial life-and-death situations, such as competitive sports). The fight-or-flight response is totally about lower, self-centered morality. And conversely, sensorimotor function, which we regard as healthy, is quite often unhealthy and “regressive”, as when we judge people by “superficial” (e.g., skin color, physical disabilities) sensorimotor features, rather than according to deeper, more evolved emotional and cognitive ones. In all cases, what leads us to judge lower, earlier functions as “bad” or regressive depends on context. If the context is deemed appropriate, then the lower function is considered healthy.
I think this whole topic is an excellent example of how Wilber’s failure to synthesize concepts–tacking them onto each other rather than integrating them into each other– leads him to make numerous unnecessary distinctions, thus greatly complicating his system. Just consider the statement “When the green adult “activates purple,†he or she is actually activating the basic capacities (basic structures) first laid down during the “purple period†(e.g., phantasmic-emotional), but because the self’s exclusive identity is no longer at the “purple level,†the corresponding transitional structures (morals, values, worldviews) are not fully activated unless one is regressing (or unless one is activating a purple subpersonality).” In the first place, the adult is not “green”. The adult is beige plus purple plus red plus blue plus orange plus green (or whatever spectrum of colors involved in the development). A green adult would be a disembodied intellect, all those other vmemes and lower functions are essential to the adult’s function. In the second place, he or she does not “activate the basic capacities”. These capacities are activated, and the resulting pattern of behavior is what we call an adult, and what each of us as an adult identifies with. And third, yes, the morals, etc., are ordinarily not fully activated, but neither is the sensorimotor and other “neutral” lower, earlier functions. This, for example, is why children see the world much more clearly, in a sensory sense, than we do. They can’t, of course, integrate these sensory data with feelings and intellect, as we do, but they also can’t integrate their self-centeredness with higher morality, as we also do. Thus while we develop to adults beyond simple preoccupation with self, we also develop a far greater ability than children have to take care of ourself. The lower morality is very necessary to us in many ways that don’t involve regression.
In other words, I would just say, “Every adult has a purple component, but when this component predominates in an inappropriate situation, we consider it unhealthy.”
OK, I see it’s Edward. I could have sworn your name wasn’t there when I first responded, but never mind.
The other major source of confusion in Wilber’s ideas revolves around the concept of transcendence. Wilber applies this term to a very broad range of relationships, relationships that are so different from each other that a distinction in this case is begged for. I distinguish between transformation and transcendence. The developmental stages of humans involve transformational, not transcendent, relationships, because they are clearly dependent on one another. As I noted in my preivous post, for example, an adult includes several lower stages of morality and of various other functions, and these are essential to the adult’s overall behavior. You do not lose the earlier stages when you grow up. They are always there, and require only the appropriate situation to be manifested.
In contrast, an organism truly transcends its cells. No individual cell is essential to the organism’s function; it is trivial. And the behavior of an organism is completely different from the behavior of any of its individual cells. It is not the case that the behavior of these cells will be manifested by the organism in a certain situation. The organism may have a great range of behaviors, but none of these behaviors involves “regressing” to the level of behavior of individual cells. The organism is totally beyond this level, in a way that individual at one developmental stage is never beyond earlier developmental stages. Transcendence is a way of totally escaping history, in a way that transformation cannot.
There are several other ways to distinguish transcendence from transformation. Transcendence completely preserves the properties of lower holons within the higher. While the organism itself does not manifest the behavior of its individual cells, these cells may behave within an organism in ways essentially identical to cells outside the organism. In any organism, some (not all) cells exist very much the way they do outside the organism. This is because within any organism there are cells that do not exist within multicellular holons–tissues, organs and organ systems. Tney are, speaking loosely (though also literally) free-floating. They are to be contrasted with other cells that exist within higher, multicellular holons–any cell in a tissue or organ, for example, behavior of which is greatly modified by their interactions with other cells in the multicellular holon.
In contrast, transformation always modifies the behavior of lower holons. As we have seen, earlier, self-centered morality, when it is manifested, is never exactly like that of the original. It is regulated by the higher holons or structures. The same with sensorimotor function, and all other lower functions. This is very obvious in the structure of the brain where all these functions reside. Each lower structure or holon is part of a higher holon or structure that regulates it. Lower brain structures are not free-floating. They are tied to higher structures by numerous interactions that change their behavior. It is the emergence of these interactions that result in development, in changes in function of these structures.
What I’m interested in these days is getting around to deciding what should be included and what should be transcended, what values are supported by integral theories and what are not.
In this process I think we should also recognize that some things are transcended because they are found to be wrong. We need to be careful about keeping the deep structures separate from the superficial content that is attracted to the stage. Does a given moral (or any other) belief arise from the deep structure or is it peculiar to the surface translations of cultures, sub-cultures and sub-groups.
The bare breast is a good example. The breast does not become obscene at a given level, it’s simply a manifestation of a peculiar Western fixation.
The other thing I want to say about apparent ‘regression’ is that, in the case of morality, there is generally no systematic deconstruction of every moral code. We adapt our mores according to what we experience. So if you are postconventional and live in rural America you may very well have reassessed your values as needed. But you might then find that when you travel to a completely different culture that other vales you didn’t realize you had are challenged. Suppose you move from Kansas and then find yourself on a naturist beach in Spain and you find yourself shocked and embarrassed (which are emotions that occur when deep values are confronted). IOW – some of this is situational. You cannot adapt until a situation requiring you to adapt presents itself.
“I think we should also recognize that some things are transcended because they are found to be wrong.”
Wrong by the new standards that replace them. From a broader view, I would say the earlier values are, in the new, changed conditions, inappropriate or maladaptive.
Racism is a good example, Most societies today, certainly the developed Western ones, of course regard it as wrong, evil. So how did it originate in the first place? Almost all animal species are able to distinguish their own species from others, and most can also distinguish kin from non-kin (This is two-dimensional perception in my scheme). Distinguishing other species is necessary for survival of a species, and distinguishing non-kin is necessary for survival of kin relationships, i.e., certain genes. Superficial differences such as those in skin color are of course easily recognized, and trigger very old self-other responses. In today’s societies, these distinctions are clearly maladaptive, but they weren’t always so. I regard our change in this regard as genuinely transformational, definitely more than just horizontal (see below), but also not transcendent.
“We need to be careful about keeping the deep structures separate from the superficial content that is attracted to the stage. Does a given moral (or any other) belief arise from the deep structure or is it peculiar to the surface translations of cultures, sub-cultures and sub-groups.”
I agree, very good point. A lot of today’s differences are horizontal ones. I would include among the latter a lot of attitudes towards the human body, sexuality, etc. But there are genuinely transformational changes in that area, such as social attitudes towards the role of women. Again, the older attitudes are rooted in earlier necessities for survival which have long become out-dated. Again because there are major transformational differences in attitudes towards gender, they can easily get mixed up with more superficial attitdues towards sex, making the entire area very complex and controversial.
Andy,
It doesn’t matter if we make the distinction between enduring or transitional structures to the point I’m making. You think that what Wilber is calling transitional is really enduring, but you also agree that the latter stages in this transformative process “always modifies the behavior of lower holons.†If we apply this to worldviews as transformational endurinig structures (your terms) the result is the same: the latter worldview modifies the former.
In the specific case I referenced in the original blog, the worldview that there are objective, ontological levels of reality apart from the subjective, epistemological intepretation would seem to be an earlier and hence less developed worldview than one that includes the more postmodern view of their inextricable relationship. Hence the latter modifies the former in a transformational process of greater inclusion. So naturally the latter would include the former, but not in its original formulation. This is why Ken says that an integral methodological pluralism can generate the former worldview under appropriate conditional contexts, but as in any developmental sequence the former is not aware of the latter.
Now granted those in our postmodern culture are certainly aware of this distinction, as they are embedded in the culture. And of course this culture allows one to choose any previous worldview it wants. So in that sense those that now choose the former are aware of the latter, but the originators of the former worldview were most certainly not, being embedded in an earlier cultural matrix. Or to paraphrash Ray, the originators of the perennial philosophy couldn’t adapt to a postmodern situation because it had yet to arise. Whereas us postmoderns can adapt to an ealier situational worldview either out of necessity or choice. Enduring or transitional structure, the outcome is the same.
“It doesn’t matter if we make the distinction between enduring or transitional structures to the point I’m making. You think that what Wilber is calling transitional is really enduring, but you also agree that the latter stages in this transformative process “always modifies the behavior of lower holons.†If we apply this to worldviews as transformational endurinig structures (your terms) the result is the same: the latter worldview modifies the former.”
It “always modifies the behavior of lower holons†in a transformative relationship, but as I also pointed out, not always in a transcendent relationship. So a prediction of this view would be that if a new, higher holon emerges that transcends humanity, earlier worldviews could exist within this higher holon in a form not modified by later worldviews.
We can see a beginning of this trend in modern Western societies. While most individuals in these societies have a worldview that reflects the development of that society, it is possible for individuals to exist with much lower worldviews, on the order of tribe or primitive community or even lone individuals. Indeed, the fact that people like Wilber and Edwards will say there is a large variation in worldviews in a society, and characterize society by its spectrum or mean (so many % green, so many % orange, etc.; the average is green or the average is orange) is simply an observation of great heterogeneity of development.
Earlier societies, and earlier social holons at lower levels of evolution, are characterized by much more homogeneity of development/worldview of their members. In my model, worldview and other interior qualities are very closely related to social development. In earlier societies, all individuals were members of the same social holon, so they had a similar worldview. A key feature of transcendence in my model is mixed hierarchy, meaning not only pure or nested hierarchy (holarchy), but the existence of hierarchies that are not nested, but exist side by side, so to speak. Thus we can have tribal hierarchies existing fairly independently of higher social hierarchies (the latter reflect membership in government, legal system, educational system, etc.). These hierarchies are at different levels of development, and so their members’ development can greatly differ from those of members of other hierarchies.
This is an example of an enduring and largely unmodified holon and its worldview. But the same holon/worldview also exists within higher hierarchies, in a transformative relationship, and in this form it is modified. Thus even those of us who are very much embedded in complex developed societies may be members of lower, earlier holons, such as families, small social networks and communities. These smaller holons are on the same level as what I referred to earlier as (somewhat) independent tribal holons. But they are very different from the latter, because they are modified by their relationships with higher holons. Thus our views and behavior as members of families and other small networks is quite different from the views and behavior of individuals who are members of non-embedded small social holons. We may call them lawless, precisely because they exist to a significant extent outside the legal and ethical systems which are determined by the higher social holons.
“In the specific case I referenced in the original blog, the worldview that there are objective, ontological levels of reality apart from the subjective, epistemological intepretation would seem to be an earlier and hence less developed worldview than one that includes the more postmodern view of their inextricable relationship. Hence the latter modifies the former in a transformational process of greater inclusion. So naturally the latter would include the former, but not in its original formulation. This is why Ken says that an integral methodological pluralism can generate the former worldview under appropriate conditional contexts, but as in any developmental sequence the former is not aware of the latter.”
This is kind of a re-statement of the distinction between transcendence and transformation–and again, is a sign IMO of an emerging higher, transcending holon. Transformation is aware of lower stages, but sees them as not simply lower, but outdated, old-fashioned anachronistic. In other words, it does see them as rather transitional, with no role to play in the new context. It would like to think they are transitional, that eventually they will disappear. This of course is the source of numerous conflicts between green and orange, green and blue, and so on. Transcendence sees them as lower also, but still an integral part of a whole, each necessary in its place, with a role to play.
Wilber also de facto makes this same kind of distinction when he refers to tiers, which he seems to regard as a developmental relationship that is more than just that between one level and the next. Thus in his recent rant he portrayed second tier individuals as being able to see and understand first tier (though–and this is not a second tier view–he did not seem to think they had a role to play in the integral movement, but were just an annoyance), while first tier of course can’t understand second tier. The tier/tier relationship is very much how I see level/level and transcendence, while his level/level relationship (within humans and their societies) is similar to what I call stages, and transformation. So he has finally come around to making a distinction among higher/lower relationships, though he also applies level/level to relationships like organism/cell and cell/molecule, which is clearly inconsistent the level/level relationships defined among humans. Relative to a cell, an organism is a higher tier, as a cell is to a molecule.
And for the record, while I conceive of higher level or tier individuals, I consider them extremely rare, certainly not anywhere near the 1 o 2% of the population that Wilber makes them out to be. He in fact is still belittling the concept of transcendence, applying it to a level of development that is not yet transcendent. But I would say this is an inevitable result of his preoccupation with marketing his system.
“Now granted those in our postmodern culture are certainly aware of this distinction, as they are embedded in the culture. And of course this culture allows one to choose any previous worldview it wants. So in that sense those that now choose the former are aware of the latter, but the originators of the former worldview were most certainly not, being embedded in an earlier cultural matrix. Or to paraphrash Ray, the originators of the perennial philosophy couldn’t adapt to a postmodern situation because it had yet to arise. Whereas us postmoderns can adapt to an ealier situational worldview either out of necessity or choice. Enduring or transitional structure, the outcome is the same.”
I don’t see how “postmoderns can adapt to an ealier situational worldview either out of necessity or choice” unless the earlier worldview were an enduring structure. If it were transitional, it would not be around any more. And what postmoderns can adapt to is the modified earlier structure, not the pure or original one. To adapt to the latter would involve a regression, just as a highly civilized member of society would be regressing to join a street gang–or just as it would be regression for a normally developed adult to behave always as a young child.
Andy said: “And what postmoderns can adapt to is the modified earlier structure, not the pure or original one. To adapt to the latter would involve a regression….”
This is what Ken calls a retro-romantic regression. A person raised in a (post)modern culture cannot truly enter into the cultural context of an earlier worldview; it is by necessity modified by the current context. But yet there is the romantic re-creation of the past worldivew as somehow more pure and closer to nature or reality, etc.
No, Andy, wrong as in incorrect and transcended by evidence to the contrary, evidence which can be appreciated by anyone regardless of level. For example, a mythic thinker predicts the end of the world at a certain date and it doesn’t happen. Or a scientist says such and such a thing has happened but no-one can repeat the experiment.
Andy notes that via transcendence the ealier worldviews continue to exist unmodified in their original structures, whereas via transformation they are modified by later developments. It seems to me that the earlier worldviews remain unmodified only when the cognitive structure is at the commensurate level that accomodates them. When the cognitive structure evolves then the previous worldview is modified, if not completely replaced.
Ray: “No, Andy, wrong as in incorrect and transcended by evidence to the contrary, evidence which can be appreciated by anyone regardless of level. For example, a mythic thinker predicts the end of the world at a certain date and it doesn’t happen. Or a scientist says such and such a thing has happened but no-one can repeat the experiment.”
Well, I was referring to morals/values, yes, there are certainly things that earlier worldviews believe that seem wrong by any more developed worldview. Even then, though, I might argue that the mythic worldview does not believe them to be literally true in the same sense that we do, or at least most people in that earlier society don’t. Wilber tends to give earlier people less credit for being rational than is actually the case. Even humans of tens of thousands of years ago could not have survived if they had not had a rational view of the world. I think it’s arguable whether they really literally believed some of the myths associated with them.
Edward: “Andy notes that via transcendence the ealier worldviews continue to exist unmodified in their original structures, whereas via transformation they are modified by later developments. It seems to me that the earlier worldviews remain unmodified only when the cognitive structure is at the commensurate level that accomodates them. When the cognitive structure evolves then the previous worldview is modified, if not completely replaced.”
But again, the process of “accomodating” them only exists in a transformative structure. In a transcendent structure, the earlier holons are not contained directly within higher, more developed holons, so are not affected by their worldviews. I can’t of course say with any authority that humanity will evolve in this manner, but this is definitely the way things work on lower levels.
Hi Andy,
I certainly agree that Wilber should give more credit to earlier people. Magical/mythical thinking tends to be applied to things that can’t be explained rationally. We hate not having explanations and so, in the abscence of a rational explanation we interject magic/mythic explanations. We still do it to a large extent. A good example is in relationships, we constantly mythologize our partners and make assumptions about their behaviour. We can often be quite wong. Early man was quite rational about those things essential to survival. Hunter/gatherer societies develop quite a complex understanding of their environment. They may have magic/mythic explanations for non-essential things, but they had better be rational about the migration patterns of certain animals or the growing seasons of plants.
But I’m less confident about how much worldviews account for the difference between truth and belief. I think a lot has to do with the simple accretion of knowledge. We decide things are false when new knowledge proves them false. All cognitive development does is sharpen the tool and allow for more complex proofs.
Some of these proofs may indeed be only understandable by someone at the same cognitive level, but it also has to do with one’s knowledge base. I’m not stupid but there’s a lot of things I know very little about. I would need to learn the necessary material in order to be able to judge.
So a person who holds a mythic belief may relinquish that belief, not because they make a developmental leap, but because they make a knowledge leap. So they continue to believe a wrong thing until they learn that it is wrong.